Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "348697889",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 133, Report to the National Security Council by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on Examination of Baggage of Incoming Diplomatic Personnel and Shipments to Diplomatic Missions in the United States",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697889"
}

{
    "id": "348697889",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697889",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 133, Report to the National Security Council by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security on Examination of Baggage of Incoming Diplomatic Personnel and Shipments to Diplomatic Missions in the United States",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697889",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 21,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697889",
    "naId": 348697889,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 10,
            "logicalDate": "1952-06-10",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-01.pdf",
    "mediaId": "19264b9298e2ebe1",
    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. Re Examination of Baggage of Incoming\nDiplomatic Personnel (NSC 133) Squitized 1-2014 6-10-52\nA\nSquitize\nReport\nN.S.C. STATES Progress Report on NSC 17/4 & 17/6\n(Internal Security)\n11-24-52\nA\nMemo\nFor the President from Charles Declaration S. Murphy re the\nworld petroleum situation (attachments)\n12-5-52\nA\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. re Petr oleum (NSC 138) 12 8-52 52\nA\nReport\nNS.G. Status of Projects as of 12-15-52 DECLASSIFICA, 6/2011\nA\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 12-17-52\n12-12-52\nA\nDECLANIFICO\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 12-17-52\n12-13-52\nA\n4-2A-H3\nMinutes\nof the N.S.C. Meeting12-17-52\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.O.C. from James S. Lay, Jr. re Tetroloum\n12-18-52\nDeclaraified\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F. - SUBJECT FIIE\nN.S.C. - MEETINGS\nFOLDER: MEETING NO. 127\n12-17-52\nBoy 219]\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA DC 73.495\nGSA FORM 7122 (7.72)\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nState Dept. review completed\nThe President\nNLT(PSF/NSC) 1319\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 133\nCOPY NO. 1\nFBI, OSD, DOE, DOJ\nReviews Completed\nON-FILE NSC RELEASE\nINSTRUCTIONS APPLY\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE INTERIEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\non\nEXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF INCOMING DIPLOMATIC\nPERSONNEL AND SHIPMENTS TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE U. S.\nJune 10, 1952\nDECLASSIFIED 19 part\nRAC 3/27/2012\nWASHINGTON\nBy SOB NARA, Date: 6/6/13\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL\nDEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIO-\nNAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794, AS AMENDED. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF TTS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER\nTO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 133\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nJune 10, 1952\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nEXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF INCOMING DIPLOMATIC\nPERSONNEL AND SHIPMENTS TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE U.S.\nThe enclosed report by the Interdepartmental Committee\non Internal Security on the subject, together with its ac-\ncompanying memorandum from the Chairman, ICIS, is submitted\nherewith in accordance with the last paragraph of the memo-\nrandum for the consideration of the National Security Council.\nAttention is invited to the minority views of the Department\nof Justice contained in Annex A of the report. Also attached\nis a letter from the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence\nConference, containing the views of the IIC on the enclosure.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Attorney General\nThe Acting Director of Defense Mobilization\nThe Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission\nNSC 133\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nCOPY\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\n2107 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.\nJune 9, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne\nNSC Representative on Internal Security\nSUBJECT:\nExamination of Baggage of Incoming Diplo-\nmatic Personnel and Shipments to Diplomatic\nMissions in the U. S.\nAttached is a report of ICIS to the NSC dated May 21,\n1952, on the above-referenced problem, containing, as you will\nnote, both majority and minority views of the Departments re-\npresented on ICIS.\nThe Departments of State, Defense and Treasury are of\nthe view that, in the national interest and because of the\nrisk of retaliatory action against the United States, there\nshould be no change in the existing practice of allowing entry\nof pouches and other shipments to foreign diplomatic and of-\nficial personnel in the United States without limitation as\nto weight of such shipments and without examination of the\ncontents thereof. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense\nwishes to go on record as supporting a policy of reciprocal\ntreatment against those countries which examine baggage and\nshipments of United States representatives.\nThe Department of Justice, on the other hand, is of the\nview that in the national interest the internal security of\nthe United States requires that the diplomatic pouch, which\nis immune from examination under international practice, be\nrestricted in weight to 500 pounds and that all other diplo-\nmatic shipments, with the exception of the personal hand bag-\ngage of diplomatic personnel, be subject to examination in\norder to prevent the import, under the cloak of diplomatic im-\nmunity, of an assembled atomic weapon and to discourage the\nsmuggling, by the same means, of the components of such a\nweapon.\nICIS submitted a copy of the report to IIC for its con-\nsideration and an expression of its views. The IIC, in a let-\nter dated May 7, 1952, a copy of which is attached hereto, has\nadvised that within its field of jurisdiction insofar as the\ninternal security of the country is concerned, it is in defi-\nnite agreement with the view of the Department of Justice, that\nthe diplomatic pouch be limited in weight to 500 pounds and\nthat all other diplomatic shipments be subjected to examination.\nNSC 133\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\n-\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nIn the course of consideration of the problem by both the\nICIS and its Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official\nPersonnel, the Atomic Energy Commission has provided advice\non technical facts involved and interpretations thereof.\n25X1\nSince the ICIS has been unable to resolve the conflicting\nviews held by the several departments, the matter is referred\nherewith to the National Security Council for consideration\nand action in accordance with Paragraph C (4) of NSC 17/6 dated\nJuly 18, 1949.\n/s/ RAYMOND P. WHEARTY\nRaymond P. Whearty\nChairman, Interdepartmental Committee on\nInternal Security\nNSC 133\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nREPORT\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\non\nEXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF INCOMING DIPLOMATIC\nPERSONNEL AND SHIPMENTS TO DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE U.S.\nPROBLEM\n1. To determine whether incoming diplomatic and official\nbaggage should be examined upon entry in order to prevent the\nintroduction of unconventional weapons into the United States\nunder the cloak of diplomatic immunity. In this 'context the\nterm \"diplomatic baggage\" is construed to include baggage\naccompanying diplomatic personnel, unaccompanied baggage, later\nshipments to diplomatic personnel and diplomatic pouches.\nBACKGROUND\n2. The ICIS Subcommittee on Defense against Unconven-\ntional Attack in a report of its Working Group on Smuggling,\ndated February 8, 1950, drew the attention of the ICIS to the\npossibility of the introduction of unconventional weapons into\nthe United States under the cloak of diplomatic immunity.\n3. The February 8, 1950, report emphasized that one of\nthe avenues of entry appearing to present the least chance of\ndiscovery exists in present procedures under recognized\nNSC 133\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ninternational custom, wherein personal and household effects\nof certain diplomatic personnel, diplomatic pouches, and\nshipments of supplies consigned to accredited representatives\nof recognized foreign countries are admitted without customs\ninspection or surveillance of any kind. The working group\npointed out that under this international custom the shipment\nand entry of an assembled or disassembled atomic bomb, biolo-\ngical, chemical or radiological weapon would be entirely\nfeasible and practicable. The subcommittee also expressed its\nunderstanding that a similar problem exists with respect to\nprincipal resident representatives of the United Nations and\nspecialized agencies therefor. Finally, the sub-committee\nbelieved it highly important that steps be taken to close\nloopholes for the entry of such materials to the maximum extent\npossible.\nDISCUSSION\n4. The report of the Working Group on Smuggling contains\nthe group's opinion \"that, with the exception of fissionable\nmaterial used in atomic bombs, the components of all known\ntypes of unconventional weapons could be manufactured and\nassembled within the continental limits (of the U.S.) without\nrecourse to outside sources of supply\". That is to say that,\nwith the exception of the nuclear components of atomic bombs,\nthe remaining components of atomic bombs as well as the re-\nmaining unconventional weapons, chemical, bacteriological,\nNSC 133\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ngaseous, et cetera, can be covertly manufactured within the\nUnited States, and there would accordingly be little in-\ncentive to their clandestine introduction into this country.\nThe ICIS accepts this conclusion and in the circumstances, the\nonly unconventional weapons to which this report need address\nitself are atomic weapons, and only the nuclear component\nthereof.\n5. In connection with the consideration of this problem\nthe Department of State has queried all its diplomatic missions\nand consulates abroad regarding local law and practice cover-\ning the examination of accompanied and non-accompanied\ndiplomatic and official baggage in other nations. The results\nof this survey show that the preponderance of nations (52 out\nof a total of 67) by law, and every nation in actual practice,\nexempts from examination the accompanied baggage of a chief\nof diplomatic mission. The non-accompanied baggage of a chief\nof mission 1s treated slightly less leniently, being exempted\nfrom inspection by law in 48 nations and in practice in 62.\nThat is to say that only five countries in the world do not\nin fact extend the privilege of immunity from inspection to\nthe non-accompanied shipments of an ambassador or minister.\nWith regard to the accompanied and non-accompanied baggage\nof members of a diplomatic establishment below the rank of\nchief of mission, or official shipments made to the mission\nitself, it has been established that there is a great variety\nof treatment and that such examination is a matter of each\nNSC 133\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nindividual country's law or practice. In several instances the\nquestion of examination of such baggage is ruled by the\nprinciple of reciprocity and in the case of one country, namely\nSyria, there is a provision of law providing for the examina-\ntion of diplomatic baggage if such examination is in the\ninterest of national security. The U.S. practice is a liberal\none and as a rule no examination is made of the baggage and\neffects of foreign officials of diplomatic rank for accompanied\nor unaccompanied baggage or of any other shipments imported by\nthem.\n6. Although it is clear from the foregoing that the\npractice of exempting diplomatic imports from examination is\nquite uniform throughout the world, at least as far as chiefs\nof mission are concerned, nevertheless the number of states\nwhich require customs inspection for diplomats of lesser rank,\nand the nature of the conditions for exemption demanded by\nothers, demonstrate that there exists no clear rule of inter-\nnational law forbidding such examination. Accordingly in\nconsidering the problem whether in the interest of the national\nsecurity there should be made a change in the present liberal\nU.S. practice of exempting from inspection all diplomatic\nimports, one is not confronted with an accepted rule of\ninternational law as an obstacle to such a change in policy\nbut rather with a widespread and generally accepted practice,\nthe breach of which on the part of the United States could not\nNSC 133\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ngive rise to formal representations of a juridical character.\nIt would, however, undoubtedly evoke on the part of most\nother governments vociferous diplomatic protests as well as\nprompt reciprocal action with respect to the treatment accorded\nby them to American diplomatic baggage and other shipments.\n7. With regard to diplomatic pouches, it is universally\naccepted in international practice, and probably in interna-\ntional law, that, as a primary right of diplomatic inter-\ncourse, diplomatic pouches are inviolate. This principle\nrests on a clear mutuality of interest. Diplomatic pouches\nconstitute the regular means of communication between a\ngovernment and its representatives abroad and vice versa.\nIn the case of U.S. relations with the Soviet bloc, the pouch\nis of vital importance to the conduct of the business of the\nDepartments of State and Defense and other U.S. Government\nagencies, and any violation of the security thereof would be\nextremely detrimental to the nation's interest and security.\n8. As regards examination of \"diplomatic baggage\", it\nis extremely unlikely that the Soviets would utilize unaccom-\npanied baggage or accompanied baggage of diplomatic personnel\nto introduce atomic components or an assembled bomb inasmuch\nas the variety of practice in their own procedures in regard\nto examination of such baggage is sufficiently flexible to\nrender that medium highly insecure. Examination of diplomatic\npouches is not in the U.S. interest in view of the importance\nNSC 133\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthe U.S. attaches to the inviolability of its own pouches,\nregardless of the nature or the validity and importance of the\nuniversally accepted prohibition against such examination.\n9. With regard to the examination of both diplomatic\nbaggage or other shipments to members of delegations accredited\nto the United Nations, the U.S. is obligated to accord them\ntreatment similar to permanent diplomatic missions in\nWashington. This same principle applies to delegations\nparticipating in other international diplomatic conferences.\n10. The question of the desirability of establishing\na fixed weight limit of 500 pounds on \"diplomatic baggage\",\nincluding diplomatic pouches, has also been considered. The\nAtomic Energy Commission states that such a limit would (1)\nprevent the smuggling under the cloak of diplomatic immunity\nof an assembled bomb; (2) cause some delay and difficulty\nin the piecemeal shipping of non-nuclear components but would\nnot prevent nor discourage the smuggling of nuclear components;\nand (3) would necessitate the availability of trained\ntechnical personnel and space within which to assemble an\natomic bomb within the U.S.\nCONCLUSION\n11. Examination. The ICIS, with the exception of the\nDepartment of Justice, is of the opinion that in the circum-\nstances it is not in the U.S. interest to examine diplomatic\npouches. The examination of diplomatic pouches would\nNSC 133\n- 8 - -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nundoubtedly result in reciprocal reprisals seriously detri-\nmental to the operation of the Departments of State, Defense\nand other agencies in the Soviet area. The examination of\naccompanied or non-accompanied diplomatic baggage would invite\nreciprocal action which would cause inconvenience to the\noperation of U.S. missions in the Soviet bloc. In addition,\nin view of the undesirability of examining diplomatic pouches\nand the consequent contemplated continued existence of that\nunexamined channel, little purpose would be served by ex-\namining accompanied or non-accompanied diplomatic baggage, the\nuse of which as a channel for the introduction of atomic com-\nponents is remote.\n12. Weight Limitation. Concerning a 500-pound weight\nlimitation on diplomatic pouches, it is the view of the\nrepresentatives of State and Defense on the ICIS that the\nrisk of abridging the complete inviolability of diplomatic\npouches by the imposition of such a limit, which would\nmerely prevent the introduction of an assembled bomb but not\nthe components thereof, should not, in the national interest,\nbe taken. It should be noted that if the inviolability of\ndiplomatic pouches were to be abridged by the U.S. by the\nintroduction of some limitation as to weight, there is no\nassurance that retaliation by the Soviet bloc would be exactly\nreciprocal. If retaliation should take a different form, as\nfor example a limitation as to size, the U.S. operations might\nbe seriously hampered.\nNSC 133\n- 9-\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n13. The Treasury Department which has no independent\nmeans for forming a judgment in this connection is prepared to\naccept the views of the Departments of State and Defense as\nbeing those of the agencies best fitted to make a determina-\ntion in this regard.\n14. On the other hand, the Department of Justice, which\nis submitting a separate report, feels that all diplomatic\nbaggage not subject to examination be limited to 500 pounds\nand that diplomatic baggage other than diplomatic pouches\nand the personal hand baggage of diplomatic personnel be\nsubject to examination. Justice believes that the prevention\nof the introduction of an assembled bomb and the difficulties\nwhich the Soviets might experience in introducing the necessary\ntechnical personnel to assemble smuggled separate components\nmight be an important deterrent to the introduction of an\natomic weapon into the U.S. and as such would be worth the\nrisks of reprisal.\nRECOMMENDATION\n15. It is recommended that the present practice with\nregard to unlimited weight and immunity from examination of\ndiplomatic pouches and baggage remain unaltered.\nNSC 133\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nANNEX A\nMay 21, 1952\nMinority View of Department of Justice Concerning\nExamination of Baggage of Incoming Diplomatic Personnel\nand Shipments to Diplomatic Missions in the U.S.\nINTRODUCTORY\n1. Because certain considerations contained in the\n\"Discussion\" section of the majority report are regarded as not\nresponsive to the facts of the problem as presented to the\nICIS by its Subcommittees, and because the Conclusions and\nRecommendation in that report are regarded as not following\nlogically from these considerations, the Department of Justice\ndesires to present to the NSC certain other considerations\nand conclusions in the form of this minority report.\nDISCUSSION\n2. The Department of Justice adopts the first portion\nof the majority's discussion insofar as it demonstrates:\na. that the only unconventional weapons to which\nthis report need address itself are atomic weapons, and\nonly the nuclear components thereof;\nb. that every nation in actual practice, and 52 of\n67 nations by law, exempt from examination the accompanied\nbaggage of a chief of diplomatic mission;\ne. that only five countries in the world (includ-\ning the USSR and Czechoslovakia) do not, in fact, extend\nthe privilege of immunity from inspection to the non-\naccompanied shipments of an ambassador or minister;\nd. that the practice of exempting from inspection\nall diplomatic imports is not an accepted rule of inter-\nnational law, the breach of which on the part of the\nUnited States would give rise to formal representations\nof a juridical character, but would undoubtedly prompt\nreciprocal action on the part of other nations with\nrespect to the treatment accorded by them to American\ndiplomatic shipments.\n3. The fact that the USSR and Czechoslovakia follow a\npractice of inspection of non-accompanied shipments of an\nambassador or minister is regarded as significant, in view of\nthe fact that adoption of a practice of examination of such\nNSC 133\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nbaggage by the United States would be retaliation for a\nrestriction already imposed on the United States by the USSR\nand Czechoslovakia, and, to the extent that retaliation by\nthe other nations of the Soviet Bloc might be exactly\nreciprocal, could not result in a threat to the national\ninterest or security which does not now exist.\n4. With regard to diplomatic pouches, the Department\nof Justice agrees that the inviolability which is universally\naccepted in practice rests on a mutuality of interest in free\ncommunication between a government and its diplomatic\nrepresentatives abroad. However, the Department of Justice\nquestions whether this principle of inviolability, as it\nexists in practice and if it exists in international law,\nextends to anything more than immunity from interference with,\nor examination of, diplomatic intelligence communications.\nThe ICIS majority has recognized that the United States, as\nwell as foreign nations with diplomatic missions in the United\nStates, avail themselves of the security of the diplomatic\npouch for shipments which are not intelligence communications\nin the literal sense; it is the very security of the pouch\nfor this purpose which gives rise to the problem. It cannot\nbe said that mutuality of interest in unrestricted communica-\ntion of diplomatic intelligence requires that this broad\nchannel remain open for unlimited import of other material\nwhich constitutes a threat to the internal security of the\nnations involved. Granting the convenience that this free\nchannel affords to the Departments of State and Defense and\nother United States Government agencies, it is questioned\nwhether the non-intelligence shipments via this medium are\nof sufficient essentiality to the national security of the\nUnited States to justify the majority's statement that viola-\ntion of the immunity from examination of the diplomatic pouch\nwould be \"extremely detrimental to the nation's interest and\nsecurity.\" In the absence of some showing of the nature of\nthe non-intelligence material or some evaluation of it in\nterms of the national interest and security, this free channel\nfor shipments to representatives abroad of the State and\nDefense Departments and other Government agencies must be\nconsidered as a convenience merely to the operations of such\npersonnel.\n5. The majority states that it is extremely unlikely\nthat the Soviets would utilize unaccompanied baggage or\naccompanied baggage of diplomatic personnel to introduce atomic\ncomponents or an assembled bomb. The Department of Justice\nregards this as a gratuitous assumption, without any basis in\nthe facts known to the committee and without any logical\nrelationship to the rationale that purports to support it.\nIf it is meant that, because the Soviets examine unaccompanied\nNSC 133\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nbaggage of United States diplomatic personnel, they would\nnot utilize this medium out of fear that the United States\nmight retaliate by examining their unaccompanied or accompanied\nbaggage, the reasoning appears to substitute a mere conjecture\nfor the reasoned conclusion of the Working Group on Smuggling.\nIn that Group's report dated February 8, 1950, it was stated\nthat entry of an assembled or disassembled atomic bomb would\nbe entirely feasible and practicable by means of uninspected\nadmittance of diplomatic shipments. The Group indicated the\nnecessity, as a countermeasure, of modification of diplomatic\nimmunity to permit inspection of baggage and effects of\ndiplomatic personnel. This ICIS majority report constitutes\nan outright rejection of the conclusion and recommendation of\nthe report of the Working Group on Smuggling, without suggest-\ning any solution of the problem or any countermeasure to\nprotect the internal security of the United States from an\nestablished threat of import of a weapon of mass destruction.\n6. With respect to the question of establishing a\nfixed weight limit on diplomatic baggage, including diplomatic\npouches, the Department of Justice objects to the majority's\nphrasing of the views of the Atomic Energy Commission, insofar\nas they assert that the Commission felt that the establishment\nof a fixed weight limit of 500 lbs. on diplomatic baggage\nwould not prevent nor discourage the smuggling of nuclear\ncomponents. In his letter dated October 8, 1951, the Acting\nChairman of the Atomic Energy Commission pointed out the\ngreat number and careful handling of the pouches required to\nsmuggle the component parts of an atomic weapon and the diffi-\nculty in terms of time and technical skill to assemble the\nweapon in the United States. The Department of Justice feels\nthat this necessity for breaking down an atomic weapon into\nits components, the necessity for utilizing a great number\nof pouches requiring special handling and the necessity for\nimporting technical personnel to assemble the weapon would\nrender this medium of smuggling highly insecure and susceptible\nof detection, and that the obvious implication of the Atomic\nEnergy Commission's letter is that such necessity would\ndiscourage the smuggling of the components of such a weapon.\nCONCLUSION\n7. It is to be borne in mind that the problem posed by\nthe report of the Working Group on Smuggling was that unex-\namined shipments to foreign diplomatic and official personnel\nin the United States afforded an avenue of entry for weapons\nof unconventional attack which appeared to present the least\nchance of discovery. As long as any such avenue remains open\nand available, precautions taken by this nation against atomic\nattack, such as the radar screen and port security program,\nNSC 133\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nremain an imcomplete attempt to deal with a serious threat\nto the internal security of the United States. When the\nproblem is viewed in this light, considerations of internal\nsecurity must be accorded great weight in any balancing of the\nreasons for and against the effective closing of this avenue\nof entry. The Department of Justice strenuously contends that\nconsiderations of internal security have not been given their\nproper weight by the ICIS majority.\n8. There is a complete absence of a showing of the\nnature and importance of the activities abroad of representa-\ntives of the Departments of State and Defense and other\nagencies of the United States which require access to an\nunlimited channel of diplomatic shipments other than\nintelligence. There is no evaluation of the degree to which\nthe interests of the national security abroad would be impaired\nor threatened by retaliatory measures which would limit the\nimmunity of the diplomatic pouch to intelligence communica-\ntions. For this reason, the Department of Justice feels that\nthere 1s no demonstration of considerations of national\nsecurity abroad which override or outweigh the threat to\ninternal security which exists as long as the USSR and Soviet\nBloc nations have at hand the ready medium for undetected\nshipment to this country of an assembled atomic weapon.\n9. The Department of Justice concurs with the ICIS\nmajority in the view that the diplomatic transmission of\ncommunications between this country and its representatives\nabroad must remain inviolate from examination and that the\nrisk of reprisal requires that this nation continue to per-\nmit the entry of the diplomatic pouch to the United States\nwithout examination.\n10. However, in view of the threat to the internal\nsecurity of the United States, resulting from the unlimited\navailability of the diplomatic pouch for shipment of an\nassembled atomic weapon, the Department of Justice submits\nthat it is immediately necessary to restrict the weight of\ndiplomatic pouches coming into the United States to 500 lbs.\nSuch a weight limitation on diplomatic pouches would prevent\nthe introduction through this channel of an assembled atomic\nweapon, and, while it would not prevent the clandestine import,\nunder the cloak of diplomatic immunity, of the component parts\nof an atomic weapon, nevertheless, the number of pouches,\nthe import of technical personnel and the physical facilities\nrequired for the assembling of the weapon in the United\nStates, would tend to render this medium susceptible to detec-\ntion and would discourage its use for introduction of weapons\nfor mass destruction.\nNSC 133\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n11. With regard to unaccompanied diplomatic baggage the\nDepartment is of the opinion that, without any weight limita-\ntion, such shipments should be subject to examination when the\nnational interest so requires. Such examination would result\nin the detection of an assembled atomic weapon or the nuclear\ncomponents thereof. No violation of free diplomatic communica-\ntion would be involved in such an examination, and as a matter\nof fact, such procedure would be exactly responsive to the\nexisting practice with respect to United States diplomatic\nshipments in the USSR and in Czechoslovakia and which may be\nexpected, by way of retaliation, in the other nations in the\nSoviet Bloc.\n12. With regard to accompanied baggage, the Department\nis of the opinion that for substantially the same reason, the\nUnited States should examine all such baggage, except the\npersonal hand baggage of diplomatic representatives.\nRECOMMENDATION\n13, The Department of Justice, therefore, recommends\nimmediate adoption of the following:\na. Limitation of the weight of unexamined diplo-\nmatic pouches to 500 pounds.\nb. Customs examination of all diplomatic pouches\nin excess of 500 pounds.\nc. Customs examination of all shipments of\ndiplomatic baggage, whether accompanied or unaccompanied,\nexcept the personal hand baggage of diplomatic\nrepresentatives.\nNSC 133\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9\nTOP SECRET\nCOPY\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION\nWASHINGTON 25, D. C.\nMay 7, 1952\nVIA LIAISON\nMr. Raymond P. Whearty\nChairman\nInterdepartmental Committee on\nInternal Security\nU. S. Department of Justice Building\nWashington, D. C.\nDear Mr. Whearty:\nReference is made to your letter dated April 8,\n1952, concerning the\n2 in which you requested the views of the Interdepart-\n25X1\nmental Intelligence Conference.\nPlease be advised that the IIC is in definite agree-\nment with the minority views contained in Annex A to the\nreport furnished by you. This IIC position is taken within\nthe IIC's field of jurisdiction in so far as the internal\nsecurity of this country is concerned.\nSincerely yours,\n/8/ J. Edgar Hoover\nChairman\nInterdepartmental Intelligence Conference\nNSC 133\n- 16 -\nTOP SEGRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/27 : NLT-PSF-48-1-1-9"
}