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ECRET
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2. Soviet Isolation of China from the Western
theless, a new treaty, whatever its nominal
Powers.
terms, will strengthen the Soviet position in
China.
The "walkout" of Soviet and satellite dele-
The treaty probably will include an eco-
gates at the UN probably was designed to iso-
nomic agreement granting, at least on paper,
late the Chinese Communists from the West-
extensive Soviet credits to China. The port
ern world, particularly from the US, and to
of Dairen may be opened to commercial traffic
thwart the development of a new US policy
and placed under nominal Chinese control.
in the Far East. The Peiping regime's con-
In view of Vyshinsky's hot denial of Soviet
current seizure of consular properties also has
designs on the border regions, the USSR is un-
had the effect of delaying Western recogni-
likely to impinge formally on their territorial
tion. If the USSR had intended to expedite
integrity but instead probably will bring them
the seating of a Chinese Communist repre-
under Soviet domination through special po-
sentation in the UN, orthodox parliamentary
litical agreements and contracts for "joint"
procedures would have been more effective.
Sino-Soviet economic development.
Instead, the USSR staged a dramatic boycott
Although the Chinese are sensitive on these
of UN proceedings, which actually may have
issues, Chinese resentment of the privileged
delayed UN acceptance of a Peiping delega-
Soviet position in China is unlikely to be stim-
tion. The Soviet diplomatic affront to the
ulated enough by the anticipated Sino-Soviet
French over Indochina, although primarily
treaty to present a serious control problem to
connected with Communist revolutionary ef-
the Chinese Communists. By taking a mod-
forts in Southeast Asia, may also be part of
erate position in the treaty, leaving room in
an effort to minimize China's contacts with
which to maneuver later, and by postponing
the Western Powers. The USSR may be con-
the possibility of serious Chinese disillusion-
cerned with preventing any US effort to en-
ment, should Moscow fail to carry out the eco-
courage or assist the Chinese to take an inde-
nomic concessions in the treaty, the USSR
pendent line in dealings with Moscow. In
could facilitate the gradual transformation of
any case, if and when the US does recognize
Soviet influence into Soviet control and Soviet
the Chinese Communists and the Peiping
advice into Soviet direction. Even in the bor-
representatives are seated in the UN, the
der regions, the USSR relies at present prin-
USSR will be in a position to claim that the
cipally upon the voluntary cooperation of the
Western Powers simply surrendered to Soviet
Chinese Communists. The Soviet leaders
pressure.
probably estimate that the Peiping regime
cannot consolidate its position in China with-
3. Sino-Soviet Relations.
out becoming dependent on the USSR. The
While there is an implicit suggestion in the
USSR, exploiting China's need for "friendly
protracted stay of Mao Tse-tung and his huge
aid," can gradually strengthen the Soviet hold
entourage in Moscow that excessive Soviet de-
on the party machine, the armed forces, the
mands are preventing Sino-Soviet agreement,
secret police, communications, and channels
of information.
in all probability a new treaty of friendship
between China and the USSR will be an-
4. Drive toward Southeast Asia.
nounced in the near future. Both the Mos-
cow and Peiping governments have every in-
Communist control of China, assuming
terest in completing a treaty that will con-
Sino-Soviet cooperation, provides the base for
found and refute the Western "imperialists"
spreading revolutionary propaganda and sub-
and conciliate the non-Communist opposition
versive activities, particularly guerrilla war-
in China. Soviet leaders probably will be too
fare, in Southeast Asia. Communist pressure
astute to try to force on the Chinese a treaty
probably will follow the customary pattern of
so transparently exploitative in character that
infiltration and subversion rather than open
Mao could not justify it to the Chinese Com-
military action such as a southward sweep of
munist Party or to the Chinese people. Never-
Mao's armies. Peiping's planning, in line
DECLASSIFIED
O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)
C.I.A.
3.31.77
SECRET
OSD letter, 1974
By NLT- NV, NARS Date 4-10-77
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"ocrText": "ECRET\n3\n2. Soviet Isolation of China from the Western\ntheless, a new treaty, whatever its nominal\nPowers.\nterms, will strengthen the Soviet position in\nChina.\nThe \"walkout\" of Soviet and satellite dele-\nThe treaty probably will include an eco-\ngates at the UN probably was designed to iso-\nnomic agreement granting, at least on paper,\nlate the Chinese Communists from the West-\nextensive Soviet credits to China. The port\nern world, particularly from the US, and to\nof Dairen may be opened to commercial traffic\nthwart the development of a new US policy\nand placed under nominal Chinese control.\nin the Far East. The Peiping regime's con-\nIn view of Vyshinsky's hot denial of Soviet\ncurrent seizure of consular properties also has\ndesigns on the border regions, the USSR is un-\nhad the effect of delaying Western recogni-\nlikely to impinge formally on their territorial\ntion. If the USSR had intended to expedite\nintegrity but instead probably will bring them\nthe seating of a Chinese Communist repre-\nunder Soviet domination through special po-\nsentation in the UN, orthodox parliamentary\nlitical agreements and contracts for \"joint\"\nprocedures would have been more effective.\nSino-Soviet economic development.\nInstead, the USSR staged a dramatic boycott\nAlthough the Chinese are sensitive on these\nof UN proceedings, which actually may have\nissues, Chinese resentment of the privileged\ndelayed UN acceptance of a Peiping delega-\nSoviet position in China is unlikely to be stim-\ntion. The Soviet diplomatic affront to the\nulated enough by the anticipated Sino-Soviet\nFrench over Indochina, although primarily\ntreaty to present a serious control problem to\nconnected with Communist revolutionary ef-\nthe Chinese Communists. By taking a mod-\nforts in Southeast Asia, may also be part of\nerate position in the treaty, leaving room in\nan effort to minimize China's contacts with\nwhich to maneuver later, and by postponing\nthe Western Powers. The USSR may be con-\nthe possibility of serious Chinese disillusion-\ncerned with preventing any US effort to en-\nment, should Moscow fail to carry out the eco-\ncourage or assist the Chinese to take an inde-\nnomic concessions in the treaty, the USSR\npendent line in dealings with Moscow. In\ncould facilitate the gradual transformation of\nany case, if and when the US does recognize\nSoviet influence into Soviet control and Soviet\nthe Chinese Communists and the Peiping\nadvice into Soviet direction. Even in the bor-\nrepresentatives are seated in the UN, the\nder regions, the USSR relies at present prin-\nUSSR will be in a position to claim that the\ncipally upon the voluntary cooperation of the\nWestern Powers simply surrendered to Soviet\nChinese Communists. The Soviet leaders\npressure.\nprobably estimate that the Peiping regime\ncannot consolidate its position in China with-\n3. Sino-Soviet Relations.\nout becoming dependent on the USSR. The\nWhile there is an implicit suggestion in the\nUSSR, exploiting China's need for \"friendly\nprotracted stay of Mao Tse-tung and his huge\naid,\" can gradually strengthen the Soviet hold\nentourage in Moscow that excessive Soviet de-\non the party machine, the armed forces, the\nmands are preventing Sino-Soviet agreement,\nsecret police, communications, and channels\nof information.\nin all probability a new treaty of friendship\nbetween China and the USSR will be an-\n4. Drive toward Southeast Asia.\nnounced in the near future. Both the Mos-\ncow and Peiping governments have every in-\nCommunist control of China, assuming\nterest in completing a treaty that will con-\nSino-Soviet cooperation, provides the base for\nfound and refute the Western \"imperialists\"\nspreading revolutionary propaganda and sub-\nand conciliate the non-Communist opposition\nversive activities, particularly guerrilla war-\nin China. Soviet leaders probably will be too\nfare, in Southeast Asia. Communist pressure\nastute to try to force on the Chinese a treaty\nprobably will follow the customary pattern of\nso transparently exploitative in character that\ninfiltration and subversion rather than open\nMao could not justify it to the Chinese Com-\nmilitary action such as a southward sweep of\nmunist Party or to the Chinese people. Never-\nMao's armies. Peiping's planning, in line\nDECLASSIFIED\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)\nC.I.A.\n3.31.77\nSECRET\nOSD letter, 1974\nBy NLT- NV, NARS Date 4-10-77"
}