Ask the Scholar
Page 7 of 107
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
APPENDIX L
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAN
1. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY.*
The USSR, in its efforts to achieve its objective of dominating Iran, exploits
geographic, economic, and population relationships between Iran and the Soviet Union,
as well as Iranian national characteristics and weaknesses; it enlists the support of
discontented Iranian groups, and penetrates local organizations; it violates or manipu-
lates Irano-Soviet diplomatic instruments to its own advantage. These operations
are directed and supported by numerous Soviet official agencies, which employ ap-
proximately 1,000 Soviet nationals and an undetermined number of covert agents.
The activities of the USSR in Iran during the war years served to promote the
efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve a postwar position of ascendancy. Since the
USSR continues to pursue the same aim and to utilize many of the same techniques
adopted during 1941-1946, a brief survey of Soviet wartime activities will provide
guidance in assessing the current operations of the USSR in Iran.
From September 1941 until May 1946 all northern Iran, encompassing one-fourth
of the total area and one-half of the population of the country, was under Soviet
military occupation. The USSR utilized its occupation forces to consolidate its political
and economic position and to prepare the ground for a postwar position of ascendancy
in much the same manner as Soviet troops have been employed more recently in
Eastern Europe. The USSR not only established complete military and political con-
trol of northern Iran, which nullified the Iranian Government's authority in the area,
but even extended its influence beyond the northern provinces and into the central
government itself.
Soviet activity from 1941 through 1946 falls into two main categories. The first
consists of activities resulting from the exigencies of war such as the maintenance of
occupation troops and the operation of the northern section of the Allied supply
line to the USSR. Although Soviet needs did not differ materially from those of British
and US agencies in Iran, the means employed in filling such needs were greatly different
and were designed to shift to the Iranian Government a great part of the cost of
Soviet operations in Iran. Thus, housing and administrative buildings were requi-
sitioned without remuneration to their owners; food agreements were imposed on the
Iranian Government, giving the Soviet authorities virtual control of northern food
* The present report is based on material dating between 1944 and 1947 which is available to
US intelligence agencies in Washington. Much of the information is fragmentary or obsolescent.
While this material is sufficient to permit a general assessment of the nature and effectiveness of
past Soviet operations, no critical estimate of the future course of Soviet activities is at present
possible.
L-1
SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 7
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- bff5b83b36d33fd7
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486498778
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486498778",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 107,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486498778",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486498778",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Group, Iran, Situation Report 6",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 107,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486498778",
"naId": 486498778,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 1,
"logicalDate": "1947-08-01",
"month": 8,
"year": 1947
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 7,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875497/875497-01-007.tif",
"mediaId": "bff5b83b36d33fd7",
"ocrText": "SECRET\nAPPENDIX L\nSOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAN\n1. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET POLICY.*\nThe USSR, in its efforts to achieve its objective of dominating Iran, exploits\ngeographic, economic, and population relationships between Iran and the Soviet Union,\nas well as Iranian national characteristics and weaknesses; it enlists the support of\ndiscontented Iranian groups, and penetrates local organizations; it violates or manipu-\nlates Irano-Soviet diplomatic instruments to its own advantage. These operations\nare directed and supported by numerous Soviet official agencies, which employ ap-\nproximately 1,000 Soviet nationals and an undetermined number of covert agents.\nThe activities of the USSR in Iran during the war years served to promote the\nefforts of the Soviet Union to achieve a postwar position of ascendancy. Since the\nUSSR continues to pursue the same aim and to utilize many of the same techniques\nadopted during 1941-1946, a brief survey of Soviet wartime activities will provide\nguidance in assessing the current operations of the USSR in Iran.\nFrom September 1941 until May 1946 all northern Iran, encompassing one-fourth\nof the total area and one-half of the population of the country, was under Soviet\nmilitary occupation. The USSR utilized its occupation forces to consolidate its political\nand economic position and to prepare the ground for a postwar position of ascendancy\nin much the same manner as Soviet troops have been employed more recently in\nEastern Europe. The USSR not only established complete military and political con-\ntrol of northern Iran, which nullified the Iranian Government's authority in the area,\nbut even extended its influence beyond the northern provinces and into the central\ngovernment itself.\nSoviet activity from 1941 through 1946 falls into two main categories. The first\nconsists of activities resulting from the exigencies of war such as the maintenance of\noccupation troops and the operation of the northern section of the Allied supply\nline to the USSR. Although Soviet needs did not differ materially from those of British\nand US agencies in Iran, the means employed in filling such needs were greatly different\nand were designed to shift to the Iranian Government a great part of the cost of\nSoviet operations in Iran. Thus, housing and administrative buildings were requi-\nsitioned without remuneration to their owners; food agreements were imposed on the\nIranian Government, giving the Soviet authorities virtual control of northern food\n* The present report is based on material dating between 1944 and 1947 which is available to\nUS intelligence agencies in Washington. Much of the information is fragmentary or obsolescent.\nWhile this material is sufficient to permit a general assessment of the nature and effectiveness of\npast Soviet operations, no critical estimate of the future course of Soviet activities is at present\npossible.\nL-1\nSECRET"
}