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SECRET
REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUMMARY
1. The unprovoked attack on the Republic
about a drop in the morale of the Western
of Korea by the armed forces of the Soviet-
world.
controlled North Korean government opened
2. Whatever turn events take in Korea, the
a new phase in the power conflict between the
USSR has the capability of creating a series of
USSR and the non-Soviet world. For the first
incidents roughly comparable to the Korean
time since the end of World War II, the USSR
episode, each one threatening either to bank-
deliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-
rupt the US policy of containing Soviet-Com-
Communist area of control through direct ac-
munist expansion or to disperse and overstrain
tion against a non-Soviet state by the organ-
US military forces in readiness.
ized military forces of a puppet state. Apart
Soviet leaders might estimate that the USSR
from the immediate strategic advantages of
was warranted in running the risk of global
Communist control of all Korea, the primary
war inherent in the repetition of the Korean
aim of the USSR in instigating the attack
pattern elsewhere, reasoning either: (a) that
probably was to discredit the US policy of gen-
the US would abandon or drastically reduce
eral containment of Soviet-Communism.
its commitments, particularly in Asia, before
US intervention, endorsed by nearly all of
it would challenge the USSR directly; or (b)
the non-Soviet members of the UN (including
that the outbreak of global war in which the
India), marked a line beyond which Soviet-
US took primary responsibility for enlarging
sponsored aggression could not go without be-
the area of conflict would leave the non-Soviet
ing challenged. A failure to draw this line
world critically divided and weak. The Far
would have seriously discredited the whole US
East (Taiwan, Indochina, Burma) and the
policy of containment, gravely handicapping
Balkans are the border areas where signs of
US efforts to maintain alliances and build po-
impending military action are mounting.
litical influence with the Western European
3. While the early reaction of Western Eu-
powers and with other nations closely aligned
rope was to give enthusiastic approval to the
with the US. The Korean incident as a whole,
US intervention in Korea, the Western Euro-
particularly the virtual collapse of resistance
pean nations are unlikely to take resolute and
by the Republic of Korea and the interposition
coordinated action to meet the challenge im-
of US forces in the path of the attack, raises
plicit in the "limited war" phase of world
several problems of the gravest importance to
power conflict unless US military power can
US security. Outstanding among them is the
be mobilized and deployed in strength that is
possibility that reverses in the fighting in Ko-
plainly sufficient to constitute at least a sub-
rea may quickly counter the favorable initial
stantial deterrent to further Soviet or Soviet-
psychological effects of intervention and bring
sponsored military aggression.
19 July 1950
CIA.
Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The information contained
herein is as of 14 July 1950.
& O. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
1
OSD letter,
NARS
Date
4-14-77
By
NLT-
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nREVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE\nSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\nSUMMARY\n1. The unprovoked attack on the Republic\nabout a drop in the morale of the Western\nof Korea by the armed forces of the Soviet-\nworld.\ncontrolled North Korean government opened\n2. Whatever turn events take in Korea, the\na new phase in the power conflict between the\nUSSR has the capability of creating a series of\nUSSR and the non-Soviet world. For the first\nincidents roughly comparable to the Korean\ntime since the end of World War II, the USSR\nepisode, each one threatening either to bank-\ndeliberately attempted to expand the Soviet-\nrupt the US policy of containing Soviet-Com-\nCommunist area of control through direct ac-\nmunist expansion or to disperse and overstrain\ntion against a non-Soviet state by the organ-\nUS military forces in readiness.\nized military forces of a puppet state. Apart\nSoviet leaders might estimate that the USSR\nfrom the immediate strategic advantages of\nwas warranted in running the risk of global\nCommunist control of all Korea, the primary\nwar inherent in the repetition of the Korean\naim of the USSR in instigating the attack\npattern elsewhere, reasoning either: (a) that\nprobably was to discredit the US policy of gen-\nthe US would abandon or drastically reduce\neral containment of Soviet-Communism.\nits commitments, particularly in Asia, before\nUS intervention, endorsed by nearly all of\nit would challenge the USSR directly; or (b)\nthe non-Soviet members of the UN (including\nthat the outbreak of global war in which the\nIndia), marked a line beyond which Soviet-\nUS took primary responsibility for enlarging\nsponsored aggression could not go without be-\nthe area of conflict would leave the non-Soviet\ning challenged. A failure to draw this line\nworld critically divided and weak. The Far\nwould have seriously discredited the whole US\nEast (Taiwan, Indochina, Burma) and the\npolicy of containment, gravely handicapping\nBalkans are the border areas where signs of\nUS efforts to maintain alliances and build po-\nimpending military action are mounting.\nlitical influence with the Western European\n3. While the early reaction of Western Eu-\npowers and with other nations closely aligned\nrope was to give enthusiastic approval to the\nwith the US. The Korean incident as a whole,\nUS intervention in Korea, the Western Euro-\nparticularly the virtual collapse of resistance\npean nations are unlikely to take resolute and\nby the Republic of Korea and the interposition\ncoordinated action to meet the challenge im-\nof US forces in the path of the attack, raises\nplicit in the \"limited war\" phase of world\nseveral problems of the gravest importance to\npower conflict unless US military power can\nUS security. Outstanding among them is the\nbe mobilized and deployed in strength that is\npossibility that reverses in the fighting in Ko-\nplainly sufficient to constitute at least a sub-\nrea may quickly counter the favorable initial\nstantial deterrent to further Soviet or Soviet-\npsychological effects of intervention and bring\nsponsored military aggression.\n19 July 1950\nCIA.\nNote: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-\npartments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The information contained\nherein is as of 14 July 1950.\n& O. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\n1\nOSD letter,\nNARS\nDate\n4-14-77\nBy\nNLT-"
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