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{
    "localId": "486498778",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
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    "id": "486498778",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 1,
            "logicalDate": "1947-08-01",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1947
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{
    "seq": 13,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-013.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nterritory, and may be expected to expand their activities. These elements for the\nmost part have a revolutionary political orientation, are dissatisfied with the existing\nGovernment of Iran, and have received material benefits from their Soviet affiliations.\nAlthough the tribes as a whole maintain an anti-Soviet attitude and the majority\nof influential Kurdish chieftains have reasserted their allegiance to the central govern-\nment, disaffected elements of the Kurds and other tribes are still particularly suscepti-\nble to Soviet propaganda and are cooperating with Soviet agents. These include certain\nelements of the former Kurdish Republic and disaffected individuals and renegades\namong the Jalali, Herki, and Iraqi Barzanis in the northwest, as well as the Picheranlu\nin the northeast. The USSR is also endeavoring to exploit other dissident tribal groups,\nnotably sections of the Arab tribes of southwestern Iran.\nCertain minorities are also made use of by the Soviets in their operations. The\nUSSR has enlisted the active support of White Russians in Iran as agents for various\nsubversive purposes. The Armenians are utilized as a propaganda instrument in\nconnection with Soviet charges of discriminatory treatment of minorities by the Iranian\nGovernment. Individual Armenians are employed as active agents. The current Soviet\nrepatriation of Armenians to the USSR is expected to provide a supply of indoctrinated\nArmenians for reintroduction into Iran as Soviet agents and propagandists. While\nmost Iranians are not receptive to Soviet ideology, some of Iran's intelligentsia and\nstudents consider Soviet ideology as a means of effecting improvements in Iran's social\nand governmental structure. They accordingly represent an instrument of informed\npublic opinion for the dissemination of Soviet propaganda. Another small but influen-\ntial group consists of certain members of the former Qajar dynasty, whose political\naspirations are encouraged by the Soviets with a view to promoting regional movements\nand to undermining the authority of the present regime.\nIn accordance with the Soviet practice elsewhere of seeking to obtain control over\nlocal transportation systems, in Iran the Soviets are reported to be meeting with some\nsuccess in infiltrating muhajirs,\" Tudeh Party members, and other leftist elements into\nthe ranks of the Iranian State Railways organization.\nWhile the Iranian Army is, for the most part, loyal, it contains some pro-Soviet\nelements, including a few high-ranking officers. The Soviets are not only seeking to\nwin additional sympathizers but are training young Iranians in their espionage school\nat Baku for penetration of the army. The USSR aims to obstruct the enactment\nof\nneeded army reforms and to hamper the army's mission of maintaining internal\nsecurity.\nSoviet operations through these diverse channels are designed to discredit the Gov-\nernment of Iran; to undermine the confidence of the people in their leaders; to foment\ndisturbances; to encourage separatist movements and other forces which might have a\ndivisive and disruptive effect on Iran's tenuous unity; and to support political groups\naiming to establish a government subservient to the Soviet Union. They serve, more-\nover, as an effective means of facilitating the official and covert operations of Soviet\n* Consult Annex II-2 for discussion.\nL-7\nSECRET"
}