Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "348697911",
    "label": "National Security Council Progress Report by the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security on the Implementation of Internal Security (NSC 17/4; 17/6)",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697911"
}

{
    "id": "348697911",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697911",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Progress Report by the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security on the Implementation of Internal Security (NSC 17/4; 17/6)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697911",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-02-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-02-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-02-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 30,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/348697911",
    "naId": 348697911,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 24,
            "logicalDate": "1952-11-24",
            "month": 11,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 30,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750712/750712-02.pdf",
    "mediaId": "9b59c00d49aa70f6",
    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. Re Examination of Baggage of Incoming\nDiplomatic Personnel (NSC 133) - Squitized 1-2014 6-10-52\nA\nSAnitize\nReport\nN.S.C. Status Progress Report on NSC 17/4 & 17/6\n(Internal Security)\n11-24-52\nA\nMemo\nFor the President from Charles Declaration S. Murphy re the\nworld petroleum situation (attachments)\n12-5-52\nA\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. re Petr oleum (NSC 138) 12 8-52\nA\nReport\nNS.G. Status of Projects as of 12-15-52 DECLASSIFIED, 6/2011\nA\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 12-17-52\n12-12-52\nA\nDECLANIFIED\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 12-17-52\n12-13-52\nA\n4-2A-13\nMinutes\nof the N.S.C. Meeting12-17-52\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. Lay, Jr. re Petroloum\n12-18-52\n4\nDeclaraified\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F. - SUBJECT FIIE\nN.S.C. - MEETINGS\nFOLDER: MEETING NO. 127\n12-17-52\nBoy 219\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA DC 73.495\nGSA FORM 7122 (7.72)\nThe President\nCOPY NO 1\nSANITIZED COPY\nAuthority: NLT 86-13\n(use Means 8-18-87)\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nPROGRESS REPORT\nI\nby\nNSC REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\non the implementation of\nINTERNAL SECURITY\n(NSC 17/4 and NSC 17/6)\nNovember 24, 1952\nUNTORSSECRET\nINSURITY INFORMATION\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nOctober 31, 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSUBJECT:\nPROGRESS REPORT ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nREFERENCES:\nNSC 17 Series; Progress Reports on\nThe Implementation of \"Internal Security\"\ndated November 7, 1949, March 17, 1950,\nAugust 29, 1950, March 26, 1951 and December 20, 1951.\n-\n1. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6-F of\nNSC 17/4, which directs the NSC Representative on Internal Security\nto report to the National Security Council from time to time on\nprogress being made for the provision of adequate internal security.\nThis report summarizes major developments, projects and actions relating\nto the recent activities of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal\nSecurity (ICIS) and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC).\nIn addition, where. appropriate, observations of the writer are included.\n2. U. S. Programs for National Security\nOn May 23, 1952, in response to the President's request,\na joint IIC-ICIS report was submitted and circulated to the Council on\nthe FY 1953 internal security program, as approved by the President,\nfor submission to the Congress (NSC 114/3).\nOn August 14, 1952, in response to the President's request,\na joint IIC-ICIS report was submitted and circulated to the Council on\nthe status of our internal security preparedness, as of the end of FY 1952,\nwhen viewed in the light of the approved objectives contained in the\nNSC 68 and 114 series (NSC 135).\n3. Planning for National Security\nAS a result of an ICIS study designed to provide a more\nadequate basis for planning for the security of the United States, the\nNSC approved a directive to the CIA, JCS, IIC and ICIS for the purpose of\ndeveloping a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to\ninjure the continental United States. In keeping with that directive\nthe IIC submitted to CIA its estimate of the capability of the USSR to\nUNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET\nUTPE SECRET IED\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nconduct sabotage and otherwise disrupt internal activities in the\nUnited States. ICIS in turn submitted to CIA an exhaustive evaluation\nof the ways and means available to counter potential enemy capabilities,\nas estimated by the IIC. In accordance with the IISC directive these\nsubmissions of the IIC and ICIS, together with related estimates\nrequired of JCS and the IAC, were used by the Director of Central\nIntelligence in the preparation for the Council of the summary evaluation\nreferred to above. (Inasmuch as the IIC and the ICIS submissions to\nCIA contain the most exhaustive analyses prepared to date on our weak-\nnesses and strengths in this important segment of the internal security\nfield, and since those submissions have not been circulated formally to\nthe NSC, it is noted that they are readily available to interested\nCouncil members through their respective IIC-ICIS representatives, as\nwell as through the Office of the Executive Secretary, USC.) *\n4. Subversive Patterns and Trends\nThe IIC agencies continue to prepare and appropriately\ndistribute to interested agencies analyses relating to significant\nsubversive patterns and trends in areas involving their individual\nfields of responsibility. During this period the military members of\nIIC distributed periodic consolidated counterintelligence reports,\nemphasizing therein developments which may constitute potential threats\nto the internal security of the military services. In addition they\nhave distributed, for the guidance of the appropriate field commands,\nspecial estimates of the subversive situation pertaining to particular\ngeographic areas. During the same period the FBI prepared and disseminated\nanalyses relating to: (a) the current activities of the Communist Party,\nUSA, including its organizational apparatus, a tabulation of its finances\nand membership, its activities in youth, educational, racial, propaganda,\nlabor and legislative fields, as well as in areas involving international\nrelations, underground activities, etc., (b) the current Communist Party\nLine, (c) the relationship of the Communist Party, USA, to Soviet Russia,\n(d) the identification and security significance of the Communist\n\"Classics,\" (e) the l'arxist-Leninist principles governing the Communist\npress in the United States, (f) the documentary proof that the Communist\nParty, USA, teaches and advocates the overthrow of the U. S. Government\nby force and violence.\n(k) the Independent\nSocialist League, and (1) the United Labor Party.\nMemorandum for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject \"A Project\nto Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the\nUnited States,\" dated October 21, 1952.\nLINCI ASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 2 -\nUNITOR SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n5.. Identification of Dangerous and Potentially Dangerous Persons\nAs indicated in previous Progress Reports, the FBI is\nengaged in a continuing investigative program of identifying individuals\ndangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security and national\ndefense of the United States. Persons thus identified are being\nconsidered for apprehension and detention, should circumstances require\nsuch action. As of October 10, 1952, 19,436 individuals have been so\nidentified, as compared with approximately 17,000 a year ago.\n6. Prosecution of Communist Party Functionaries\nBased on FBI-developed evidence, 85 leading functionaries\nof the Communist Party have been indicted, and thus far 31 have been\nconvicted, for conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the U, S. Government\nby force and violence. Additional trials are scheduled to begin in the\nnear future. The investigative and prosecutive attention thus afforded\nthe Communist Party has contributed substantially to U. S. internal\nsecurity by creating a better public understanding of the true nature\nof this subversive menace, while impairing substantially the membership,\norganizational operations, financial condition and general effectiveness\nof the party apparatus. In its presently disorganized state, with\nmembership decreasing to approximately 24,674, as compared with 35,310\nas of June 30, 1951, the Communist Party is placing increased reliance\nupon underground activity and upon operation through front organizations.\nTOP SECRESIFIED\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY IMFORMATION\nIn the case of those foreign officials attached to United\nNations headquarters who, apart from their conduct of regular UN business,\nmay be utilizing that medium to engage in activities inimical to our\nnational security, there has been very little counterintelligence cover-\nage to date due, primarily, to circumstances beyond the immediate control\nof the responsible security agencies. Following its conduct of a study\ninvolving the entry into the United States of personnel who are actually\nor potentially dangerous, the ICIS concluded that a re-examination should\nbe made of the proposed unilateral definition of the \"headquarters\ndistrict of the UN and its immediate vicinity,\" in the light of a\nrealistic appraisal of U. S. security considerations. Accordingly, on\nFebruary 1, 1951, the ICIS proposed to the Secretary of State and the\nAttorney General that such a re-examination be made with a view to\nlimiting strictly the headquarters area in the interest of protecting\nthe security of the United States against UN-connected aliens, who are\ndangerous or potentially dangerous, in order that they might be confined\nto a more restricted area while in the United States. To date, no\nsuccess has been achieved in this regard. While it is recognized that\ncertain inherent risks to this country were assumed in accepting and\nestablishing UN headquarters in New York City, it appears essential that\nat least limited security precautions be imposed, without interfering\nwith the conduct of legitimate UN business, for in the absence of such\nlimitations it would be imprudent to expect that UN-connected personnel\nwith inimical intent will refrain from utilizing the privileges and\nfacilities available to them here to further their anti-U. S. objectives.\n8. Examination of Baggage of Incoming Diplomatic Personnel\nand Shipments to Diplomatic Missions in the United States\nThe advisability of examining or placing weight limitations\nupon incoming baggage, pouches and shipments of foreign diplomatic and\nofficial personnel in the United States has been the subject of ICIS-IIC\nstudy, inasmuch as such media serve as possible means for the introduction\nof unconventional weapons, including assembled atomic bombs, under the\ncloak of diplomatic immunity. At the present time no examination, weight\nlimitation or other controls exist with respect to such baggage or ship-\nments, An ICIS report, containing divergent views with respect to the\nresolution of this problem, has been circulated for the Council's\nconsideration (NSC 133).\nTOP SECRET\n- 4 -\nUNIOP ASSIFIED\nSECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n9. Government Employee Security Program\nAfter extensive study and consultation with 46 departments\nand agencies, ICIS, in collaboration with the Civil Service Commission,\nsubmitted to NSC the results of its detailed investigation of, as well\nas its recommendations concerning, the administration of the Government\nEmployee Security Program (NSC 113/1). Following NSC consideration of\nthe ICIS report it was appropriately distributed within the Executive\nBranch for the guidance of each department and agency having an employee\nsecurity program. In addition, and in keeping with ICIS recommendations,\nthe report Was referred by the President to the Civil Service Commission\nwith a view to the establishment of a single general program to cover\neligibility for employment in the Federal service, whether on grounds of\nsecurity, loyalty or suitability. The single general program envisaged\nin the ICIS report should be designed in such a manner as to: (a) eliminate\nthe confusion caused by the three programs now in existence under which\nemployment may be denied, or employees may be suspended or removed from\nFederal service on grounds of security, loyalty or suitability; (b) adequately\nprotect the security-interests of the United States, without infringing\nunduly upon the rights of Federal employees.\n10. Personnel Security Clearance Program\nICIS proposed an Executive Order establishing minimum\nstandards for security clearance for access to classified security infor-\nmation in the Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.\nOn July 12, 1951, the proposed order was adopted by the Council, approved\nby the President, and, on the latter's direction, was transmitted to the\nBureau of the Budget for issuance. Based on the Bureau's subsequent circu-\nlation of the draft for further agency comment, minor revisions were made\ntherein whereupon it was processed as to legality and form by the Attorney\nGeneral. Its promulgation by the President is anticipated momentarily.\nIts effective implementation should contribute substantially to the ob-\njectives of the internal security program.\n11. Security of Classified Contracts\nPending the promulgation of the ICIS draft executive order\ncovering minimum standards for security clearance for access to classified\nsecurity information, ICIS has postponed consideration of the question of\nrequiring additional security checks relating to classified contracts let\nby departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. In the interim,\nhowever, the military members of the IIC are making a coordinated effort\nto insure that security is being maintained in connection with classified\ncontracts let by the Department of Defense. Their efforts in this regard\nmay result in new procedures to improve security in Department of Defense\ncontractor facilities engaged on classified projects.\nTOP SECRETFIED\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n12. Industrial Security\nA. Industry Evaluation and Facilities Protection Boards\nBased on ICIS recommendations to the Council, the\nIndustry Evaluation Board (IEB) was established on January 6,\n1951, and the Facilities Protection Board (FPB) on May 4, 1951.\nBriefly, IEB has the responsibility of identifying and listing,\nthrough the application of economic and technical criteria,\nkey industrial facilities, materials, and products important\nto U. S. mobilization efforts, and of assigning for purposes of\nsecurity supervision each key facility so identified to the\ndepartment or agency having paramount interest in it. It is\nthe primary responsibility of the FPB to develop and promulgate\npolicies and criteria to effect a balanced program of protection\nfor the facilities rated by IEB, as well as for other facilities\nrequiring industrial security guidance.\nThe IEB reports the following progress as of October 1,\n1952. In the manufacturing field (1) 210 segments of industry\n(such as chemical, petroleum, pharmaceuticals, metal mining,\nmachine tools, electronics, aircraft, etc.,) have been selected\nfor analyses; (2) 6,057 facilities have been considered, and\n1,047 criticality ratings have been assigned to the 818 individual\nfacilities in that group which have been determined to be of\nexceptional importance to defense mobilization. In the non-\nmanufacturing field (1) 22,193 facilities in the electric power\nindustry have been considered, and criticality ratings have been\nassigned to the 627 facilities in that group which have been\ndetermined to be of key importance to defense mobilization;\n(2) criteria have been approved for railroads, petroleum pipe-\nlines, natural gas pipelines, international telecommunications,\nand inland waterways. In accordance with NSC 99, IEB has\nassigned to the Department of Defense, on an interim basis,\nprotective responsibility for the 818 manufacturing facilities\nand the 627 nonmanufacturing facilities identified above. With\nthe exception of a few additional assignments to the Atomic\nEnergy Commission, no other assignments have been made to date\nby the IEB.\nAs of October 1, 1952, the FPB, in consultation with\nappropriate representatives of both government and industry, had\ndeveloped for guidance purposes a comprehensive manual entitled\n\"Principles of Industrial Security.\" This manual, which will\nbe published in the near future, affords a basic treatment of\nthe elements, factors, measures, and techniques on which a\nbalanced industrial security program may be established. In\nTOP SECRET SIFIED\n- 6 -\nUTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\naddition, through government-industry cooperation, the FPB\nhas prepared individual draft manuals specifically geared\nto the security requirements and problems of the following\nsegments of industry: air transportation, electric power,\nexplosives, petroleum and gas, railroad transportation, ware-\nhousing, water works, and street and highway transportation\nfacilities.\nA review of the organization and functioning of the\nIEB and FPB, initiated earlier by the ICIS, was suspended by\nthat Committee on May 29, 1952, based upon a request from the\nBureau of the Budget and on advice that the Bureau was under-\ntaking an independent examination of the general industrial\nsecurity problem. The Bureau's examination has resulted in the\ncirculation for agency comment of a proposed draft executive\norder on the subject. Pending further action thereon by the\nBureau of the Budget, IEB and FPB continue to function as\nconstituted initially by. the Council.\nB. Counterintelligence Coverage of Vital Installations\nThe IIC agencies have continued to accelerate their\nprogram of increasing informant and source-of-information\ncoverage of vital installations to assist in circumventing\nand/or receiving warning of possible acts of sabotage, espionage\nand other subversive activities affecting such installations.\nThis coverage is resulting in the collection of pertinent\ndata concerning potential subversive activities within these\ninstallations and the general areas where they are located.\nC. Foreign-Directed Sabotage\nReports of sabotage have risen sharply since the out-\nbreak of hostilities in Korea. While the FBI carries the major\ninvestigative burden in this respect, these reports have also\nhad a direct impact upon the military services. These investi-\ngations receive immediate, continuous attention and entail\nthe utilization of considerable personnel to determine whether\nactual sabotage exists. During the period covered by this\nreport there have been no instances of foreign-directed\nsabotage in this country.\nD. Vulnerability Tests of Vital Air Force Installations\nThe Office of Special Investigations (OSI) is devoting\nspecial attention to its program of conducting vulnerability tests\nand surveys of vital Air Force installations in coordination with\nUNCL ASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION\nthe Commands concerned. The purpose of this program is to\nemphasize the importance of realistic internal security\nmeasures, as well as to demonstrate weaknesses that may\nexist in order that corrective action may be taken.\nE. Industrial Security Program of the Munitions Board\nThe military members of the IIC are assisting the\nMunitions Board in formulating uniform regulations pertaining\nto that aspect of the industrial security program which is of\ndirect concern to the Department of Defense. They report\nthat while basic policies in this field will not change\ngreatly, uniform application of the Munitions Board's\npolicies and related procedures will result in increased\nsecurity.\nF. Expanded Industrial Security Fingerprinting Program\nThe Munitions Board requested an ICIS determination\nas to the over-all value of initiating a greatly expanded\ninterdepartmental industrial security fingerprinting program\nwhich the Board had under consideration. After consultation\nwith the IIC, the ICIS advised the Board that the results to\nbe obtained from the type of program suggested would not in\nall probability be of sufficient magnitude to warrant the\ntremendous expenditure of money, services of employees and\nspace required for such a program. Since sufficient authority\ndoes not exist at present to require the discharge of\ndangerous individuals from certain critical positions in\nindustry, it was further concluded that the implementation of\nthe program projected by the Munitions Board would not result\nin sufficient benefit to internal security to warrant its\nundertaking. (Proposed legislation to permit removal and/or\nexclusion from defense industry of such dangerous individuals\nis under consideration in the NSRB.)\n13. Nuclear Storage Facilities\nIIC, in consultation with the Armed Forces Special Weapons\nProject, (AFSWP), has perfected arrangements whereby the names of\nindividuals having access to nuclear storage facilities are appropriately\nindexed in the files of FBI, ONI, G-2, and OSI in order to insure that\nany derogatory information concerning such persons will be furnished\npromptly to AFSWP.\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 8 -\nUNTOP ASSIFIED\nSECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n14. Security Control of Air Traffic\nFrom the standpoint of our internal defenses against un-\nconventional attack by air, the security control of air traffic entering,\ndeparting or moving within the United States has been the subject of\nextensive ICIS study. The ICIS report on this subject concludes that\nthe most serious threat of unconventional air attack of this character\nis one of small scale clandestine operations, particularly within our\nwild land areas and along the Mexican border. Through such operations\nthe unauthorized transportation of fissionable material, subversive\npersonnel, bacterial agents, or explosives could be accomplished readily.\nBased upon the foregoing and upon related findings and recommendations\nof its Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, the ICIS\nreferred its study to the Secretary of Commerce, together with a request\nthat his Department undertake the action necessary to assure security\ncontrol over nonmilitary air traffic. In view of the close relationship\nof civil air traffic problems to the responsibilities of the Air Defense\nCommand, the Department of Commerce referred the ICIS report to the Joint\nCAA-USAF Air Defense Planning Board for an evaluation of the recommendations\nin the report, both in terms of their effect upon established air defense\npolicies and with respect to their operational feasibility. Thereafter,\nthe Secretary of Commerce advised ICIS that he does not believe that his\nDepartment should accept the sole coordinating responsibility of a program\nso closely related to national defense, although he indicated that his\nDepartment would consider sharing such an assignment jointly with the\nDepartment of Defense. Accordingly, the ICIS has requested the Secretary\nof Defense to undertake jointly with the Secretary of Commerce the\nnecessary coordination, provided that he agrees with the concept of dual\nagency responsibility, as outlined by the Secretary of Commerce.\n15. Protection of Critical Patents\nThe peacetime problem of withholding from the public\ndomain of U. S. patents, which if released might be detrimental to the\nnational security, has been pending in the ICIS since the Committee's\ninception. The Department of Defense, the AEC and the Patent Office\nconcurred in a proposed bill which would remedy the problem. The bill\nwas enacted as the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, and was approved by\nthe President on February 1, 1952. The ICIS has analyzed this legislation\nand has concluded that it achieves the same degree of security as was\naccomplished under wartime legislation, and that it is adequate to meet\npresent security problems inherent in the issuance of patents,\nUNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n16. Defense Against Biological Warfare in the United States - Humans\nAfter consultation with the appropriate agencies, ICIS\ncompleted a study of the possibilities of covert biological attack\nagainst humans, the problems created by those possibilities, and the\nstatus of measures to defend against them. While the ICIS concluded\nthat the chances of preattack detection of a biological warfare attack\non human life are remote, it approved a number of suggested programs, the\nsatisfactory execution of which, in the opinion of the ICIS, is urgently\nrequired in the interest of adequate defense against biological warfare\nattacks. The ICIS report and recommendations on this problem have been\nreferred to FCDA and the Public Health Service, and both agencies have\nagreed to collaborate in the implementation of the programs outlined therein.\n17. Protection of Federal Buildings and Personnel from\nUnconventional Attack\nICIS has deferred final action with respect to the detailed\nstudy and report which have been made concerning this problem pending the\nclassification by NSRB of the functions of Government agencies into\nprotection priority groups, which is to be followed by the conduct of\nvulnerability surveys by the General Services Administration. On\nJanuary 17, 1952, ICIS requested NSRB to effect the aforementioned\nclassification on an expedite basis. This has not been accomplished\nto date. Until these classifications are made, vulnerability surveys\nwill not be undertaken, with resulting delay to ICIS in its efforts to\nachieve an adequate program for the safeguarding of Federal buildings\nand personnel against unconventional attack.\n18. Control of Foreign Funds Held Within the United States\nICIS has terminated its consideration of internal security\nquestions relating to control of foreign funds in the United States, since\nsuch problems as foreign assets control and the blocking of transactions\nwith Communist China and North Korea are being handled on an operating\nbasis by the Treasury Department in accordance with the Trading with the\nEnemy Act.\n19. Controls over the Export of Strategic Materials\nFollowing its inquiry into this subject, the ICIS has con-\ncluded that, from the standpoint of internal security, adequate legal\nauthority to control the export of strategic materials exists in the\nExport Control Act of 1949, as amended by Public Law 33, 82nd Congress,\napproved May 1, 1951.\nTOP SECRET\n- 10 -\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n20. Russian Listening-Transmitting Device\nIIC and ICIS, in collaboration with CIA, have initiated a\njoint security study at the direction of the President to insure that\nappropriate countermeasures are put into effect with respect to new-type,\nextremely high frequency, listening-transmitting devices which have been\nemployed against the United States by the Russians. Considerable success\nhas been achieved thus far by the FBI Laboratory. the Naval Research\nLaboratory and the Army Signal Corns\nIn the\ninterim, joint IIC-ICIS-CIA consideration of related countermeasures of\na nontechnical nature has resulted in: (a) the briefing of appropriate\nofficials of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Mutual Security Agency,\nthe senior staffs of the various diplomatic missions, the heads of the\nappropriate military commands, and the appropriate CIA missions abroad\nwith respect to the fact that such devices are being used by the Soviets;\n(b) the issuance of instructions to the appropriate personnel relative to\nthe discussion of highly sensitive matters; (c) the initiation of arrange-\nments for appropriate personnel to be visited and briefed in more detail\nwith respect to this development, including the use of countermeasure\nequipment. The IIC-ICIS-CIA Committee is coordinating its further\ndeliberations on this problem with the developments of the agencies which\nare handling its technical aspects, and it is contemplated that a joint\nreport will be submitted in the near future with respect thereto.\n21, Avoidance of the Termination of Travel Control Authority\nPrior to the expiration of the state of war between the\nUnited States and Japan, ICIS examined the possible effects thereof upon\nthe travel control authority of this Government. Except for normal\nimmigration laws and procedures, the only controls over persons departing\nfrom and entering the United States were the regulations prescribed\npursuant to the Act of May 22, 1918, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1941.1\nSince all travel controls under the authority of this Act would terminate\nupon the ratification of the Treaty with Japan and upon the expiration of\nthe national emergencies proclaimed by the President in 1939 and 1941,\nICIS recommended to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that\nthey sponsor legislation designed to make then existing travel control\nauthority applicable to all national emergencies proclaimed by the\nPresident. This objective of ICIS was subsequently realized with the\npassage of the Emergency Powers Continuation Act, which, inter alia,\nextended the life of pertinent travel control legislation for the period\nof the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950.\nAccordingly, authority for essential travel control activities exists for\nthe duration of the present emergency.\n/\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nD\n22. Control of Certain Aliens Attempting to Depart for\nCommunist China\nDuring the period covered by this report the Department of\nJustice temporarily prevented the departure from the United States of a\nnumber of Chinese aliens, who were attempting to depart for China under\nconditions indicating that the technical and scientific knowledge and\nexperience, gained by them in the United States, would be made available\nto the Chinese Communists and their allies. To assist the Department of\nJustice in making final determinations as to whether such departures would\nbe prejudicial to the interests of the United States, ICIS arranged with\nthe Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, JCS, for the Research and Develop-\nment Board to advise the Attorney General as to whether the aliens con-\ncerned had such technical or scientific skill or training that their\nservices should be denied the Communist regime in China. The Department\nof Justice has advised the ICIS that the assistance rendered by the\nResearch and Development Board has proved entirely satisfactory; that since\nthe receipt of the Board's advice the Department of Justice has prevented\ntemporarily the departure of 99 Chinese nationals; and that the advice\nsupplied by the Board will be used for guidance purposes in disposing of\nsimilar cases involving scientifically trained Chinese and other nationals\nattempting departure from the United States.\n23. Port Security Program\nICIS has discontinued action with respect to the port\nsecurity program based upon the President's order of February 1, 1951,\ndirecting the establishment of a joint Navy-Coast Guard port security\ncommittee. That order vests in the joint committee responsibility for\nthe coordination, integration, continuing review, and the making of\nperiodic reports to the President as to the adequacy of the port security\nprogram in terms of current and emerging requirements. Accordingly, ICIS\nis refraining from the performance of any coordinating functions in the\nport security field but, at the same time, in view of its broad responsibi-\nlities in the field of internal security and the relationship thereof to\nport security matters, the ICIS has arranged with the Department of the\nprogram. Treasury to be kept advised of developments pertaining to the port security\n24. Patrol of Land Borders and Patrol Inspections at Seaports\nof Entry\nIn earlier Progress Reports NSC has been advised of the study\nand numerous recommendations made by ICIS with respect to the related\nproblems of preventing the illegal entry of potentially and actually\ndangerous persons, and of establishing more effective controls and\nsurveillances over vessels and aircraft of foreign registry and alien crews.\nTOP SECRETSIFIED\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nOne of the recommendations proposed that the personnel of the Immigration\nand Naturalization Service (INS) be augmented sufficiently to make\npossible a more effective patrol of our land borders. The Bureau of\nthe Budget allowed a supplemental appropriation request of $6,500,000\nfor additional border patrol positions, but the Congressional appropriation\nwas limited to $1,000,000. The Commissioner of Immigration subsequently\nadvised that, as a consequence of the foregoing, the Border Patrol would\nremain inadequate for the proper control of our land borders. This\nadvice was communicated to the NSC Representative on Internal Security and,\nin turn, to the Bureau of the Budget as an example of one of the basic\nfactors limiting the attainment of the internal security program projected\nin NSC 114/2 entitled \"U. S. Programs for National Security.\" Thereafter,\nthe Budget Bureau twice authorized a renewed request for funds to carry\nout the border patrol program and the request was twice rejected by the\nCongress. The Budget Bureau advises that in its present preparation of\nestimates for FY 1954, funds are being recommended not only to expand\nborder patrol activities to the level previously recommended, but also\nto expand very substantially the investigative staff of INS.\nAnother recommendation made by ICIS called for sufficient\naugmentation of the patrol inspection force of INS to provide for the\nstationing at all principal seaports of entry of adequate personnel to\nmake a thorough search of arriving vessels for stowaways, and to maintain\nappropriate surveillance of vessels while in U. S. ports to prevent the\nlanding of stowaways, as well as the landing of crewmen who have been\ndenied shore leave. Due to monetary and personnel limitations this\nrecommendation has not been implemented to date; however, the budget\nestimates for FY 1954 include funds for this purpose. Other recommendations\nmade by the ICIS have been effectuated by the inclusion, in the recently\nenacted Omnibus Immigration Act, of provisions which subject to criminal\npenalties any persons who permit unauthorized landing of aliens, or who\nbring into or harbor aliens unlawfully within the United States, and by\nprovisions which require the consent of the Attorney General prior to the\nactual discharge of nonresident alien crewmen in this country.\n25. Centralized System of Immigration Records Relating to\nAll Aliens\nThe feasibility of establishing a centralized system of\nimmigration records for internal security, intelligence, and other\npurposes was the subject of study by various bodies even before the\nestablishment of the Internal Security Committees of the NSC, No money\nwas ever appropriated to accomplish a complete centralization of alien\nrecords and, as a consequence, the alien files of INS are maintained on\na decentralized basis. Following its own study of the problem, ICIS\nTOP SECRET\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nconcluded that with limited changes the present system of record keeping\non aliens entering, departing, and residing in the United States would\nrepresent the maximum feasible steps which can be taken to meet the\nrequirements of the security-intelligence agencies. These limited changes\nhave been recommended by ICIS to the Secretary of State and the Attorney\nGeneral, and, if effectuated, will result in: (a) the reissuance of\noutstanding nonresident aliens' border crossing cards issued to Mexican\nnationals; (b) the maintenance in INS central files of a copy of each\napplication for nonresident aliens' border crossing cards issued in the\nfuture to nationals of Mexico; (c) the maintenance in INS central files\nof a record of the arrival and departure of all nonresident alien crewmen.\nIn the latter connection the Bureau of the Budget advises that in its\npresent preparation of estimates for FY 1954 funds are being recommended\nto permit the establishment by INS of a central security index covering\napproximately 1,000,000 alien crewmen. When put into effect, these\nrecommended steps will contribute substantially to the needs of the\nsecurity-intelligence agencies in processing cases of a security nature\nrelating to those aliens.\n26. Screening of Specified Types of Applicants for Nondiplomatic\nand Nonofficial Visas\nOne of the recommendations, resulting from an earlier\nstudy by the ICIS of the problem of preventing the entry into the United\nStates of undesirable aliens, called for the submission to the Visa\nDivision of the Department of State, prior to actual issuance of visas,\nof specific and detailed identifying information on all nondiplomatic and\nnonofficial visa applicants whenever the advisory opinion of the Secretary\nof State is required prior to the actual issuance of visas. This advisory\nopinion procedure involves a security check prior to the approval of visa\napplicants and, in accordance with the ICIS recommendations, it was\nextended to include all natives, nationals, residents and former residents\nof, and recent visitors to all Communist or Communist-controlled countries\nor areas. In addition to providing increased security in the checking of\nvisa applicants, another objective of this recommendation was to assure\neffectiveness in making checks against the files of the security-intelli-\ngence agencies prior to the issuance of visas, and to obtain in each case\nthe advisory opinion of the Secretary of State as to the advisability of\nissuing or denying such visas. The Department of State reports that\nnecessary instructions, along the lines indicated above, have been issued\nto officials of that Department concerned with the issuance of visas, but\nthat the resulting increase in the work load of the Department was greater\nthan could be handled under its budget. Accordingly, full implementation\nof this recommendation of the ICIS has not been attained. In lieu thereof\ndiplomatic and consular officials have been advised that in those cases\nwherein the visa-issuing officer is satisfied that an alien in any one of\nLINCL\nASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nthe above described categories is admissible, the visa may issue without\na precheck advisory opinion. Those in which the visa-issuing officer has\nany doubt are required to be submitted to the headquarters of the Depart-\nment in Washington on a precheck advisory opinion basis. In those in-\nstances wherein the visa does issue without a precheck advisory opinion,\nthey are examined on a postcheck basis following the issuance of the visa.\nThe Department of State reports that when and if funds become available,\nit will endeavor to implement fully the advisory opinion procedure on a\nprecheck basis as recommended by ICIS. Meanwhile, although some improve-\nment has been made, our security in this area is dependent in part upon\nthe varying judgments of individual visa-issuing officers in the field\nrather than on headquarters determinations made in advance of the issuance\nof visas and based upon the total information available in the files of\nthe security-intelligence agencies.\nAnother recommendation resulting from the aforementioned\nICIS study would require individual visas on foreign passports or other\ntravel documents of alien crewmen on ships or aircraft, thereby permitting\nmore effective security screening prior to arrival at U. S. ports.\nPertinent provisions of the Omnibus Immigration Act, if appropriately\nimplemented, should result in the realization of this recommendation\nsubstantially along the lines proposed by the ICIS.\n27. Processing of Evacuees\nIn consultation with the IIC and the Washington Liaison Group,\nthe ICIS has under consideration the study and recommendations of its Sub-\ncommittee on Entry and Exit relating to the problem of processing and\nscreening mechanisms which should be instituted with respect to U. S.\nnationals evacuated from foreign areas in the event of a war involving\nthe United States. Since there are potentially or actually dangerous U. S.\nnationals residing or travelling abroad who would be included in any evacu-\nation program, and inasmuch as it is likely that enemy agents, saboteurs\nand subversives would endeavor to infiltrate evacuee groups, appropriate\nscreening machinery for use in such an emergency will be required for\ninternal security purposes.\n28. Censorship Planning and Readiness Measures\nIn view of the general relationship to the internal security\nprogram of planning and readiness measures for wartime national censorship,\nICIS and IIC are advised periodically of the progress being made in this\nregard by the NSRB and the Department of Defense. The military members of\nthe IIC are active in readying measures to implement NSRB planning for\nwartime national censorship. However, the IIC and the ICIS as such are\nconducting no activities in this field, although they continue to follow\nthe progress being made with respect to postal and telecommunications\nUNCI ASSIFIED\nSECRET\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ncensorship planning and readiness measures in order to insure coordination\nwith the internal security program where appropriate, and for the purpose\nof avoiding duplication of effort.\n29. Classification, Transmission and Handling of Security\nInformation in the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government\nAt the time of his approval of Executive Order 10290, which\nwas proposed by the ICIS and which resulted in the establishment of\nuniform regulations relating to the captioned subject, the President\ndirected the NSC, through its ICIS, \"to furnish advice and assistance to\nthe departments and agencies in connection with these regulations and to\nmaintain a continuing review of the classification activities in every\ndepartment or agency to insure uniform and proper application of these\nregulations, including declassification whenever possible.\" Special and\ncontinuing attention has been afforded this directive by the ICIS and its\nSubcommittee on Executive Order 10290. (This Subcommittee, consisting of\na public information officer and a security officer from each of the\nDepartments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice, was established to\nassist ICIS in carrying out this important task.) Through this Subcommittee\nthe ICIS has canvassed all agencies concerned to determine the status of\ntheir efforts to bring their respective procedures into accord with the\norder; to arrange for assisting them in connection with the preparation\nof intra-agency implementing regulations where required; to insure\nprovisions for declassification and downgrading; to initiate orientation\nand training of employees; and to effect appropriate inspection and report-\ning systems. To date, in addition to furnishing general guidance to the\ninterested agencies, the ICIS Subcommittee on Executive Order 10290 has\nreceived 32 sets of proposed intra-agency regulations, which were submitted\nby the respective departments and agencies pursuant to the order. Sixteen\nsets have been determined by the Subcommittee to be in conformity with\nthe order, and 16 are awaiting final endorsement by the Subcommittee.\nSeven additional agencies are either using the regulations promulgated by\nExecutive Order 10290 or have no requirements for internal regulations.\nFive agencies have failed to submit draft internal regulations for review\nby the Subcommittee and appropriate action is being taken in this regard.\nDuring the period covered by this report, the Chairman, ICIS,\nwas requested by the Chief Counsel to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on\nInvestigations, Committee on Government Operations, to attend a meeting of\nan advisory committee of members of the press, identified as \"The Anti-\ncensorship Committee,\" for the purpose of discussing the origin, need for,\nand implementation of Executive Order 10290. With the President's approval\nthe Chairman, ICIS, met with this advisory press committee, and responded\nto its inquiries concerning the order.\nUNCP ASSIFIED\nSECRET\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nExperience under this order to date indicates that it is\nserving to correct some of the abuses of the classification systems which\nhad developed prior to its issuance, and that it is creating a better\nappreciation on the part of many agencies as to the need for strictly\nlimiting security classification activities to information which requires\nsafeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States. Despite\nthe foregoing, however, the objective of Executive Order 10290 can never\nbe achieved fully until resolute action of an administrative or prosecutive\nnature is taken against personnel of the Executive Branch who \"plant\" or\n\"leak\" to non-Governmental sources classified security information of the\nhighest order of importance to the national security of this country.\n30. Foreign Access to U. S. Classified Security Information\nICIS in consultation with IIC is continuing its efforts to\nachieve an acceptable solution to the serious security problems occasioned\nby the access to U. S. classified security information which is granted to\nrepresentatives of foreign governments. On June 1, 1951, following full\ncoordination with all interested departments and agencies, the ICIS sub-\nmitted a report to the NSC with proposed regulations and procedures for\ndetermining the eligibility of individual representatives of foreign\ngovernments to receive U. S. Government classified security information.\nOn July 2, 1951, NSC action thereon was deferred at the request of the\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense. On November 16, 1951, the Office of\nthe Secretary of Defense, after noting that the North Atlantic Treaty\nnations were not prepared to accept all of the requirements provided for\nin the recommended regulations and procedures of the ICIS, proposed that\nthe ICIS report be referred back to that Committee for reconsideration.\nTo date success has not been attained in the continuing efforts which have\nbeen made in the ICIS to achieve a solution to this problem which will meet\nwith the approval of all interested departments and agencies. In connection\nwith this matter the Council's attention is again invited to the fact that\nthe referenced ICIS report, with its accompanying draft regulations, was\ndesigned to remedy a very serious internal security defect which was made\nevident in the course of the Fuchs atomic espionage case, namely, that\ncertain representatives of foreign governments, including Fuchs, were being\nafforded access to classified security information of this Government\nwithout any assurance that they had been cleared adequately by either the\nsponsoring government or the U. S. Government; that the proposed ICIS\nregulations would govern our Executive Branch in those instances wherein\nit is necessary that representatives of foreign governments be allowed\nto receive information classified for security reasons by this Government;\nand that some policy, such as that proposed originally by ICIS, is\nabsolutely essential in order to correct the situation which facilitated\nthe occurrence of the Fuchs case, and to give some assurance that such leaks\nTOP ERSERIED\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nof vital security information will not recur. Agreement on the ICIS draft\nregulations submitted to NSC on June 1, 1951, was reached only after the\npaper was weakened in its internal security aspects to the point that it\nwas considered by many as constituting the absolute minimal approach to\nthe problem of establishing security standards to govern U. S. depart-\nments and agencies in releasing classified security information to\nrepresentatives of foreign governments. In the light of this most\nserious defect in our internal security system, and in view of the funda-\nmental deficiencies known to exist in the screening and related security\nsystems of Great Britain, France, and other nations, which are now\nreceiving U. S. classified security information, some formula must be\narrived at expeditiously, which, while taking into account our inter-\nnational objectives, will insure adherence to adequate security safeguards\nin the granting of foreign access to U. S. classified security information.\n31. NATO Security System - \"National Security Authority\"\nA NATO Security System has been established on the basis of\nagreements reached by representatives of this Government with representa-\ntives of other nations participating in NATO. Although the views of the\nICIS and IIC have not been solicited with respect to regulations developed\nunder the NATO Security System, the ICIS was requested by the Secretary\nof Defense to furnish advice with respect to one proposed revision of the\nNATO Security System, which related to the designation of a \"national\nsecurity authority\" responsible for NATO security. This revision would\nprovide for the establishment of a \"national security authority\" responsible\nfor NATO security within each member country, including day-to-day classi-\nfication, transmission, and distribution of NATO security information, as\nwell as the screening, selection and clearance of all its nationals who have\naccess to such information. Since the function of the \"national security\nauthority\" would be essentially operational in character, and inasmuch as\nthe ICIS is nonoperational in nature, the ICIS was obliged to reject itself\nas the \"national security authority\" despite its related responsibilities\nunder Executive Order 10290. ICIS proposed, accordingly, that representa-\ntives of the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, and the Mutual\nSecurity Agency be designated to carry out the aforementioned functions.\nIt is understood that this proposal is now being carried into effect, under\nthe aegis of the Department of Defense, substantially along the lines\nrecommended by the ICIS. (It is noted that some of the regulations embodied\nin the NATO Security System are contrary to policies and regulations adopted\nby the NSC and approved by the President for application in the U. S.\ninternal security field. While U. S. objectives in the international field\nmay at times be overriding insofar as internal security considerations are\nconcerned, U. S. representatives should obtain the advice and guidance of\nthe appropriate Internal Security Committees of the Council before their\ndepartments and agencies commit this Government at an international level\nin areas directly involving internal security. In the light of the\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 18 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nforegoing, the NSC Representative on Internal Security has suggested to\nthe IIC and the ICIS that necessary action be taken within their respective\ndepartments and agencies to insure that the Committees' views are obtained\nbefore any policy is formally adopted, whether on the national or international\nlevel, which may affect the internal security of the United States, unless\nit is clear that the contemplated policy will not conflict with U. S.\nprograms and policies in the internal security field.) *\n32. Tripartite Security Working Group (U.S., U.K., France)\nIn April, 1951, representatives of the Governments of the\nU.S., U.K., and France initiated joint surveys of the systems and methods\nemployed by each for the purpose of recommending any action considered\nnecessary for the attainment of mutually acceptable security standards.\nU. S. membership in this tripartite group included representatives of the\nIIC, the State Department Representative on the ICIS, as well as personnel\nfrom other interested agencies of our Government. A comparative evaluation\nof the security systems in effect in the three countries has served to\npoint up the many fundamental deficiencies existing in the British and\nFrench security systems. The efforts of the group to date have culminated\nin the three governments concurring in an agreed statement of basic\nprinciples which recognize the need for employing sound security measures.\nFurther meetings of the group are now being held to determine the progress\nmade to date in implementing their agreed principles of security, and in\norder to recommend further measures to correct existing security deficiencies.\nWhile the work of this group thus far has been instrumental in bringing\nabout a recognition of the need for employing sound security measures,\nmuch remains to be done particularly in the U.K. and France, with respect\nto the realistic implementation of the agreed principles of security, before\nthe U. S. Government can be assured that classified security information,\nwhich it releases to those governments, is being safeguarded adequately.\n33. Dissemination of Unclassified Strategic Information\nThe many aspects of the problem of handling dissemination\nof unclassified strategic and technological information, the release of\nwhich would result in a net disadvantage to the national security of the\nUnited States, continue to be afforded active consideration in the ICIS.\nBased upon its comprehensive study of exchange arrangements between\nAmerican and Soviet bloc organizations, ICIS has approved an interim report\non the subject and has made recommendations resulting in the establishment,\nunder the aegis of CIA, of an interdepartmental group to advise Government\n# See Dissent of Defense Department Representative on ICIS (Appendix A)\nand Statement of NSC Representative on Internal Security (Appendix B).\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET SIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nED\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nagencies with respect to the exchange of publications with Soviet bloc\norganizations, and to assist in coordinating Governmental activities in\nthis field. This advisory group, composed of representatives of the\nDepartments of State, Defense and Commerce, the CIA, the AEC and the\nLibrary of Congress, is to be guided in its considerations by the two-fold\nobjective of denying the Soviet bloc technical and other information of\npossible strategic value, without disturbing the few available avenues\ndetermined to be essential to the continued acquisition of Soviet bloc\npublications required for our intelligence purposes. Further studies are\ncontinuing on this and related aspects of the problem, including the\nquestion of controlling, at the prepublication level, strategic information,\nthe release of which would result in a net disadvantage to the national\nsecurity. Pending the completion of the over-all study by the ICIS of\nthis delicate and extremely complex problem, the export of technical\npublications to the Soviet bloc continues under general export license\n1951.) arrangements. (See paragraph C-17 of the Progress Report dated December 20,\n34. Importation of Communist Literature\nIn consultation with the Post Office Department, ICIS has\ninitiated a study to determine the treatment which should be accorded the\nlarge quantities of Communist propaganda shipped into the United States\nfrom the Soviet Union and from other countries abroad.\n35. Other Current Projects\nVarious related facets of a number of the general problems\nreferred to above are being afforded continuing study by either the\nICIS or the IIC. In addition thereto, the following specific matters\nare being given study and consideration at this time:\na. The problem of controlling undesirable, deportable\naliens whose countries of origin refuse to receive them.\nb. The problem of determining the status and disposition\nto be made during a war-related emergency of alien crew members\nand officers of specified classes of foreign vessels in U. S. ports.\nc. The screening of dangerous or potentially dangerous\nU. s. citizens who enter and depart the United States as crewmen\nemployed on foreign vessels.\nd. The screening of air crewmen and other persons employed\naboard aircraft in international flights.\nUTOP SECRET\nIED\n- 20 -\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nSECURITY INFORMATION\ne. The problem of increasing the number and comprehensive-\nness of searches of persons, baggage, parcel post and freight\nleaving the United States, to contravene covert export of\nstrategic materials of value to Soviet bloc countries.\nf. Measures to protect against the clandestine introduction\nof unconventional weapons via commercial shipments, baggage and mail.\n6. Adequate machinery to provide an integrated disease-\nreporting-system, whereby a biological warfare attack might be\nrecognized promptly.\nh. Immunization of key officials against biological warfare\nattacks.\ni. Protection of livestock and crops from biological warfare\nattacks.\nj. Protection of our forests and range lands.\nk. The problem of protecting strategic information concern-\ning American industry and shipping, which is normally collected\nby domestic insurance companies and transmitted abroad in\nconnection with established reinsurance practices.\n1. The problem of preventing undesirable disclosure of\ntechnological knowledge by U. S. technical personnel in foreign\ncountries.\nm. The problem of controlling U. S. visits of foreign\nnationals for industrial inspection purposes in those instances\nwherein internal security may be affected adversely.\nn. The problem of remedying certain threats to internal\nsecurity in the radio communications field.\n36. Internal Security Coordination - General\nThe ICIS and IIC, through both individual and joint committee\nefforts, have continued to afford special attention to the problem of\neffectively coordinating the broad field of internal security, as directed\nby the Council and the President. In executing their responsibilities, the\nCommittees have demonstrated consistently a keen appreciation of the\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 21 -\nUNCLASSIFIED\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nnecessity for reconciling traditional American liberties with the contemporary\nrequirement for effective national security safeguards. Within that frame-\nwork they are achieving notable success in their efforts to effect adequate\ninternal security by the improvement of existing security measures, and the\nreadying of additional programs for application in the event of an increased\nemergency or general war.\nI: J. Patrick Patrick Coyne Syne\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\n- 22 -\nUNIOR SECRET\nAPPENDIX A\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nOFFICE OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE\nINTERDEPARTHENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nRoom 3D 327, The Pentagon\nWashington 25, D. C.\n18 November 1952\nMEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. PATRICK COYNE\nNSC Representative on Internal Security\nSUBJECT: Progress Report on Internal Security Prepared by the\nNSC Representative on Internal Security\n1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph A (4) of the\nICIS charter contained in NSC 17/6, dated 18 July 1949, the following\ncomments are submitted with reference to the report, above subject,\ndated 31 October 1952, prepared by you and the changes thereto,\ndated 14 November 1952. These comments are forwarded to you in\naccordance with letter submitted to your office by the Chairman, ICIS.\n2. The Department of Defense Representative on the ICIS concurs\nin the document referred to above with the exception of certain com-\nments contained in paragraph 31, entitled, \"NATO Security System -\nNational Security Authority.\"\n3. The Department of Defense makes strong objection to the\ncharge contained in the report that some of the regulations embodied\nin the NATO security system are contrary to internal security policies\nand regulations adopted by the National Security Council and approved\nby the President for the following reasons:\na. The NATO organization was established in August of 1949.\nAt that time one of the first considerations made by the Ad Hoc Group\nconvened for that purpose was the question of security as it concerned\nclassification, transmission and handling of documents. The ICIS,\nwhich was established in July 1949, was in no position then to act\non these matters. Therefore, a complete security plan was adopted in\naccordance with existing security standards and subsequently approved\non 18 November 1949 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This security\nplan corresponded in all details to that under which the JCS functioned\nat that time. It was far in excess of any minimum security standard\nfor the handling of classified documents then adopted by the Executive\nBranch of the Government. Later, the senior NATO governing body,\ncomposed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the\nSecretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Mutual Security\nAgency approved this document (known as DC/1) as U. S. representa-\ntives on the North Atlantic Council.\nAPPENDIX A\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nUNCLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nSIFIED\nSECURITY INFORMATIO\nb. The NATO organization continued to function under the\noriginal security regulations for approximately two years when, in the\ninterest of greater security administration, it was proposed that a\nrevision be made in order to provide a National Security Authority (NSA)\nfor each separate NATO country. The JCS properly proposed that the\ndesignation of such authority should be the prerogative of the ICIS.\nThe question was thereupon submitted to that Committee on 1 November\n1951. In order to present the entire problem to the ICIS, a complete\ncopy of the revised NATO security regulations, entitled DC 2/7, was\nsubmitted for reference purposes. ICIS action in this matter is\ncorrectly given in the disputed paragraph of your report. However, it\nis desired to point out that the ICIS and its Subcommittee on the Pro-\ntection of Classified Government Data had in its possession the new\nproposed MATO security regulations DC 2/7 for a period of approximately\nfive months, and at no time did any ICIS member state or suggest that\nthe regulations were contrary to any security policies and regulations\nof the Executive Department. If any such question had occurred, it is\ncertain to have been considered by responsible officials within the\nNATO structure prior to formal approval and adoption of the regulations\non 8 April 1952 by the Council Deputies. Further, it is desired to\npoint out that when the ICIS considered the question of the National\nSecurity Authority on 1 April 1952, the NSC representative on Internal\nSecurity made similar charges before the ICIS, and at that time the ICIS\ntook no action suggesting any changes in the NATO regulations.\nc. It is true that detailed comparison of the NATO security\ndocument DC 2/7 with the provisions of Executive Order 10290, para-\ngraph 25, Part IV, will result in some differences -- particularly\nas they refer to definitions of \"Top Secret\", \"Secret\", \"Confidential\"\nand \"Restricted\". However, the definitions of \"Top Secret\" and \"Secret\"\nare practically identical with those advocated by the ICIS in its\nsubmission of a recommended Executive Order to the NSC. These defini-\ntions were subsequently modified before publication of the Executive\nOrder. Nevertheless, the definitions used in the NATO document are\nnot materially contradictory to those prescribed in Executive Order\n10290, and, as a matter of fact, the detailed criteria and examples\nemployed in the NATO document are of material benefit as guidance to\nproper classification. It is agreed that under \"Confidential\" and\n\"Restricted\" as defined in the NATO document, there are provisions\nfor taking into account \"unwarranted injury to an individual\" and\n\"matters, investigation, documents of a personal and disciplinary nature\"\nboth of which considerations were deliberately excluded from Executive\nOrder 10290. Nevertheless, the practice of certain countries of taking\nsuch matters into account in classifying their documents obviously had\nto be accepted in order to achieve agreement at an international level,\nd. It is stated in the disputed paragraph that the views of\nthe ICIS were not solicited with respect to the NATO security regula-\ntions with the exception as to advice on the placement of a National\nAPPENDIX A\n- 24 -\nTOP SECRET\nUNCLASSIFIED\n20\nTOP SECURITY\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nSecurity Authority. On the contrary, the JCS and the Department of\nDefense Representatives on both the ICIS and IIC were continually\nconsulted in the preparation of the NATO security regulations and the\nthoughts contained therein reflected current security thinking of both\nthe ICIS and the IIC.\ne. It cannot be presumed that all U. S. security regulations\nwill be entirely absorbed within the NATO structure. Our U. S. repre-\nsentatives attempt to inject the best U. S. thinking on security matters\nbut they cannot guarantee entire acceptance by other nations. It is\nnoteworthy that the U.S., U.K. and France have reached complete agree-\nment on a system of security principles and standards comparable to our\nown. It is conceivable that it will be possible to extend these standards\nthroughout NATO countries.\n3. For the reasons mentioned above, it is desired to point out that\nwhile the NATO security regulations do not in all respects conform exactly\nwith U. S. regulations on the subject, it is my opinion that they are\nsubstantially identical and reflect the best thinking on security in\naccordance with U. S. standards. Further, they definitely do not con-\ntain anything contrary to the Internal Security policies and regulations\nadopted by the NSC and approved by the President.\n4. Under the circumstances, therefore, in order to correct any\nfalse impression as to the intent and purpose of the NATO \"security system,\nI recommend deletion of the entire discussion beginning at the bottom\nof Page 18, starting with the sentence \"It is noted, etc.\".\n5. If the recommendation contained in paragraph 4, above, is not\nacceptable, I propose that a copy of this memorandum accompany the report\nas a Department of Defense dissent.\n(signed) J. L. MC KEE\nMajor General, USA\nDefense Department Representative\non ICIS\nASSIFIED\nAPPENDIX A\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\n320\nAPPENDIX B\nUNCI ASSIFIED\nSECURITY INFORMATION\nNovember 21, 1952\nSTATEMENT BY THE NSC REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nI cannot concur in the recommendation (Appendix A) that certain\ndeletions be made in the foregoing report for the following reasons.\nSome of the NATO security regulations, as revised and approved\non April 8, 1952, are contrary to the spirit and letter of policies and\nregulations which were issued by the President at the time he approved\nExecutive Order 10290 on September 24, 1951.* For example, the classifi-\ncation \"Confidential\" and \"Restricted\" contained in the NATO security\nregulations authorize the use of the security classification system for\nwithholding such nonsecurity data as: (1) information which \"would cause\nunwarranted injury to an individual,\" (2) information \"of a personal and\ndisciplinary nature,\" and (3) information \"the knowledge of which it is\ndesirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.\" This authorization\nis contrary to Presidential instructions, issued with respect to Executive\nOrder 10290, which emphasize that: (1) \"the Order prohibits any agency from\nclassifying nonsecurity matters,\" and (2) that \"these regulations are to\nbe used exclusively to safeguard the security of the Nation and are not to\nbe used, under any circumstances, for any other purpose.\"\nThe misuse of the security classification system to withhold\nnonsecurity data of a personal and administrative nature is injurious to\nsecurity. The disguising of such nonsecurity information under security\nlabels jeopardizes efforts to fulfill the sole purpose of the security\nclassification system, namely, the safeguarding of official information\nwhich requires protection in the interest of the national security.\nDespite the aforementioned inconsistencies, the Internal Security\nCommittees of the Council were not given an opportunity to comment upon\nthe substantive content of the draft NATO security regulations prior to\ntheir formal adoption on April 8, 1952. While some of the individual\nmembers of the Committees may have been consulted with respect thereto,\nsuch consultation does not constitute action by the Committees as prescribed\nby existing NSC directives.\nWhen the NATO security regulations were submitted to ICIS for\nthe sole purpose of obtaining ICIS views concerning the designation of\na \"national security authority,\" I suggested to the ICIS that the pro-\nposed regulations should be examined substantively, since they appeared\nto conflict with the policies and regulations which had been announced\n# Executive Order 10290 establishes policies and regulations for\nthe classification, transmission, and handling of security\ninformation in the Executive Branch of the Government.\nAPPENDIX B\n- 26 -\nTOP SECRET IFIED\n1320\nTOP SECRET IED\nSECURITY INFORMATION\npreviously by the President. The Office of the Defense Department\nRepresentative on ICIS made it clear to the Committee at that time\nthat it opposed such an examination. Consequently, none was made.\nThe ICIS and IIC were established under the Council by the\nPresident on March 23, 1949, and were assigned exclusive responsibility\nfor coordinating the entire field of internal security, including\nresponsibility for furnishing expert guidance on internal security\nmatters to interested departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.\nAs to the policies and regulations promulgated with respect to the\nsecurity classification system of the U. S. Government, the President,\non September 25, 1951, \"directed the NSC, through its ICIS, to furnish\nadvice and assistance to the departments and agencies in connection with\nthese regulations (Executive Order 10290) and to maintain a continuing\nreview of the classification activities in every department or agency to\ninsure uniform and proper application of these regulations.\"\nI appreciate fully that on the basis of overriding national\nsecurity considerations, limited departure from prescribed internal\nsecurity practices may be required in the course of international negoti-\nations. However, I do not believe that security regulations, inconsistent\nwith or contrary to NSC-adopted and Presidentially-approved directives,\nshould be effectuated without the benefit of the views of the Internal\nSecurity Committees of the Council with respect to the impact of such\nproposed regulations upon the internal security of the United States.\nIn the light of the foregoing, it is my belief that I would not\nbe fulfilling my responsibility in reporting to the NSC pertinent facts\nregarding U. S. internal security if I refrained from inviting the attention\nof the Council to the two observations which are proposed for deletion,\nnamely, (1) some of the regulations embodied in the NATO Security System\nare contrary to policies and regulations adopted by the NSC and approved\nby the President; and (2) the duly designated Internal Security Committees\nof the Council should be afforded an opportunity to comment on the substan-\ntive content of any projected policies or regulations, before their\nadoption on either a national or international level, in the event they\naffect the internal security of the United States.\nIn connection with the foregoing it is noted that the ICIS\nRepresentatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice have\napproved the report as written and, insofar as it covers the activities\nof the companion committee, all members of the IIC have expressed their\nconcurrence therein.\nAPPENDIX B\n- 27 -\nTOP SECRET\nSIFIED"
}