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petroleum industries in both Venezuela and
lations, mines, or sugar mills in Argentina,
Mexico. Soviet saboteurs may also be present
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico,
in the petroleum industries in Argentina and
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In addition
Peru. In these four countries, present secu-
to oil in Venezuela and Mexico strategic ma-
rity measures are inadequate to deter effec-
terials particularly affected would be manga-
tively a concentrated Soviet-Communist sabo-
nese in Brazil, copper and iodine in Chile,
tage effort against vulnerable key points in
sugar in Cuba, lead and mercury in Mexico,
the petroleum facilities. Other likely targets
and tin and antimony in Bolivia. Commu-
are the petroleum facilities in Curacao, Aruba,
nist work-stoppage capabilities are greater
and Trinidad.
under present conditions, because the govern-
Because of the highly vulnerable nature of
ments concerned, with some minor exceptions,
some of the railway facilities, which could be
would limit the duration of work-stoppages if
damaged with only small amounts of equip-
not prevent them entirely in times of emer-
ment or technical ability, the Communists
gency.
are capable of immobilizing for a month or
During the period short of war, Communist
more vulnerable parts of railways serving the
labor leaders will endeavor to promote strikes
mining areas of Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil
largely to maintain or improve their positions
and Peru. Such action would restrict the
of leadership, to test their strength, and to
flow of tin, antimony, and lead in Bolivia; ni-
develop situations for propaganda exploita-
trate, iodine, and copper in Chile; antimony,
tion. In addition, they will promote consider-
arsenic, fluorspar, lead, zinc, cadmium, copper,
able labor agitation, in some cases causing
graphite, manganese, mercury, mica and tung-
economic instability. They will not inten-
sten in Mexico; manganese in Brazil; and lead,
tionally carry such actions so far as to invite
vanadium, and copper in Peru.
serious government countermeasures. In a
Soviet sabotage agents could use Pana-
war period, however, Communist leaders, if so
manian territory as a base of operations
encouraged by Soviet exhortation, will risk
against Panama Canal installations. Com-
their control of labor organizations and the
munists in Cuba are believed capable of sig-
livelihood of their members in an effort to
nificant sabotage in the sugar industry by fir-
paralyze strategic industries.
ing cane fields and damaging communication
The Latin American Communists can re-
and transport facilities. In other industries
duce the supply of critical and strategic ma-
and countries, local Communists are capable
terials through public agitation. Commu-
of minor and sporadic sabotage.
nists in Brazil have already organized front
groups capable of exploiting the theme of
It is estimated that Soviet-directed sabotage
nationalization of petroleum, monazite, and
will be reserved for the eve or the first stages
other strategic minerals. Although Bolivian
of a US-USSR war, and that local Commu-
Communist strength is not great, the Commu-
nists will perpetrate sporadic and isolated acts
nists, favored by unstable political conditions
of sabotage under current circumstances.
that are likely to result in mass disturbances,
Communists in most Latin American coun-
can probably touch off considerable violence
tries can develop labor-management disputes
and destruction and stoppage of economic ac-
over wages and working conditions into strikes
tivity and will make every effort to do so. In
and other types of work stoppages, particu-
a number of other Latin American countries,
larly if their leadership is not too evident.
Communists can and will add to agitation for
They can also prolong and intensify disputes
any proposed measures tending to deter pos-
not of Communist instigation. They cannot,
sible investments in the area, and they also
however, develop significant strikes for admit-
will add their weight to any local moves to-
tedly Soviet political purposes. Strikes last-
ward expropriation of foreign-owned proper-
ing two weeks or more can be effected on such
ties and reservation of national materials for
facilities as railways, ports, petroleum instal-
exclusively national use.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "5\npetroleum industries in both Venezuela and\nlations, mines, or sugar mills in Argentina,\nMexico. Soviet saboteurs may also be present\nBolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico,\nin the petroleum industries in Argentina and\nPeru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In addition\nPeru. In these four countries, present secu-\nto oil in Venezuela and Mexico strategic ma-\nrity measures are inadequate to deter effec-\nterials particularly affected would be manga-\ntively a concentrated Soviet-Communist sabo-\nnese in Brazil, copper and iodine in Chile,\ntage effort against vulnerable key points in\nsugar in Cuba, lead and mercury in Mexico,\nthe petroleum facilities. Other likely targets\nand tin and antimony in Bolivia. Commu-\nare the petroleum facilities in Curacao, Aruba,\nnist work-stoppage capabilities are greater\nand Trinidad.\nunder present conditions, because the govern-\nBecause of the highly vulnerable nature of\nments concerned, with some minor exceptions,\nsome of the railway facilities, which could be\nwould limit the duration of work-stoppages if\ndamaged with only small amounts of equip-\nnot prevent them entirely in times of emer-\nment or technical ability, the Communists\ngency.\nare capable of immobilizing for a month or\nDuring the period short of war, Communist\nmore vulnerable parts of railways serving the\nlabor leaders will endeavor to promote strikes\nmining areas of Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Brazil\nlargely to maintain or improve their positions\nand Peru. Such action would restrict the\nof leadership, to test their strength, and to\nflow of tin, antimony, and lead in Bolivia; ni-\ndevelop situations for propaganda exploita-\ntrate, iodine, and copper in Chile; antimony,\ntion. In addition, they will promote consider-\narsenic, fluorspar, lead, zinc, cadmium, copper,\nable labor agitation, in some cases causing\ngraphite, manganese, mercury, mica and tung-\neconomic instability. They will not inten-\nsten in Mexico; manganese in Brazil; and lead,\ntionally carry such actions so far as to invite\nvanadium, and copper in Peru.\nserious government countermeasures. In a\nSoviet sabotage agents could use Pana-\nwar period, however, Communist leaders, if so\nmanian territory as a base of operations\nencouraged by Soviet exhortation, will risk\nagainst Panama Canal installations. Com-\ntheir control of labor organizations and the\nmunists in Cuba are believed capable of sig-\nlivelihood of their members in an effort to\nnificant sabotage in the sugar industry by fir-\nparalyze strategic industries.\ning cane fields and damaging communication\nThe Latin American Communists can re-\nand transport facilities. In other industries\nduce the supply of critical and strategic ma-\nand countries, local Communists are capable\nterials through public agitation. Commu-\nof minor and sporadic sabotage.\nnists in Brazil have already organized front\ngroups capable of exploiting the theme of\nIt is estimated that Soviet-directed sabotage\nnationalization of petroleum, monazite, and\nwill be reserved for the eve or the first stages\nother strategic minerals. Although Bolivian\nof a US-USSR war, and that local Commu-\nCommunist strength is not great, the Commu-\nnists will perpetrate sporadic and isolated acts\nnists, favored by unstable political conditions\nof sabotage under current circumstances.\nthat are likely to result in mass disturbances,\nCommunists in most Latin American coun-\ncan probably touch off considerable violence\ntries can develop labor-management disputes\nand destruction and stoppage of economic ac-\nover wages and working conditions into strikes\ntivity and will make every effort to do so. In\nand other types of work stoppages, particu-\na number of other Latin American countries,\nlarly if their leadership is not too evident.\nCommunists can and will add to agitation for\nThey can also prolong and intensify disputes\nany proposed measures tending to deter pos-\nnot of Communist instigation. They cannot,\nsible investments in the area, and they also\nhowever, develop significant strikes for admit-\nwill add their weight to any local moves to-\ntedly Soviet political purposes. Strikes last-\nward expropriation of foreign-owned proper-\ning two weeks or more can be effected on such\nties and reservation of national materials for\nfacilities as railways, ports, petroleum instal-\nexclusively national use.\nSECRET"
}