Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe
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NEUTRALITY AND THIRD-FORCE TENDENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE
SUMMARY
Recent events in the Far East, the develop-
the constancy of US policy and support. The
ment of the ECA and MDAP programs, and
Third-Force concept, on the other hand, has
various other factors, have brought into focus
received more explicit formulation and has
the position of West European governments
been espoused by influential groups and indi-
toward contributing to West European de-
viduals within certain West European govern-
fense. A wide variety of minority groups,
ment and official circles.
however, in Western Europe (the NATO coun-
Neutralist sentiment is likely to remain
tries plus Western Germany) espouse the con-
strong, and will increase if there is serious
cepts of (a) neutrality, which involves out-
economic dislocation in Western Europe and
right dissociation from the East-West conflict
if the military position of the US, especially
and non-participation in any war unless di-
in the Far East, is weakened. The govern-
rectly attacked; or of (b) Third-Force, which
ments of Western Europe will tend to respond
looks to the restoration of European inde-
to popular demands for an independent (but
pendence in order to exert influence in the
not neutral) policy as their needs for US
East-West conflict and reduce the preponder-
economic and military support decrease.
ance of the US in European affairs. The
exact strength or degree of importance of
Neither the growth of neutrality nor of Third-
neutralist sentiment is difficult to measure be-
Force sentiment will, however, outweigh the
cause it is diffused throughout the popula-
factors that induce West European govern-
tions and stems largely from war-weariness,
ments to support the achievement of US objec-
defeatism, fear of the USSR, and distrust of
tives in Western Europe during 1950-53.
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report; for a dissent of the Intelligence Organization of
the Department of State, see Enclosure. This report contains information available to
CIA as of 13 November 1950.
SECRE
1
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nNEUTRALITY AND THIRD-FORCE TENDENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE\nSUMMARY\nRecent events in the Far East, the develop-\nthe constancy of US policy and support. The\nment of the ECA and MDAP programs, and\nThird-Force concept, on the other hand, has\nvarious other factors, have brought into focus\nreceived more explicit formulation and has\nthe position of West European governments\nbeen espoused by influential groups and indi-\ntoward contributing to West European de-\nviduals within certain West European govern-\nfense. A wide variety of minority groups,\nment and official circles.\nhowever, in Western Europe (the NATO coun-\nNeutralist sentiment is likely to remain\ntries plus Western Germany) espouse the con-\nstrong, and will increase if there is serious\ncepts of (a) neutrality, which involves out-\neconomic dislocation in Western Europe and\nright dissociation from the East-West conflict\nif the military position of the US, especially\nand non-participation in any war unless di-\nin the Far East, is weakened. The govern-\nrectly attacked; or of (b) Third-Force, which\nments of Western Europe will tend to respond\nlooks to the restoration of European inde-\nto popular demands for an independent (but\npendence in order to exert influence in the\nnot neutral) policy as their needs for US\nEast-West conflict and reduce the preponder-\neconomic and military support decrease.\nance of the US in European affairs. The\nexact strength or degree of importance of\nNeither the growth of neutrality nor of Third-\nneutralist sentiment is difficult to measure be-\nForce sentiment will, however, outweigh the\ncause it is diffused throughout the popula-\nfactors that induce West European govern-\ntions and stems largely from war-weariness,\nments to support the achievement of US objec-\ndefeatism, fear of the USSR, and distrust of\ntives in Western Europe during 1950-53.\nNote: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air\nForce have concurred in this report; for a dissent of the Intelligence Organization of\nthe Department of State, see Enclosure. This report contains information available to\nCIA as of 13 November 1950.\nSECRE\n1"
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