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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Review of the World Situation, CIA 11-50",
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    "seq": 8,
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    "ocrText": "ECRET\n5\ndeployed in the populous Red River Delta\n5. Deterioration of Indian-Chinese Communist\narea around the northern capital of Hanoi.\nRelations.\nThe deteriorating French military position\nConcurrent with their operations in North\nhas aggravated the political crisis in Indo-\nKorea, Chinese Communist forces in south-\nchina. The Vietnamese Premier, who here-\nwest China have apparently begun a westward\ntofore has acquiesced to French policy, has\nmovement toward the Tibetan capital. This\napparently expressed the views of even the\nwell-advertised advance makes it clear that\nmoderate Vietnamese in publicly denouncing\nthe Peiping government is determined to ex-\nthe French position in current French-Viet-\ntend its control over the province, with or\nnamese political negotiations.\nwithout a negotiated settlement. In pursu-\nIf the Indochina problem were to be taken\ning that objective, the Chinese Communists\nto the UN in the present political context, con-\nhave not been, nor will be, deterred by Indian\nstructive and helpful action by the UN would\nentreaties to refrain from a military settle-\nbe extremely difficult. So long as the Chinese\nment.\nCommunists have not given convincing evi-\nChina's conduct regarding Tibet has\ndence of overt intervention, so long as the\naroused considerable anger and resentment\nexternal appearance is one of European colo-\nwithin the Indian Government. Recent Chi-\nnial power fighting revolutionary native ele-\nnese references to the Indian border princi-\nments, and so long as the anti-Communist\npalities of Nepal and Sikkim, China's agita-\nnative government is at odds with the French,\ntion among the tribes of northern Burma, and\nit is extremely doubtful that the UN could\nincreasing Chinese support for the Ho Chi\nagree on a basis for initiating effective mili-\nMinh cause in Indochina present a further\ntary action against Ho Chi Minh. Until the\npotential challenge to Indian security inter-\ncivil as well as the military problem of Indo-\nests and should produce further misgivings\nchina is submitted to the UN, and Indochina\nabout the wisdom of retaining friendship to-\nbecomes, like Korea, virtually a trust terri-\nward Peiping as one of the central features of\ntory, it is improbable that the UN can take\nIndian foreign policy. Nevertheless, Nehru\neffective action.\nhimself is still the prime mover in external\nAlthough some Frenchmen now favor\naffairs, and the underlying considerations in-\nthrowing the entire Indochinese problem into\nvolved in his China policy (the need to get\nthe UN, it is unlikely that, in the absence of\nalong with India's most powerful neighbor,\nintense pressure from other Western Powers\nthe belief in the Peiping regime as a legitimate\nand further deterioration of the French posi-\nexpression of Asiatic nationalism, and the\ntion, the French Assembly would accept such\nfear of global war) continue to exercise a\na solution. The containment of the Ho Chi\npowerful influence on Indian thinking. Al-\nMinh forces at this juncture depends, there-\nthough it is not yet clear that any basic\nfore, almost exclusively on unilateral US ac-\nchange in India's international outlook will\ntion. Given a continuation of the present\ntake place in the immediate future, consider-\npolitical situation in Indochina, even with US\nable pressure is undoubtedly being placed on\naid (short of direct ground, air, and naval\nNehru to abandon his moral support of Com-\nsupport), it is doubtful that the French can\nmunist China. As the threat of Communist\nhold northern Indochina for more than six\nexpansion into Southeast Asia with Chinese\nmonths, nor all of Indochina for more than\nsupport and instigation is intensified, the\neighteen months. The mounting threat of\npressure for abandonment of China will in-\ndeeper US involvement in Korea, however,\nmay well force both the French and the UN to\ncrease. It is already apparent that some In-\nseek an early political solution. One recent\ndian leaders are worried about Indochina and\ndevelopment which may contribute toward the\nBurma, and positive assistance from India in\nsolution of the Indochina problem is the dis-\ncurbing Chinese-dominated Communist ex-\nillusionment in India with the aims and poli-\npansion into those two countries must be\ncies of China.\nrecognized as a definite possibility.\nSECRET\nE. O. DECLASSIFIED 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nC.I.A.\nOSD\nletter,\nNARS\nDate\n4-16-17\nBy\nNLT-"
}