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SECRET
REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES
TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Emphasis on Asia.
tional resentment against Western interven-
tion. The revolution has succeeded and, tem-
East Asia has become the center of the
porarily at least, virtually has destroyed US
world's more immediate and urgent inter-
influence in China along with the power of the
national tensions. The Western Powers, com-
Kuomintang government. Peasant unrest
mitted to a policy of containing Soviet influ-
and nationalism are not peculiar to China.
ence, heretofore have concentrated their ef-
They are powerful forces nearly everywhere
forts in Europe and the Near East. The
in Asia. Moreover, at present there is a stub-
danger of Soviet aggression or subversion in
born element of anti-Westernism in Asiatic
these areas has not passed, but it has receded.
nationalism. The urgent question of 1950 in
For the time being the ripe "revolutionary
Asia, therefore, is whether Soviet-oriented,
situation" of Communist doctrine is little in
China-based Communism can continue to
evidence, very much less than in France and
identify itself with nationalism, exploit eco-
Italy a year or two ago. The year 1950 will
nomic privations and anti-Western sentiment,
be a crucial period in the efforts of the West-
and sweep into power by one means or an-
ern European community to reorganize and
other elsewhere in Asia.
reconstruct its political, economic, and mili-
tary strength. These efforts, associated with
2. Communism in China.
the second, i.e., constructive, phase of the
In the long run, and to some extent in 1950,
European Recovery Program (ERP) and the
the success of Soviet-oriented Communism in
first phase of the Military Assistance Program
South Asia will depend on how China develops
(MAP), remain the primary factors in calcu-
as a base from which to export revolution.
lations of US security interests. The oppor-
The Chinese Communist regime in Peiping
tunity to develop these long-range programs,
has won undisputed military control of China
however, exists because the threat of Commu-
nist revolution has lessened and the atmos-
proper and will receive diplomatic recognition
phere of immediate military emergency has
by most of the nations of the world.
lifted. While the strength and stability of
a. Recognition.
Europe will continue to be of prior strategic
Political leaders in many Asiatic states, par-
importance to the US, most of the crises of
ticularly Nehru in India, see the advent of the
1950 probably will arise in Asia. Some of
Communist regime to power as the culmina-
them are already at hand.
tion of an indigenous national revolution of
In Asia, the situation is still fluid. As else-
many years' duration and welcome it as such.
where around the world, the USSR is working
Though these Asiatic political leaders may
toward the expansion of Soviet influence. As
have misgivings about the Communist govern-
elsewhere, the USSR has employed the tradi-
ment, they consider it to have a comparatively
tional pressures of power politics whenever
broad popular base and therefore to be quali-
they seemed profitable, but mainly relies on
fied to replace the Kuomintang, which not
the revolutionary Communist techniques of
propaganda, infiltration of government by
only has been thoroughly discredited as an ef-
subservient local Communists, subversion, and
fective government but also was widely iden-
insurrection. In China, the local Communist
tified with Western intervention, dictatorial
movement was able to identify itself with en-
political procedures, and special privilege for a
demic agrarian discontent as well as with na-
landed, commercial, and financial minority.
SECRET
E. O. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
2
C.I.A. OSD letter, 13:31-77
HL
NARS
Date4-18.77
Dv
NLT-
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nREVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES\nTO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\n1. Emphasis on Asia.\ntional resentment against Western interven-\ntion. The revolution has succeeded and, tem-\nEast Asia has become the center of the\nporarily at least, virtually has destroyed US\nworld's more immediate and urgent inter-\ninfluence in China along with the power of the\nnational tensions. The Western Powers, com-\nKuomintang government. Peasant unrest\nmitted to a policy of containing Soviet influ-\nand nationalism are not peculiar to China.\nence, heretofore have concentrated their ef-\nThey are powerful forces nearly everywhere\nforts in Europe and the Near East. The\nin Asia. Moreover, at present there is a stub-\ndanger of Soviet aggression or subversion in\nborn element of anti-Westernism in Asiatic\nthese areas has not passed, but it has receded.\nnationalism. The urgent question of 1950 in\nFor the time being the ripe \"revolutionary\nAsia, therefore, is whether Soviet-oriented,\nsituation\" of Communist doctrine is little in\nChina-based Communism can continue to\nevidence, very much less than in France and\nidentify itself with nationalism, exploit eco-\nItaly a year or two ago. The year 1950 will\nnomic privations and anti-Western sentiment,\nbe a crucial period in the efforts of the West-\nand sweep into power by one means or an-\nern European community to reorganize and\nother elsewhere in Asia.\nreconstruct its political, economic, and mili-\ntary strength. These efforts, associated with\n2. Communism in China.\nthe second, i.e., constructive, phase of the\nIn the long run, and to some extent in 1950,\nEuropean Recovery Program (ERP) and the\nthe success of Soviet-oriented Communism in\nfirst phase of the Military Assistance Program\nSouth Asia will depend on how China develops\n(MAP), remain the primary factors in calcu-\nas a base from which to export revolution.\nlations of US security interests. The oppor-\nThe Chinese Communist regime in Peiping\ntunity to develop these long-range programs,\nhas won undisputed military control of China\nhowever, exists because the threat of Commu-\nnist revolution has lessened and the atmos-\nproper and will receive diplomatic recognition\nphere of immediate military emergency has\nby most of the nations of the world.\nlifted. While the strength and stability of\na. Recognition.\nEurope will continue to be of prior strategic\nPolitical leaders in many Asiatic states, par-\nimportance to the US, most of the crises of\nticularly Nehru in India, see the advent of the\n1950 probably will arise in Asia. Some of\nCommunist regime to power as the culmina-\nthem are already at hand.\ntion of an indigenous national revolution of\nIn Asia, the situation is still fluid. As else-\nmany years' duration and welcome it as such.\nwhere around the world, the USSR is working\nThough these Asiatic political leaders may\ntoward the expansion of Soviet influence. As\nhave misgivings about the Communist govern-\nelsewhere, the USSR has employed the tradi-\nment, they consider it to have a comparatively\ntional pressures of power politics whenever\nbroad popular base and therefore to be quali-\nthey seemed profitable, but mainly relies on\nfied to replace the Kuomintang, which not\nthe revolutionary Communist techniques of\npropaganda, infiltration of government by\nonly has been thoroughly discredited as an ef-\nsubservient local Communists, subversion, and\nfective government but also was widely iden-\ninsurrection. In China, the local Communist\ntified with Western intervention, dictatorial\nmovement was able to identify itself with en-\npolitical procedures, and special privilege for a\ndemic agrarian discontent as well as with na-\nlanded, commercial, and financial minority.\nSECRET\nE. O. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\n2\nC.I.A. OSD letter, 13:31-77\nHL\nNARS\nDate4-18.77\nDv\nNLT-"
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