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    "localId": "470155174",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 11-50",
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    "id": "470155174",
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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 11-50",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155174",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1950-11-15",
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nREVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE\nSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\n1. Current Patterns of Soviet Strategy.\nnew vigor and determination shown by the\nUN in recent months has caused the USSR to\nAs a result of the intervention of Chinese\nchange either its strategic objectives or its\nCommunist troops in Korea, the UN tactical\naggressive tactics. Prolongation of the fight-\nposition there has deteriorated sharply, and\ning in Korea as a result of Chinese Commu-\nthe USSR has regained the initiative in its\nnist intervention is a crucial step in securing\ncontinuing world-wide power-contest with the\nthe immediate Soviet aims of: (a) consoli-\nUS and its allies. The intervention demon-\ndating control over the Satellites, including\nstrates that the USSR is willing to pursue\nCommunist China; (b) securing the strategic\nthe experiment in war-by-proxy despite a con-\napproaches to the USSR; and (c) preventing\nsiderable risk of vastly enlarging the area of\nthe establishment on the Soviet periphery of\narmed conflict. Chinese-Soviet propaganda\nforces capable of threatening the Soviet mili-\nand the course of action undertaken by the\ntary position.\ntwo powers suggest that Communist leaders\nbelieve the Western Powers are unprepared\n2. Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.\neither politically or militarily to initiate hos-\nIn addition to considerations of general\ntilities against the USSR, and that they will\nstrategy, the USSR and its Chinese allies were\navoid war with China so long as neither the\nfaced during the past month with the need to\nUSSR nor Communist China is technically and\ntake immediate action to offset or minimize\nofficially in the Korean war. As a form of in-\nthe effects of the defeat of the North Korean\nsurance, however, the USSR has simultane-\nforces and of the rapid UN advance toward\nously developed its \"peace offensive\" in the\nthe Manchurian and Siberian borders. In de-\nUN and in other diplomatic contexts, thereby\nciding upon intervention of Chinese Commu-\nlaying the foundation for temporary with-\nnist forces to restore the military situation\ndrawal through a limited political accommo-\nand to avert the political and strategic conse-\ndation, if and when such a move should prove\nquences of the threatened disaster, both the\nexpedient. In the meantime, Soviet policy\nUSSR and China accepted a greater risk of\ncontinues to aim at the exploitation of local\ndirect war with the US than was implicit in\nweaknesses on the periphery of the non-Com-\nany earlier adventures. Because the USSR\nmunist world without the direct use of Soviet\nis in an advanced state of war-readiness, it\nmilitary power.\nmust be assumed that the Kremlin leaders,\nIn addition to halting the advance of UN\naware of the danger of direct UN or US re-\nforces in Korea, the Chinese Communists have\ntaliation against China or the USSR, were\nmoved to take over Tibet and are both train-\nprepared to accept any challenge given.\ning and supplying the Communist-led guer-\nBoth the USSR and China stood to gain\nrillas who are gravely threatening French\ncertain immediate advantages from inter-\ncontrol of northern Indochina. The USSR is\nvention, which would serve to: (a) avert the\nengaged in long-range penetration programs\nimmediate psychological and political conse-\nin many areas, particularly Germany, Yugo-\nquences for the world Communist movement\nslavia, Greece, Iran, Burma, Malaya, and the\nof the military defeat of the North Korean\nPhilippines, where local military action can\nforces; (b) keep UN forces away from the ac-\nbe precipitated when conditions permit.\ntual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c)\nNeither the beginning of the accelerated North\nprovide an area in Korea from which military\nAtlantic Treaty rearmament program nor the\nand guerrilla operations could be mounted;\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nB. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (8)\n3\nE.I.A.\n3-31-77\nletter,\nBy\nNLT-\nHL\nNARS\nDate\n4.18.77"
}