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ΓOP SECRET SOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS 18 September 1946 1. Since the publication of Special Study No. 3 on 24 August 1946 on the possibility of early Soviet military aggression there have been additional reports suggesting the imminence of such action. The most notable of them are: a. That MVD chiefs from Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, and the French, British, and U.S. Zones in Germany, meeting at Brussels on 25 August, were directed to disrupt industrial activity in their respective areas through sabotage, strikes, and disorders, in preparation for "military action in the months to come." b. That Stalin, on 2 September, issued an order discon- tinuing Soviet demobilization and directing that personnel in process of demobilization return to their units. C. That Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian troops have been concentrated on the Greek frontier. d. That the Soviets intend to seize Istanbul by force on the night of 18-19 September. 2. Each of these reports may be explained on other grounds than the imminence of aggressive Soviet military operations. a. The first evidently refers to future, and perhaps hypo- thetical, Soviet military action. The fact that the strikes and disorders have not yet occurred would indicate that the action referred to is at least not imminent. b. It has long been anticipated that Soviet demobilization would be discontinued on the completion of its third stage about 1 Septem- ber. The only disturbing aspect of the report is the reference to the re- call of men in process of demobilization. The report is from an unsure source; it is possible that the alarmist element was introduced in its - 1 - TOP SECRET

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    "ocrText": "ΓOP SECRET\nSOVIET MILITARY INTENTIONS\n18 September 1946\n1. Since the publication of Special Study No. 3 on 24 August 1946\non the possibility of early Soviet military aggression there have been\nadditional reports suggesting the imminence of such action. The most\nnotable of them are:\na. That MVD chiefs from Holland, Belgium, France,\nItaly, and the French, British, and U.S. Zones in Germany, meeting at\nBrussels on 25 August, were directed to disrupt industrial activity in\ntheir respective areas through sabotage, strikes, and disorders, in\npreparation for \"military action in the months to come.\"\nb. That Stalin, on 2 September, issued an order discon-\ntinuing Soviet demobilization and directing that personnel in process of\ndemobilization return to their units.\nC. That Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian troops have\nbeen concentrated on the Greek frontier.\nd. That the Soviets intend to seize Istanbul by force on\nthe night of 18-19 September.\n2. Each of these reports may be explained on other grounds than\nthe imminence of aggressive Soviet military operations.\na. The first evidently refers to future, and perhaps hypo-\nthetical, Soviet military action. The fact that the strikes and disorders\nhave not yet occurred would indicate that the action referred to is at\nleast not imminent.\nb. It has long been anticipated that Soviet demobilization\nwould be discontinued on the completion of its third stage about 1 Septem-\nber. The only disturbing aspect of the report is the reference to the re-\ncall of men in process of demobilization. The report is from an unsure\nsource; it is possible that the alarmist element was introduced in its\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET"
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