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SECRET
done to safeguard US strategic interests there that does not simultaneously raise the
question of commitments to a rump Nationalist regime.
4. THE NEAR EAST.
The Thin Pie Crust-Greece, Turkey, Iran
Greece still is and will continue to be the most troublesome sector of this strategic
frontier between the US and the USSR. Turkey, in spite of its new government and
a minor agitation about the movement of warships from Italy to the USSR, is firm.
Iran is veering toward open US-orientation.
In Iran, the new government of Saed has steadily improved its position. Saed's
US leanings have taken the form of the removal of dissident ministers, the extension of
the US military mission contract, the establishment of a new US consulate, official
publicity to counter USSR charges of US interference, and consultation with US Over-
seas Consultants Incorporated concerning a program of economic development. The
USSR has generally held off from direct pressure. Even if this represents no more
than a lull in the Soviet campaign against Iran, it has the practical advantage of pro-
viding a momentary breathing spell.
Although economic difficulties have finally brought about a change in cabinets,
Turkey is still wholly committed to maintaining a strategic position in the Near East
in line with US interests. In connection with this stand the US is being more openly
approached for correlative commitments. Most significant is the Turkish interest in
being specifically included in any security pact aimed at checking Soviet expansion.
The official desire is that the US, in order to sustain Turkish morale, should constantly
and officially repeat its intention of supporting Turkey's resistance to Soviet-Commu-
nist pressure. Even without such statements Turkish morale appears excellent. There
is no indication of unwillingness, official or popular, to accept the burden of being
indefinitely mobilized.
In contrast, Greece shows signs of becoming a "running sore," calling for constant
doctoring but unable to respond to treatment. The military stalemate continues to
benefit the guerrillas by furthering their intentions of undermining the moral fiber of
the country by preventing its economic and political reconstruction. Greek economy
has reached so advanced a state of inflation that an adverse military or political develop-
ment could easily touch off an explosion. Neither the government nor the opposition
can offer decisive solutions to the military and economic problems, and are caught in a
web of political maneuvers. A dictatorial solution remains a possibility. Greek
morale has reached the point where it offers no foundation for any plan that requires
attention and energetic development over a period of time. Yet the definition of
Greece as a major US strategic interest is as valid as ever. Its significance has, if any-
thing, been increased rather than diminished by the general pattern of instability and
uncertainty that has taken shape in the Near and Middle East. The factors which
originally led to the acceptance of a US commitment in Greece still clearly operate.
The return on the US investment, in the form of stability, has not been realized.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) of (E)
6
C.I.A.
3-31-17
OSD letter, Aspril 1974
By NLT- He NARS Date 4-H-77
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"ocrText": "SECRET\ndone to safeguard US strategic interests there that does not simultaneously raise the\nquestion of commitments to a rump Nationalist regime.\n4. THE NEAR EAST.\nThe Thin Pie Crust-Greece, Turkey, Iran\nGreece still is and will continue to be the most troublesome sector of this strategic\nfrontier between the US and the USSR. Turkey, in spite of its new government and\na minor agitation about the movement of warships from Italy to the USSR, is firm.\nIran is veering toward open US-orientation.\nIn Iran, the new government of Saed has steadily improved its position. Saed's\nUS leanings have taken the form of the removal of dissident ministers, the extension of\nthe US military mission contract, the establishment of a new US consulate, official\npublicity to counter USSR charges of US interference, and consultation with US Over-\nseas Consultants Incorporated concerning a program of economic development. The\nUSSR has generally held off from direct pressure. Even if this represents no more\nthan a lull in the Soviet campaign against Iran, it has the practical advantage of pro-\nviding a momentary breathing spell.\nAlthough economic difficulties have finally brought about a change in cabinets,\nTurkey is still wholly committed to maintaining a strategic position in the Near East\nin line with US interests. In connection with this stand the US is being more openly\napproached for correlative commitments. Most significant is the Turkish interest in\nbeing specifically included in any security pact aimed at checking Soviet expansion.\nThe official desire is that the US, in order to sustain Turkish morale, should constantly\nand officially repeat its intention of supporting Turkey's resistance to Soviet-Commu-\nnist pressure. Even without such statements Turkish morale appears excellent. There\nis no indication of unwillingness, official or popular, to accept the burden of being\nindefinitely mobilized.\nIn contrast, Greece shows signs of becoming a \"running sore,\" calling for constant\ndoctoring but unable to respond to treatment. The military stalemate continues to\nbenefit the guerrillas by furthering their intentions of undermining the moral fiber of\nthe country by preventing its economic and political reconstruction. Greek economy\nhas reached so advanced a state of inflation that an adverse military or political develop-\nment could easily touch off an explosion. Neither the government nor the opposition\ncan offer decisive solutions to the military and economic problems, and are caught in a\nweb of political maneuvers. A dictatorial solution remains a possibility. Greek\nmorale has reached the point where it offers no foundation for any plan that requires\nattention and energetic development over a period of time. Yet the definition of\nGreece as a major US strategic interest is as valid as ever. Its significance has, if any-\nthing, been increased rather than diminished by the general pattern of instability and\nuncertainty that has taken shape in the Near and Middle East. The factors which\noriginally led to the acceptance of a US commitment in Greece still clearly operate.\nThe return on the US investment, in the form of stability, has not been realized.\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) of (E)\n6\nC.I.A.\n3-31-17\nOSD letter, Aspril 1974\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 4-H-77"
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