Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486498778",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778"
}

{
    "id": "486498778",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 107,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
    "naId": 486498778,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 1,
            "logicalDate": "1947-08-01",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1947
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 12,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-012.tif",
    "mediaId": "923dc6eaf7946eed",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\ncontinuity, absence of local self-government, and political factionalism in all branches\nof the central and provincial administration.\nThese factors are reflected in an attitude of inertia on the part of most of the\npopulation and the government toward critical internal conditions and the need for\nexecuting long overdue social and administrative reforms. Because of the lack of\nstandards of public morality, moreover, public officials, press representatives, and\ninfluential private citizens are in many cases susceptible to outright subversion for\npersonal profit.\nIn consequence, the Soviet Government is in a position to capitalize upon\nIran's failure to cooperate in the national interest or to carry out reforms essential\nto internal stability; moreover, the USSR will have the opportunity to exploit the cor-\nruptibility of individuals and organs of public opinion.\ne. Economic Dependence.\nAlthough the closely interlocking barter agreements which tied Iran to the\nUSSR prior to and during the last war no longer exist, northern Iran will probably\ncontinue to remain in a condition of relative economic dependence on the USSR by\nvirtue of its geographical proximity and the absence of other profitable outlets for\nnorth Iranian produce, which is customarily exchanged for Soviet manufactured goods\nand processed foods. The USSR is in a position to exploit this situation by the impo-\nsition of commercial boycotts on northern Iran designed to wrest concessions from the\nIranian Government, a procedure which it has employed in the past. The general\nfactor of northern Iran's economic dependence on the USSR has a special significance\nbecause of the probability that the USSR will seek, as a prelude to ultimate domination\nof Iran, to detach northern areas from the control of the central government.\n4.\nLOCAL CHANNELS EMPLOYED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES.*\nSpecific local channels exist which the USSR uses assiduously to exploit the\nfavorable conditions outlined in the preceding section. Since the activities within\nthese channels are largely clandestine in character and since US intelligence coverage\nin Iran is inadequate, available data present only a fragmentary picture of current\noperations.\nCertain political and labor organizations, originally developed under Soviet aegis,\nwhich have provided effective support to the USSR in the past, are still being utilized\nby the Soviet Union. These include the Tudeh Party, which is now being reconsti-\ntuted throughout Iran; remnants of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, the Tudeh's\nprovincial offshoot; remnants of the militant Central Committee of Trade Unions,\nidentical with the Tudeh in policy and leadership. These organizations include trained\nCommunist organizers and agitators, indoctrinated Iranians until recently in exile in\nthe Soviet Union, leftist and liberal elements. Although these organizations have\nbeen subjected to restrictive and suppressive measures by the Iranian Government,\nresidual elements are now active throughout Iran and in refuge in adjacent Soviet\n* Consult Annex II for further details.\nSECRET\nL-6"
}