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4. Military Intentions and Capabilities
a. Army Plans
The Iranian General Staff limits its military planning to the main-
tenance of internal security and to the defense of Iran's frontiers, par-
ticularly those which would be in the path of an invasion from the USSR.
Soviet invasions could be readily launched through Azerbaijan, along the
shores of the Caspian Sea, and through Khurasan, and they would probably be
accompanied by parachute drops in the Tehran area and at other strategic
points in the interior.
Although the Saadabad Pact (see page III-6) provides for consulta-
tion by the signatory powers in the event of an attack on any one of them,
there is little possibility of mutual military support between Turkey, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Iran if one is attacked by the USSR. Iran's own strategy
for defense against the USSR is based on plans to fight a delaying action
pending arrival of assistance from the United States, Great Britain, or,
in the future, the military forces of the United Nations.
The armed tribes have always been the most important internal prob-
lem. The army, which has long used the tribes as a proving ground for
military tactics and as a source of plunder, has heretofore advocated a
policy of enforced disarmament. Recently the Iranian Chief of Staff has
sought the cooperation of the tribes, viewing them as a possible adjunct to
the army in the event of an attack by the USSR. Such cooperation, however,
cannot be secured unless the army changes its traditional tribal policy.
b. Military Capabilities
Because of poor morale, lack of trained personnel, inadequate
modern equipment, and friction within the command, the Iranian Army would
have great difficulty in carrying out specific military plans. It is un-
able to withstand aggression by a large power or a combination of small
powers, and unless foreign military support were forthcoming within a few
days, the army would quickly disintegrate. It is unable to maintain over-
all internal security, and a disarmament campaign against the tribes could
be successful only in isolated areas; an extensive attack against the
tribes would meet strong resistance and would succeed only in driving the
tribesmen's arms underground to await use as soon as heavy concentrations
of army troops were withdrawn. The army's low morale may be attributed
to maladministration, insufficient and irregular remuneration, inadequate
combat experience, lack of individual responsibility toward the national
interests, and disregard on the part of officers for the welfare of the
troops. Friction in command has developed from the Chief of Staff's
practice of by-passing the Ministry of War and dealing directly with the
Shah as commander-in-chief of the army. It is anticipated that purchase
of surplus US military supplies may enable the army to keep internal
security under favorable conditions but not to increase measurably its
ability to counter substantial foreign aggression.
IV-5
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n4. Military Intentions and Capabilities\na. Army Plans\nThe Iranian General Staff limits its military planning to the main-\ntenance of internal security and to the defense of Iran's frontiers, par-\nticularly those which would be in the path of an invasion from the USSR.\nSoviet invasions could be readily launched through Azerbaijan, along the\nshores of the Caspian Sea, and through Khurasan, and they would probably be\naccompanied by parachute drops in the Tehran area and at other strategic\npoints in the interior.\nAlthough the Saadabad Pact (see page III-6) provides for consulta-\ntion by the signatory powers in the event of an attack on any one of them,\nthere is little possibility of mutual military support between Turkey, Iraq,\nAfghanistan, and Iran if one is attacked by the USSR. Iran's own strategy\nfor defense against the USSR is based on plans to fight a delaying action\npending arrival of assistance from the United States, Great Britain, or,\nin the future, the military forces of the United Nations.\nThe armed tribes have always been the most important internal prob-\nlem. The army, which has long used the tribes as a proving ground for\nmilitary tactics and as a source of plunder, has heretofore advocated a\npolicy of enforced disarmament. Recently the Iranian Chief of Staff has\nsought the cooperation of the tribes, viewing them as a possible adjunct to\nthe army in the event of an attack by the USSR. Such cooperation, however,\ncannot be secured unless the army changes its traditional tribal policy.\nb. Military Capabilities\nBecause of poor morale, lack of trained personnel, inadequate\nmodern equipment, and friction within the command, the Iranian Army would\nhave great difficulty in carrying out specific military plans. It is un-\nable to withstand aggression by a large power or a combination of small\npowers, and unless foreign military support were forthcoming within a few\ndays, the army would quickly disintegrate. It is unable to maintain over-\nall internal security, and a disarmament campaign against the tribes could\nbe successful only in isolated areas; an extensive attack against the\ntribes would meet strong resistance and would succeed only in driving the\ntribesmen's arms underground to await use as soon as heavy concentrations\nof army troops were withdrawn. The army's low morale may be attributed\nto maladministration, insufficient and irregular remuneration, inadequate\ncombat experience, lack of individual responsibility toward the national\ninterests, and disregard on the part of officers for the welfare of the\ntroops. Friction in command has developed from the Chief of Staff's\npractice of by-passing the Ministry of War and dealing directly with the\nShah as commander-in-chief of the army. It is anticipated that purchase\nof surplus US military supplies may enable the army to keep internal\nsecurity under favorable conditions but not to increase measurably its\nability to counter substantial foreign aggression.\nIV-5\nSECRET"
}