Ask the Scholar
Page 10 of 12
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
6
the whole experiment of European unification
militarization is eventually permitted, it prob-
hinges upon finding an effective means of
ably will be restricted to military units of di-
utilizing German resources while preventing
visional size permanently assigned to the West-
another upsurge of German aggression. It
ern defense force under NATO command, and
remains questionable whether the movement
German units would be kept at a fixed ratio to
toward a unified Western European-US effort
the forces of the other participating nations.
can become sufficiently operative in time to
In any case, West Germany probably will be
achieve the objectives that are essential to US
called on to furnish steel, raw materials, and
security.
finished goods not exclusively of a military na-
d. German Rearmament.
ture, permitting the other Western nations to
devote a larger proportion of their industrial
The increase in the tempo of Western Euro-
output to munitions.
pean preparations for defense has made more
urgent some decision on the question of Ger-
Meanwhile, the Germans are increasingly
man rearmament. Recreation of an inde-
gaining a position to exact a high political
pendent national army and a full-scale muni-
price for the services that they can render to
tions industry in West Germany has been
Western Europe and the US. The initiative
clearly rejected by all the North Atlantic Pact
for making or breaking the progress of West-
(NATO) nations and the majority of the Ger-
ern Europe toward an effective defense against
mans themselves. Nevertheless, all the West-
the USSR is passing into German hands as
ern European countries, including France and
time goes on. Increasing NAT emphasis on
Germany, have recognized the ultimate need
the necessity of securing the cooperation of
for West German industrial and military con-
German manpower and military materiel to
tributions to the common defense of Western
stop a possible Soviet advance has enabled
Europe. Present French opposition relates to
the Germans, who are determined to make the
the timing rather than the principle of Ger-
most of the opportunity, to recover an appre-
man rearmament, although the French atti-
ciable measure of control over their external
tude is holding up a firm decision. The
and internal affairs. The Adenauer govern-
French maintain that West German militari-
ment already has shown indications of its
zation may result in reduced cooperation on
use of the leverage given it by the US position
the part of the German Federal Government,
and the need for German steel, to influence
revived military spirit among the German
the course of such efforts toward European
people, and increased Soviet suspicions of the
integration as the Schuman Plan. Thus, with
military designs of the Western allies. Al-
the prospect of increased coal and steel or-
though not "irrevocably opposed" to German
ders, as well as the removal of restrictions to
remilitarization at a later date, the French
meet the needs of the Western rearmament
advocate prior development of a strong NATO
effort, the Germans no longer see the same
army, a large NATO stockpile of munitions,
advantages in merging their industry with the
and a firmly integrated command structure
less efficient French, Belgian, and Italian ones
under the Schuman Plan.
prior to the organization and training of any
German units. French opposition probably
Nevertheless, German sentiment tends to
will weaken as a result of pressure by the
favor participation in a Western defense force.
other NATO countries, particularly if the US
West Germany desires remilitarization not
were to guarantee both rapid delivery of arms
only for reasons of security but also for the
and equipment for the expanded NATO forces
increased prestige and bargaining power it
now envisioned, and the creation of positive
would gain by sharing in the common defense
safeguards against eventual German domi-
effort. Thus, while seeking in every way to
nance of an integrated Western force. The
get an equal role in the Western community,
other NATO nations generally consider Ger-
the Adenauer government is firmly committed
man remilitarization essential to European se-
to the Western European camp. If interna-
curity and would probably consent to any
tional tension continues to be high, it prob-
formula acceptable to France. If German re-
ably will impel the Atlantic community to find
DEGLASSIFIED
SECRET
O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
C.I.A.
OSD
letter,
3.31-27
By
NARS
Date
$ 12.77
Page data
- Page
- 10
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 5fd39205b1996c65
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 470155161
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "470155161",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 10-50",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"imageCount": 12,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "470155161",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 10-50",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "470155161",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 10-50",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-001.tif",
"imageCount": 12,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155161",
"naId": 470155161,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 18,
"logicalDate": "1950-10-18",
"month": 10,
"year": 1950
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 10,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875437/875437-14-010.tif",
"mediaId": "5fd39205b1996c65",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n6\nthe whole experiment of European unification\nmilitarization is eventually permitted, it prob-\nhinges upon finding an effective means of\nably will be restricted to military units of di-\nutilizing German resources while preventing\nvisional size permanently assigned to the West-\nanother upsurge of German aggression. It\nern defense force under NATO command, and\nremains questionable whether the movement\nGerman units would be kept at a fixed ratio to\ntoward a unified Western European-US effort\nthe forces of the other participating nations.\ncan become sufficiently operative in time to\nIn any case, West Germany probably will be\nachieve the objectives that are essential to US\ncalled on to furnish steel, raw materials, and\nsecurity.\nfinished goods not exclusively of a military na-\nd. German Rearmament.\nture, permitting the other Western nations to\ndevote a larger proportion of their industrial\nThe increase in the tempo of Western Euro-\noutput to munitions.\npean preparations for defense has made more\nurgent some decision on the question of Ger-\nMeanwhile, the Germans are increasingly\nman rearmament. Recreation of an inde-\ngaining a position to exact a high political\npendent national army and a full-scale muni-\nprice for the services that they can render to\ntions industry in West Germany has been\nWestern Europe and the US. The initiative\nclearly rejected by all the North Atlantic Pact\nfor making or breaking the progress of West-\n(NATO) nations and the majority of the Ger-\nern Europe toward an effective defense against\nmans themselves. Nevertheless, all the West-\nthe USSR is passing into German hands as\nern European countries, including France and\ntime goes on. Increasing NAT emphasis on\nGermany, have recognized the ultimate need\nthe necessity of securing the cooperation of\nfor West German industrial and military con-\nGerman manpower and military materiel to\ntributions to the common defense of Western\nstop a possible Soviet advance has enabled\nEurope. Present French opposition relates to\nthe Germans, who are determined to make the\nthe timing rather than the principle of Ger-\nmost of the opportunity, to recover an appre-\nman rearmament, although the French atti-\nciable measure of control over their external\ntude is holding up a firm decision. The\nand internal affairs. The Adenauer govern-\nFrench maintain that West German militari-\nment already has shown indications of its\nzation may result in reduced cooperation on\nuse of the leverage given it by the US position\nthe part of the German Federal Government,\nand the need for German steel, to influence\nrevived military spirit among the German\nthe course of such efforts toward European\npeople, and increased Soviet suspicions of the\nintegration as the Schuman Plan. Thus, with\nmilitary designs of the Western allies. Al-\nthe prospect of increased coal and steel or-\nthough not \"irrevocably opposed\" to German\nders, as well as the removal of restrictions to\nremilitarization at a later date, the French\nmeet the needs of the Western rearmament\nadvocate prior development of a strong NATO\neffort, the Germans no longer see the same\narmy, a large NATO stockpile of munitions,\nadvantages in merging their industry with the\nand a firmly integrated command structure\nless efficient French, Belgian, and Italian ones\nunder the Schuman Plan.\nprior to the organization and training of any\nGerman units. French opposition probably\nNevertheless, German sentiment tends to\nwill weaken as a result of pressure by the\nfavor participation in a Western defense force.\nother NATO countries, particularly if the US\nWest Germany desires remilitarization not\nwere to guarantee both rapid delivery of arms\nonly for reasons of security but also for the\nand equipment for the expanded NATO forces\nincreased prestige and bargaining power it\nnow envisioned, and the creation of positive\nwould gain by sharing in the common defense\nsafeguards against eventual German domi-\neffort. Thus, while seeking in every way to\nnance of an integrated Western force. The\nget an equal role in the Western community,\nother NATO nations generally consider Ger-\nthe Adenauer government is firmly committed\nman remilitarization essential to European se-\nto the Western European camp. If interna-\ncurity and would probably consent to any\ntional tension continues to be high, it prob-\nformula acceptable to France. If German re-\nably will impel the Atlantic community to find\nDEGLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nC.I.A.\nOSD\nletter,\n3.31-27\nBy\nNARS\nDate\n$ 12.77"
}