Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe
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SECRET
NATIONAL
4
RECORDS
Aliso
Local Factors. In addition to these over-
the eyes of its various advocates, the Third-
all factors, there are local problems which con-
Force concept may vary from a distinctly pro-
tribute to the existence of neutralist senti-
Western orientation (Adenauer's version) to a
ment in the NATO countries. In France and
position permitting close trade relations and
Italy, where national Communist parties are
more cooperation with the East. Under ex-
powerful politically and dominate the trade
treme nationalist leaders, in Western Ger-
unions, the neutralists argue that neutrality
many in particular, the latter position would
is the sole means of achieving internal unity
represent a serious obstacle to US foreign
supported by all political groups. In Italy the
policy.
restrictive features of the peace treaty have
The more important implications of these
contributed to neutralist sentiment, while in
tendencies toward independence of US poli-
Western Germany neutrality is sometimes ad-
cies, however, lie in the various schemes of
vanced as the sole means of securing the unity
West European integration. Emphasis has
of East and West Germany. This latter view
changed somewhat from the Third Force as
is also espoused by elements in the Evangelical
an organization which would stand between
Church, including Pastor Niemoeller, and has
the US and the USSR and act as a mediator
also played a part in the tensions in the West
to the more recent version, supported by con-
German Cabinet. In Denmark, and to some
tinental European Socialists in particular,
degree in Norway, the profound feeling for
which conceives of the Third Force as a con-
Scandinavian unity is a factor in promoting
tinental grouping firmly integrated into the
neutrality sentiment.
Atlantic community and capable of wielding
an influence comparable to that of the US and
3. Third-Force Thinking.
the UK. Effective development of the Schu-
Third-Force thinking in West European
man Plan establishing a coal-steel pool for a
countries differs from the neutrality concept
single market in Western Europe would create
in that it does not reject participation in the
a powerful economic and political basis for
East-West conflict, but rather demands par-
such a movement. Under such circum-
ticipation on terms of equality. The Third
stances, the Third Force might become a con-
Force envisages independent policy formula-
tinental combination capable of exploiting the
tion for each country, or for Western Europe
East-West conflict, rather than supporting, in
as a whole. Thus it rejects a completely neu-
every instance, the policies of the US.
tral attitude, but encourages policies inde-
The national concepts of independent ac-
pendent of and sometimes in direct opposition
tion, which have found support in the UK and
to those of the US. It is based largely on the
in the Scandinavian members of the NATO,
pursuit of national or regional interests which
and the Third-Force principles held in other
do not always conform to those of the US, and
continental countries included in the NATO,
on a general concern over US predominance.
are favored by the following factors: (1) the
It consists of a desire to regain West European
traditional national and European independ-
freedom of action in world affairs by creating
ence of action that has survived the defeatism
in Western Europe conditions for exerting
considerable influence in the East-West con-
of war; (2) the obvious differences in eco-
flict, or at least of adopting an independent
nomic, cultural, and material interests which
foreign affairs role. An example is the UK's
distinguish Europe from the US; (3) the prog-
more or less consistent policy of remaining
ress toward West European economic recov-
aloof from current schemes for European in-
ery which has lessened, even if it has not
tegration. In addition, West German Chan-
closed, the gap between European and US eco-
cellor Adenauer has called for the creation of
nomic power; and (4) the growing belief, sup-
a powerful united Western Europe (including
ported by the shift in the military develop-
Western Germany) which could develop into
ments in the Far East, that the US has in-
a Third Force in the East-West conflict, or
creasing need of the political, economic, and
as a "counterweight in favor of peace." In
military alliance of the European powers.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nNATIONAL\n4\nRECORDS\nAliso\nLocal Factors. In addition to these over-\nthe eyes of its various advocates, the Third-\nall factors, there are local problems which con-\nForce concept may vary from a distinctly pro-\ntribute to the existence of neutralist senti-\nWestern orientation (Adenauer's version) to a\nment in the NATO countries. In France and\nposition permitting close trade relations and\nItaly, where national Communist parties are\nmore cooperation with the East. Under ex-\npowerful politically and dominate the trade\ntreme nationalist leaders, in Western Ger-\nunions, the neutralists argue that neutrality\nmany in particular, the latter position would\nis the sole means of achieving internal unity\nrepresent a serious obstacle to US foreign\nsupported by all political groups. In Italy the\npolicy.\nrestrictive features of the peace treaty have\nThe more important implications of these\ncontributed to neutralist sentiment, while in\ntendencies toward independence of US poli-\nWestern Germany neutrality is sometimes ad-\ncies, however, lie in the various schemes of\nvanced as the sole means of securing the unity\nWest European integration. Emphasis has\nof East and West Germany. This latter view\nchanged somewhat from the Third Force as\nis also espoused by elements in the Evangelical\nan organization which would stand between\nChurch, including Pastor Niemoeller, and has\nthe US and the USSR and act as a mediator\nalso played a part in the tensions in the West\nto the more recent version, supported by con-\nGerman Cabinet. In Denmark, and to some\ntinental European Socialists in particular,\ndegree in Norway, the profound feeling for\nwhich conceives of the Third Force as a con-\nScandinavian unity is a factor in promoting\ntinental grouping firmly integrated into the\nneutrality sentiment.\nAtlantic community and capable of wielding\nan influence comparable to that of the US and\n3. Third-Force Thinking.\nthe UK. Effective development of the Schu-\nThird-Force thinking in West European\nman Plan establishing a coal-steel pool for a\ncountries differs from the neutrality concept\nsingle market in Western Europe would create\nin that it does not reject participation in the\na powerful economic and political basis for\nEast-West conflict, but rather demands par-\nsuch a movement. Under such circum-\nticipation on terms of equality. The Third\nstances, the Third Force might become a con-\nForce envisages independent policy formula-\ntinental combination capable of exploiting the\ntion for each country, or for Western Europe\nEast-West conflict, rather than supporting, in\nas a whole. Thus it rejects a completely neu-\nevery instance, the policies of the US.\ntral attitude, but encourages policies inde-\nThe national concepts of independent ac-\npendent of and sometimes in direct opposition\ntion, which have found support in the UK and\nto those of the US. It is based largely on the\nin the Scandinavian members of the NATO,\npursuit of national or regional interests which\nand the Third-Force principles held in other\ndo not always conform to those of the US, and\ncontinental countries included in the NATO,\non a general concern over US predominance.\nare favored by the following factors: (1) the\nIt consists of a desire to regain West European\ntraditional national and European independ-\nfreedom of action in world affairs by creating\nence of action that has survived the defeatism\nin Western Europe conditions for exerting\nconsiderable influence in the East-West con-\nof war; (2) the obvious differences in eco-\nflict, or at least of adopting an independent\nnomic, cultural, and material interests which\nforeign affairs role. An example is the UK's\ndistinguish Europe from the US; (3) the prog-\nmore or less consistent policy of remaining\nress toward West European economic recov-\naloof from current schemes for European in-\nery which has lessened, even if it has not\ntegration. In addition, West German Chan-\nclosed, the gap between European and US eco-\ncellor Adenauer has called for the creation of\nnomic power; and (4) the growing belief, sup-\na powerful united Western Europe (including\nported by the shift in the military develop-\nWestern Germany) which could develop into\nments in the Far East, that the US has in-\na Third Force in the East-West conflict, or\ncreasing need of the political, economic, and\nas a \"counterweight in favor of peace.\" In\nmilitary alliance of the European powers.\nSECRET"
}