Ask the Scholar
Page 28 of 43
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
SECTION IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. Genesis of Present Military Policies.
Norway could be easily defended against conventional attack since fortifi-
cation of its mountainous coasts and interior would make penetration from the
outside extremely difficult. Implementation of a national defense based on this
favorable topography, however, is hampered by deficiencies in material resources
and in manpower. Though some of the emplacements left by the Nazis, who forti-
fied the coast against Allied attack during the war, are intact and still usable
the small Norwegian population cannot furnish the personnel needed to man them.
The country will therefore be left relatively without defenses.
In recognition of these facts, Norwegian military policies will be based upon
cooperation in UN plans for international military security, or maintenance of a
force large enough to stave off invasion until hypothetical allies could come to
Norway's aid.
The military force at present is still in the state of comparative deteriora-
tion to which the occupation brought it and its development is subject to plan-
ning still in the inconclusive state. (See P. IV-2)
2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces.
a. Army.
The Army has a strength of 15,000 men, 5,000 of whom were called up in
September 1946. About 4,000 of the new conscripts were trained for occupation
duties in the British Zone of Germany and are now serving with the Norwegian
Occupation Brigade. Reserves number about 100,000 men, about 80% of whom had
only one brief period of conscript training prior to the German occupation and
have had no training since 1939.
The Army is handicapped by a shortage of trained officers. Many of the
officers now holding important assignments were POW's during the entire war and
have therefore had little actual military experience. A few young officers were
trained in Sweden and England, but a considerable time will elapse before their
influence will be felt.
Army equipment is being purchased, principally from Great Britain, but at
present only enough for two reduced-strength infantry divisions has been received.
Armored vehicles are limited to a few light tanks used for training, and no ar-
mored units are included in the proposed future organization.
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (19)
C.I.A. 2.15.77
IV-1
OSD letter, April 12, 1974
SECRET
Bz NLT-H NARS Date 6-7-77
Page data
- Page
- 28
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- faa01ecf366aaecd
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486498734
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486498734",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Norway, Situation Report 5",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"imageCount": 43,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486498734",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Norway, Situation Report 5",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486498734",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Norway, Situation Report 5",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-001.tif",
"imageCount": 43,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498734",
"naId": 486498734,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 1,
"logicalDate": "1947-09-01",
"month": 9,
"year": 1947
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 28,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875496/875496-02-028.tif",
"mediaId": "faa01ecf366aaecd",
"ocrText": "SECRET\nSECTION IV\nMILITARY SITUATION\n1. Genesis of Present Military Policies.\nNorway could be easily defended against conventional attack since fortifi-\ncation of its mountainous coasts and interior would make penetration from the\noutside extremely difficult. Implementation of a national defense based on this\nfavorable topography, however, is hampered by deficiencies in material resources\nand in manpower. Though some of the emplacements left by the Nazis, who forti-\nfied the coast against Allied attack during the war, are intact and still usable\nthe small Norwegian population cannot furnish the personnel needed to man them.\nThe country will therefore be left relatively without defenses.\nIn recognition of these facts, Norwegian military policies will be based upon\ncooperation in UN plans for international military security, or maintenance of a\nforce large enough to stave off invasion until hypothetical allies could come to\nNorway's aid.\nThe military force at present is still in the state of comparative deteriora-\ntion to which the occupation brought it and its development is subject to plan-\nning still in the inconclusive state. (See P. IV-2)\n2. Strength and Disposition of the Armed Forces.\na. Army.\nThe Army has a strength of 15,000 men, 5,000 of whom were called up in\nSeptember 1946. About 4,000 of the new conscripts were trained for occupation\nduties in the British Zone of Germany and are now serving with the Norwegian\nOccupation Brigade. Reserves number about 100,000 men, about 80% of whom had\nonly one brief period of conscript training prior to the German occupation and\nhave had no training since 1939.\nThe Army is handicapped by a shortage of trained officers. Many of the\nofficers now holding important assignments were POW's during the entire war and\nhave therefore had little actual military experience. A few young officers were\ntrained in Sweden and England, but a considerable time will elapse before their\ninfluence will be felt.\nArmy equipment is being purchased, principally from Great Britain, but at\npresent only enough for two reduced-strength infantry divisions has been received.\nArmored vehicles are limited to a few light tanks used for training, and no ar-\nmored units are included in the proposed future organization.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (19)\nC.I.A. 2.15.77\nIV-1\nOSD letter, April 12, 1974\nSECRET\nBz NLT-H NARS Date 6-7-77"
}