Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486498244",
    "label": "Report, OSI - 10-50, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Guidance and Control Development Particularly as Applied to Guided Missiles",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498244"
}

{
    "id": "486498244",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498244",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, OSI - 10-50, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Guidance and Control Development Particularly as Applied to Guided Missiles",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498244",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875492/875492-02-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875492/875492-02-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875492/875492-02-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 254,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498244",
    "naId": 486498244,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 6,
            "logicalDate": "1950-04-06",
            "month": 4,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 21,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875492/875492-02-021.tif",
    "mediaId": "476fdd0b3fc061f4",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nwith reducing or completely eliminating manpower by\nindustrial machinery, has increased the demand for central-\nized control and direction. To accomplish this, considering\nthe enormous extent of present-day industrial enterprises,\ntelemechanical methods must be applied.\"\nA study of technical journals, which deal with subjects outlined in the Russian\npapers published in the United States during the last five years, indicates that the Soviets\nhave devoted much more space to servomechanism theory than have the Americans.\nThe number of Soviet writers whose work is regularly published is also greater.\nIt is felt that the existence of this group of competent scientists, particularly\nsince the result of their research is openly published, points to the presence within the\nUSSR of a still larger number of high-grade men concerned with the military applications\nof servomechanisms. We find it difficult to believe that the men whose work has been\npublished have not been put to work on weapons and, consequently, have disappeared\nfrom view unless another body of equally competent scientists existed.\nWe realize that the presence of well-developed theory within the USSR does not\nnecessarily mean that practical servomechanisms have or will be constructed. At the\nsame time it must be emphasized that the USSR must have a large number of theoretically-\ntrained men in order that such devices come into being at all.\nEngineering personnel from Askania, Kreiselgeraete, Siemens, and Telefunken\nhave been or can be acquired by the Soviets. In addition the Patin factories, which\nformerly made the most satisfactory autopilot for the German Air Force, are available\nto the USSR. Probably few, if any of the Germans are creative scientists in the full\nsense, capable of ranking with leading scientists in the USSR. Collectively, however,\nthey possess extensive experience in every aspect of guided missiles and, in particular,\nthe complex and highly developed experimental techniques and technical \"know how\"\ndeveloped during the war.\nThe extent to which the knowledge of these Germans is successfully exploited is\nnot clear. It is our impression that ready exchange of information between German and\nSoviet opposite numbers does not exist. Apparently the Germans are put to work on a\nparticular piece of work which, when finished, is handed over to the Russians. At the\nsame time, we feel that sufficient interchange of technical data is made to enable the\nSoviets to design reasonably good servomechanisms.\nServomechanisms are obviously only one of the components to be developed for\nnew guidance and control systems. We feel strongly, by analogy but without any positive\ninformation, that the Soviets are in a position to design reasonably good equipment to\nsatisfy other requirements of guidance and control systems.\nIt is to be emphasized that we have little data on the extent to which Soviet\nespionage has penetrated Western activities engaged in guidance and control development.\nIt seems logical to assume, however, that guided missiles are a prime target for Soviet\nintelligence agencies, and it is prudent to assume that their activities have met with\nconsiderable success. The extent to which this intelligence has reached the Soviet work-\ning level is unknown, but we feel it prudent to adopt the position that sufficient data are\navailable to the Russian technicians and scientists to enable them to construct reasonably\nsophisticated systems.\nOnce the design stage has been passed, however, we feel that production of guidance\nand control systems will be severely handicapped by a shortage of high-grade practical\ntechnicians capable of fine and precise machine work, instrument making, model-making,\nand the like. Further, the actual construction of systems, particularly those used with\nsupersonic missiles, requires special manufacturing techniques in order to maintain the\ntolerances, alignments and precision construction demanded to ensure successful flight.\nTOP SECRET\n12"
}