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App-1
APPENDIX
DISCUSSION OF FACTS
1.
Introduction
a. The number of weapons in the Soviet stockpile 18 calculated from
the estimated cumulative production of fissionable material
The estimated cumulative production or fission-
able material, in turn, is based principally upon the estimated rate of
production of uranium metal and upon data which indicate time scales of
activity. The firmest point in this time schedule is the date of the
first Soviet atomic explosion, which establishes the date when the first
critical mass was available.
The
accuracy of the current weapons stockpile estimate is evidently limited
by the accuracy of the estimates of uranium metal production and of the
time scales of construction of the production units, using the date of
the Soviet explosion as a known fixed point.
b. The estimate of future Soviet production is subject to even
larger uncertainties than the estimate of past production. In addition
to the uncertainties in estimating future uranium production and time
scales, the possibility of future technological developments and the
increasing complexity of the Soviet program increase the number of
parameters which must be considered. Estimates of future weapon produc-
tion based on uranium supplies alone cannot be regarded as maximum, since
depleted uranium can be recovered and reused. These parameters can be
accurately evaluated only on the basis of detailed technical information
from within the USSR,
Even if such detailed
information were available to define accurately the present Soviet
capabilities, the rapid developments in the field of atomic energy make
it most improbable that even the Soviets themselves could at this time
give an accurate estimate of their cumulative atomic weapon stockpile in
mid-1954.
c. It is hoped that within the next six months the program for
A second firm time point would be
obtained by the detection of a Soviet test of a weapon containing
a. Despite the uncertainties, the Soviet atomic energy program as
set forth herein is believed to represent the best estimate consistent
PROGRACTED DATA
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"ocrText": "App-1\nAPPENDIX\nDISCUSSION OF FACTS\n1.\nIntroduction\na. The number of weapons in the Soviet stockpile 18 calculated from\nthe estimated cumulative production of fissionable material\nThe estimated cumulative production or fission-\nable material, in turn, is based principally upon the estimated rate of\nproduction of uranium metal and upon data which indicate time scales of\nactivity. The firmest point in this time schedule is the date of the\nfirst Soviet atomic explosion, which establishes the date when the first\ncritical mass was available.\nThe\naccuracy of the current weapons stockpile estimate is evidently limited\nby the accuracy of the estimates of uranium metal production and of the\ntime scales of construction of the production units, using the date of\nthe Soviet explosion as a known fixed point.\nb. The estimate of future Soviet production is subject to even\nlarger uncertainties than the estimate of past production. In addition\nto the uncertainties in estimating future uranium production and time\nscales, the possibility of future technological developments and the\nincreasing complexity of the Soviet program increase the number of\nparameters which must be considered. Estimates of future weapon produc-\ntion based on uranium supplies alone cannot be regarded as maximum, since\ndepleted uranium can be recovered and reused. These parameters can be\naccurately evaluated only on the basis of detailed technical information\nfrom within the USSR,\nEven if such detailed\ninformation were available to define accurately the present Soviet\ncapabilities, the rapid developments in the field of atomic energy make\nit most improbable that even the Soviets themselves could at this time\ngive an accurate estimate of their cumulative atomic weapon stockpile in\nmid-1954.\nc. It is hoped that within the next six months the program for\nA second firm time point would be\nobtained by the detection of a Soviet test of a weapon containing\na. Despite the uncertainties, the Soviet atomic energy program as\nset forth herein is believed to represent the best estimate consistent\nPROGRACTED DATA"
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