Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe
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L'SECRET
5
4. Probable Future Development of Neutrality
the advancing costs of living. If granted, the
and Third-Force Sentiment.
increases will accelerate the wage-price infla-
a. Political Factors.
tionary spiral unless at the same time produc-
tivity is raised substantially; if not granted,
The intensification of the East-West con-
widespread strikes are likely to cripple the
flict marked by a deteriorating East Asian sit-
rearmament effort. The net effect of such
uation is likely to have considerable bearing on
developments will be to stimulate neutrality
the development of West European neutrality
or Third-Force sentiment, especially among
or Third-Force sentiment in the period 1950-
the industrial workers and the middle-income
53. The fact of open conflict between the US
groups, who are strongly opposed to losing the
and a Soviet satellite, with the attendant
precarious gains achieved under postwar re-
strains on world peace mechanisms, has
construction programs, and who are already
heightened European alarm and desire to
doubtful of the possibility or wisdom of trying
escape involvement in a third world war. In-
to strengthen Western Europe militarily to re-
creasing involvement of the US in the Far East
sist the Soviet threat. Such sentiment will be
will increase European fears of US inability to
actively encouraged and exploited by Soviet
defend West Europe against Soviet aggression.
propaganda designed to frighten Western
Sentiment for independent action on the part
Europeans away from participation in alleged
of the West European countries may on the
US plans for an attack on the USSR.
contrary increase. As their individual and
collective military capabilities gain a greater
The economic cost to Western Europe of an
degree of economic stability, they will seek to
adequate rearmament program will raise
adopt policies more independent of the US.
strong opposition in many circles not yet in
b. Economic Factors.
sympathy with neutrality or Third-Force
The rearmament program will call for a
groups. US willingness to help finance the
substantial economic contribution. Diversion
program or provide the equipment will tend
to counteract this opposition, but a demand
of any considerable portion of the West Euro-
for extensive European self-help will increase
pean productive capacity to defense objectives
will place a heavy burden upon the economy.
popular resistance to the pursuit of US ob-
The amount of such diversion is not certain be-
jectives and will diminish the willingness of
cause, except in Germany, there remains a
the governments to make commitments within
considerable military industrial capacity pres-
the program. Neutrality sentiment can be
ently unused. Sacrifices will also be de-
expected to flourish and make converts in any
manded of the people in the form of higher
period of economic hardship induced by large-
taxes and lower living standards, and West
scale preparations for defense in Western
Europeans will be very reluctant to make such
Europe, and US defense efforts will be success-
sacrifices as long as a substantial number of
ful only in proportion to the degree of eco-
nomic stability maintained in Western Europe
them can be persuaded to hope that it is still
over the next few years.
possible to stay out of a war between the US
and the USSR, or until it is generally accepted
C. Military Factors.
that the military establishment thus created
A considerable amount of neutrality and
will guarantee their security.
Third-Force sentiment will probably develop
Rearmament is also likely to generate a
unless decisive preparations are made at once
serious inflation unless the West European
to defend Western Europe against possible So-
governments are prepared to restore or exert
viet aggression. The recent US announce-
more drastic controls over prices and alloca-
ment of its willingness to despatch additional
tion and distribution of materials than is at
troops to Western Europe will be effective in
present the case. Prices have already begun
reducing such sentiment only if reinforce-
to rise sharply in many Western European na-
ment is undertaken on a scale sufficient to con-
tions, partly as a result of the disturbance in
vince West Europeans that there is some
Korea. Serious labor trouble is in prospect
chance of repelling a Soviet attack across the
as the workers demand wage increases to meet
Elbe. Neutralist thinking will be intensified
ARCHIVENAL
THAT
UNSECRET
RECORD
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"ocrText": "L'SECRET\n5\n4. Probable Future Development of Neutrality\nthe advancing costs of living. If granted, the\nand Third-Force Sentiment.\nincreases will accelerate the wage-price infla-\na. Political Factors.\ntionary spiral unless at the same time produc-\ntivity is raised substantially; if not granted,\nThe intensification of the East-West con-\nwidespread strikes are likely to cripple the\nflict marked by a deteriorating East Asian sit-\nrearmament effort. The net effect of such\nuation is likely to have considerable bearing on\ndevelopments will be to stimulate neutrality\nthe development of West European neutrality\nor Third-Force sentiment, especially among\nor Third-Force sentiment in the period 1950-\nthe industrial workers and the middle-income\n53. The fact of open conflict between the US\ngroups, who are strongly opposed to losing the\nand a Soviet satellite, with the attendant\nprecarious gains achieved under postwar re-\nstrains on world peace mechanisms, has\nconstruction programs, and who are already\nheightened European alarm and desire to\ndoubtful of the possibility or wisdom of trying\nescape involvement in a third world war. In-\nto strengthen Western Europe militarily to re-\ncreasing involvement of the US in the Far East\nsist the Soviet threat. Such sentiment will be\nwill increase European fears of US inability to\nactively encouraged and exploited by Soviet\ndefend West Europe against Soviet aggression.\npropaganda designed to frighten Western\nSentiment for independent action on the part\nEuropeans away from participation in alleged\nof the West European countries may on the\nUS plans for an attack on the USSR.\ncontrary increase. As their individual and\ncollective military capabilities gain a greater\nThe economic cost to Western Europe of an\ndegree of economic stability, they will seek to\nadequate rearmament program will raise\nadopt policies more independent of the US.\nstrong opposition in many circles not yet in\nb. Economic Factors.\nsympathy with neutrality or Third-Force\nThe rearmament program will call for a\ngroups. US willingness to help finance the\nsubstantial economic contribution. Diversion\nprogram or provide the equipment will tend\nto counteract this opposition, but a demand\nof any considerable portion of the West Euro-\nfor extensive European self-help will increase\npean productive capacity to defense objectives\nwill place a heavy burden upon the economy.\npopular resistance to the pursuit of US ob-\nThe amount of such diversion is not certain be-\njectives and will diminish the willingness of\ncause, except in Germany, there remains a\nthe governments to make commitments within\nconsiderable military industrial capacity pres-\nthe program. Neutrality sentiment can be\nently unused. Sacrifices will also be de-\nexpected to flourish and make converts in any\nmanded of the people in the form of higher\nperiod of economic hardship induced by large-\ntaxes and lower living standards, and West\nscale preparations for defense in Western\nEuropeans will be very reluctant to make such\nEurope, and US defense efforts will be success-\nsacrifices as long as a substantial number of\nful only in proportion to the degree of eco-\nnomic stability maintained in Western Europe\nthem can be persuaded to hope that it is still\nover the next few years.\npossible to stay out of a war between the US\nand the USSR, or until it is generally accepted\nC. Military Factors.\nthat the military establishment thus created\nA considerable amount of neutrality and\nwill guarantee their security.\nThird-Force sentiment will probably develop\nRearmament is also likely to generate a\nunless decisive preparations are made at once\nserious inflation unless the West European\nto defend Western Europe against possible So-\ngovernments are prepared to restore or exert\nviet aggression. The recent US announce-\nmore drastic controls over prices and alloca-\nment of its willingness to despatch additional\ntion and distribution of materials than is at\ntroops to Western Europe will be effective in\npresent the case. Prices have already begun\nreducing such sentiment only if reinforce-\nto rise sharply in many Western European na-\nment is undertaken on a scale sufficient to con-\ntions, partly as a result of the disturbance in\nvince West Europeans that there is some\nKorea. Serious labor trouble is in prospect\nchance of repelling a Soviet attack across the\nas the workers demand wage increases to meet\nElbe. Neutralist thinking will be intensified\nARCHIVENAL\nTHAT\nUNSECRET\nRECORD"
}