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formula for remilitarization it would find ac-
old officer corps and of manpower trained and
ceptable would be German participation in a
in service under the Nazi regime. Expedi-
"European defense force." The SPD, how-
ency, time, and available facilities would pre-
ever, refuses to consider any remilitarization
clude selection of an entirely new officer corps.
plans until: (1) Allied forces in Germany are
Even if the former officers were screened so
made strong enough not merely to defend the
as to eliminate the most active Nazis, they
Elbe line successfully, but also to liberate East
would still constitute a body with strongly
Germany immediately and carry the war onto
authoritarian political tendencies, which
enemy territory; (2) Germany is made fully
might again become a powerful factor in Ger-
sovereign and equal to the other Western
many. Under their leadership, the new Ger-
European countries; and (3) a new Bundestag
man military establishment might arouse ex-
has been elected. In addition, the SPD has
treme nationalist and irredentist sentiment
taken the position that remilitarization would
(especially among the more than 8 million
have to be preceded by amendment of the
refugees and expellees), provide a cover or or-
Basic Law requiring a two-thirds Bundestag
ganizational center for various extreme right-
majority. The SPD might agree to support re-
ist groups, and influence the government by
militarization for something less than satis-
the mere weight of its position in political and
faction of its extreme demands, but it would
economic life. Military influence over the
be even more insistent than the Federal Gov-
government might lead to the alienation of
ernment on a major increase in the strength
the trade unions, the SPD, and even the left
of Allied forces in Germany. The very scope
wing of the CDU, and thereby weaken the co-
of the SPD demands, if not modified, would
hesion of the present pro-Western front in
place the Adenauer administration in a diffi-
Germany. Moreover, the coordinated de-
cult position. However, especially in view of
velopment of German economic and military
the existing opposition to rearmament, SPD
strengths may well lead to their amalgama-
support would appear to be a necessary pre-
tion and eventual ascendancy over the Fed-
requisite for the implementation of the re-
eral Government. The relative weakness of
militarization program.
this government, stemming from its lack of
For West Germany as a whole, remilitariza-
firm popular support and the probable in-
tion would bring about a greater measure of
ability or unwillingness of the present Ger-
sovereignty and international equality,
man bureaucracy to combat the military,
strengthen German prestige and bargaining
could promote such a development.
power, and increase the scope of federal au-
Another problem for Western security is
thority over the Laender. Remilitarization
posed by the doubtful position of some mili-
would necessitate formation of a federal de-
tary circles in the East-West struggle. An
fense ministry and might eventually require
anti-Communist attitude on the part of these
some form of military conscription. It would
cliques would not by any means exclude at-
shift the burden of industrial production from
tempts to reach expedient agreements directly
civilian use to military requirements. The
with the USSR or through East Germany.
general expansion of industrial activity would
Such attempts would be in line with the
absorb a large number of the unemployed and
thought, historically strong in German mili-
increase the national product, thus compen-
tary sets, that Germany's destiny lies in the
sating for a possible consumer goods shortage.
East, and that Germany has prospered most
An increase in taxation and allocation of ma-
when it has been on friendly terms with Rus-
terials in short supply would be inevitable.
sia. The revival of this tradition, which finds
The introduction of a German military or-
support on both the extreme Right and Left,
ganization into the present West German
might be given impetus by the belief that the
scene will pose serious problems for future
Western Powers will not be able to prevent a
German political development along demo-
Soviet advance in Western Europe and that
cratic lines. Effective remilitarization of
German unification can be achieved only with
West Germany will require some use of the
the help of the USSR. Those who seek an
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n4\nformula for remilitarization it would find ac-\nold officer corps and of manpower trained and\nceptable would be German participation in a\nin service under the Nazi regime. Expedi-\n\"European defense force.\" The SPD, how-\nency, time, and available facilities would pre-\never, refuses to consider any remilitarization\nclude selection of an entirely new officer corps.\nplans until: (1) Allied forces in Germany are\nEven if the former officers were screened so\nmade strong enough not merely to defend the\nas to eliminate the most active Nazis, they\nElbe line successfully, but also to liberate East\nwould still constitute a body with strongly\nGermany immediately and carry the war onto\nauthoritarian political tendencies, which\nenemy territory; (2) Germany is made fully\nmight again become a powerful factor in Ger-\nsovereign and equal to the other Western\nmany. Under their leadership, the new Ger-\nEuropean countries; and (3) a new Bundestag\nman military establishment might arouse ex-\nhas been elected. In addition, the SPD has\ntreme nationalist and irredentist sentiment\ntaken the position that remilitarization would\n(especially among the more than 8 million\nhave to be preceded by amendment of the\nrefugees and expellees), provide a cover or or-\nBasic Law requiring a two-thirds Bundestag\nganizational center for various extreme right-\nmajority. The SPD might agree to support re-\nist groups, and influence the government by\nmilitarization for something less than satis-\nthe mere weight of its position in political and\nfaction of its extreme demands, but it would\neconomic life. Military influence over the\nbe even more insistent than the Federal Gov-\ngovernment might lead to the alienation of\nernment on a major increase in the strength\nthe trade unions, the SPD, and even the left\nof Allied forces in Germany. The very scope\nwing of the CDU, and thereby weaken the co-\nof the SPD demands, if not modified, would\nhesion of the present pro-Western front in\nplace the Adenauer administration in a diffi-\nGermany. Moreover, the coordinated de-\ncult position. However, especially in view of\nvelopment of German economic and military\nthe existing opposition to rearmament, SPD\nstrengths may well lead to their amalgama-\nsupport would appear to be a necessary pre-\ntion and eventual ascendancy over the Fed-\nrequisite for the implementation of the re-\neral Government. The relative weakness of\nmilitarization program.\nthis government, stemming from its lack of\nFor West Germany as a whole, remilitariza-\nfirm popular support and the probable in-\ntion would bring about a greater measure of\nability or unwillingness of the present Ger-\nsovereignty and international equality,\nman bureaucracy to combat the military,\nstrengthen German prestige and bargaining\ncould promote such a development.\npower, and increase the scope of federal au-\nAnother problem for Western security is\nthority over the Laender. Remilitarization\nposed by the doubtful position of some mili-\nwould necessitate formation of a federal de-\ntary circles in the East-West struggle. An\nfense ministry and might eventually require\nanti-Communist attitude on the part of these\nsome form of military conscription. It would\ncliques would not by any means exclude at-\nshift the burden of industrial production from\ntempts to reach expedient agreements directly\ncivilian use to military requirements. The\nwith the USSR or through East Germany.\ngeneral expansion of industrial activity would\nSuch attempts would be in line with the\nabsorb a large number of the unemployed and\nthought, historically strong in German mili-\nincrease the national product, thus compen-\ntary sets, that Germany's destiny lies in the\nsating for a possible consumer goods shortage.\nEast, and that Germany has prospered most\nAn increase in taxation and allocation of ma-\nwhen it has been on friendly terms with Rus-\nterials in short supply would be inevitable.\nsia. The revival of this tradition, which finds\nThe introduction of a German military or-\nsupport on both the extreme Right and Left,\nganization into the present West German\nmight be given impetus by the belief that the\nscene will pose serious problems for future\nWestern Powers will not be able to prevent a\nGerman political development along demo-\nSoviet advance in Western Europe and that\ncratic lines. Effective remilitarization of\nGerman unification can be achieved only with\nWest Germany will require some use of the\nthe help of the USSR. Those who seek an\nSECRET"
}