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    "localId": "486498019",
    "label": "Report, OSI - 1/49, Central Intelligence Agency, An Estimate of Swedish Capabilities in Science",
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    "id": "486498019",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, OSI - 1/49, Central Intelligence Agency, An Estimate of Swedish Capabilities in Science",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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            "day": 9,
            "logicalDate": "1949-08-09",
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{
    "seq": 10,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875491/875491-01-010.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nCHAPTER I\nSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SWEDISH SCIENTIFIC EFFORT\n1.\nPHYSICAL PLANT\nA detailed listing of the plant, buildings, apparatus, and layout of the Swedish\nresearch effort has no place in this survey; general conclusions will be drawn, however.\na.\nAdvantage to USSR-Present\nThe USSR would gain distinct, but relatively small, advantage from the point\nof view of science by overrunning Sweden at the present time. Guided-missile ranges\nand installations probably lag far behind those of the USSR in numbers and capacities.\nThe same applies, in all probability, to all other scientific installations, with the possible\nexception of: (1) the shale-oil beds with refining and uranium-extraction plants;\n(b) the cyclotrons now being built; and (c) specialized physical-chemistry apparatus.\nSoviet interest in items (a) and (b) will probably be in inverse ratio to their own\nsuccesses in the field of nuclear energy.\nb.\nAdvantage to USSR-Future\nNo change in the situation outlined in a above is expected in the next five years,\nbeyond emphasizing that Sweden's nuclear development will appear commandingly\nattractive or diminutively inconsequential depending on the USSR's own developments.\nC.\nAdvantage to US-Present\nThe strategic questions here are: from the point of view of Swedish science\n(as it affects and is bound with other factors), is there good reason for the US to attempt\nto push Sweden off its dead-center neutrality? should the US, if a state of acute tension\narises, attempt to evacuate or destroy Swedish equipment and/or plant? or in such a\ncase should the US make a serious effort to maintain Swedish science as an effective\nentity?\nIt is clear from the preceding sections that Swedish scientific facilities are\nminuscule by US standards, with exceptions that are of minor importance strategically.\nConsequently, from this narrow view, nothing is to be gained by forcing Sweden frankly\ninto the Western orbit. On the other hand, if the USSR should threaten imminently\nit will probably be wise to make a serious effort to prevent the shale-oil installations,\nthe nuclear apparatus, and the physical-chemistry apparatus, at least, from falling\ninto Soviet hands. It will probably serve no useful purpose, technologically speaking,\nto make vigorous efforts to keep the Swedish technological plant in operation.\nd. Advantage to US-Future\nNo significant deviation from the above picture is expected within the next\nfive years.\n2. HUMAN RESOURCES\nThis section is confined to remarks about Swedish scientific personnel.\na. Advantage to USSR- Present\nThe USSR would gain little from occupying Sweden at the present time insofar\nas obtaining immediate scientific advancement is concerned. It is believed that no\nuseful effort would be contributed to the Soviet potential by the thoroughly nationalis-\ntic, anti-communistic, although exceedingly able, Swedish cadre of scientists. In time,\n3\nSECRET"
}