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{
    "localId": "470154798",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe",
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    "id": "470154798",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470154798",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
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            "day": 19,
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    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n3\nIn Germany, opposition to remilitarization\nof much of their dependence on the dollar\ncan in part be ascribed to neutralist senti-\narea.\nment, arising mainly out of war-weariness\nMilitary. The military reasons for neu-\nand the wish not to be involved in an East-\ntralist sentiment in the NATO countries stem\nWest war. The relative lack of influence of\nfrom: (1) the assumption that the Western\nthe neutrality groups and their failure to find\nEuropean countries, particularly under the\ncurrent NATO arrangements, could not be\nsympathy in the governments of the NATO\nsuccessfully defended in the face of possible\nnations should not obscure the fact that their\nattack by Soviet forces in overwhelming num-\nideas have some basis in the thinking of the\nbers; (2) the belief that atomic attack, inevi-\nmasses of the people, who support that policy\ntable in such a war because the USSR now pos-\nwhich offers to them the greatest assurance\nsesses an atomic capability, would mean the\nof peace and security.\ncomplete destruction of Western Europe; and\nc. Factors Contributing to Neutralist Senti-\n(3) inability of West European governments\nment.\nto make adequate preparations for the defense\nof Western Europe against Soviet attack.\nThe various factors contributing to neu-\ntralist sentiment in the NATO countries are\nBecause of the strong feeling that Western\npsychological as well as political, economic,\nEurope cannot be defended, in view of the lack\nand military. There are, in addition, many\nof any military force capable of resisting So-\nfactors peculiar to the individual countries.\nviet ground and air forces, West Europeans\nPolitical. Western European neutrality\ncan derive little comfort from the thought of\nsentiment stems from a conviction that the\nAllied naval superiority and strategic air\nEast-West conflict is primarily between two\nstrength in relation to possibilities of Soviet\nattack.\nrival imperialist powers, the US and the USSR,\nand should not be permitted to spread to the\nPsychological. Much of the neutralist psy-\nWest European nations. Another argument\nchology, especially in France and Italy, arises\nis that the Soviet Union does not want a war,\nfrom war-weariness and defeatism growing\nbut requires peace for its proper economic and\nout of World War II. Many of the French,\nsocial development. In addition, the neu-\nfor example, are inclined to question the effi-\ntralists have seized upon the recent shift of\ncacy of any military struggle since, in their\ninternational activity to the Far East to warn\nview, there is little distinction between the\nagainst West European involvement in that\neffects of victory and defeat. French and\narea. Finally, these groups attempt to mini-\nGermans alike dread the thought of having\nmize the extent of interests common to the\ntheir homelands once again become battle-\nUS and to the West European nations and the\ngrounds, particularly in a war waged with\nideological ties that exist between the two\natomic bombs.\nareas.\nCommunist Influence. In their struggle\nEconomic. West European neutralists de-\nagainst the maintenance of the US-Western\nplore the maintenance of the US-West Euro-\nEurope alignment, the Communist parties of\npean alignment in its present form as confirm-\nWestern Europe, through their anti-Marshall\ning the economic as well as the political divi-\nPlan propaganda, their campaigns against the\nsion of the European continent and its perma-\nMDAP, and especially their \"peace move-\nnent economic subordination to the US.\nment,\" have exploited genuine neutralist\nThey further stress the dangers of West Eu-\nsentiment in Western Europe. The peace\nropean attachment to what they consider a\ncampaign, built around the Stockholm ap-\npowerful and privileged economy, and empha-\nsize that withdrawal from the East-West con-\npeal, has had some success in winning support\nflict and assumption of a neutral position\nfrom non-Communist elements, particularly\nwould facilitate the resumption of East-West\nin France and Italy, and to a lesser degree in\ntrade, restore the balance in the European\nspreading the notion that the USSR is essen-\neconomy, and relieve Marshall Plan countries\ntially dedicated to peace.\nUISECREAED"
}