Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486499223",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Chile, Situation Report 9",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499223"
}

{
    "id": "486499223",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499223",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Chile, Situation Report 9",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499223",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875501/875501-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875501/875501-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875501/875501-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 79,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499223",
    "naId": 486499223,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 1,
            "logicalDate": "1947-09-01",
            "month": 9,
            "year": 1947
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 39,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875501/875501-01-039.tif",
    "mediaId": "9dd572951f78597b",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\ntherefore, coal consumers will have to operate on a day-to-day basis and constantly at\nthe mercy of the miners.\nThe unstable labor conditions in the coal fields, the major barrier to increased\nor even stabilized production, are due in large part to Communist control of the coal-\nmining unions. From the standpoint of exclusively domestic economic strategy, the\ncoal industry is the strongest position the Communists could occupy. Communist\nterrorism is frequently reported from the coal fields; and this, plus bad working con-\nditions in the mines, makes for cumulative discontent and numerous strikes. More-\nover, the coal industry is itself experiencing difficulties that encourage strikes.\nNinety-two per cent of Chile's coal output is produced by two Chilean-owned\nfirms, Lota and Schwager. Production costs at Lota are far higher than those at\nSchwager, but the two firms quote approximately the same prices. To protect its\nhigher margin of profit, the Schwager Company is concerned to maintain the present\nrelative cost-of-production position. If, therefore, strikes drive up wages at Schwager's,\nit loses its differential advantage; and the officials of the Schwager Company reportedly\ndefend themselves against this danger by taking steps to extend any strike in their\nmines to those of their competitors. In a sense, therefore, a segment of ownership\nin the industry is frequently in the paradoxical position of supporting Communist-in-\nspired labor activity, and the Communists have shrewdly exploited this situation.\nSome Chilean leaders hold out the hope that the successful execution of the\npresent Government plans for hydro-electrification may greatly lessen the country's\ndependence upon coal. This view overlooks the fact that these electrification plans are\npart and parcel of a wide program of general industrialization that calls for new estab-\nlishments (using all forms of power) that would use up any coal that electrification\nmight economize.\nd. Iron.\nChile has high-grade iron deposits, conveniently located at points less than\ntwenty miles from the coast. The three best known are El Tofo, Romeral, and Algarrabe.\nOf these only El Tofo is worked intensively. It lies a little north of the port of Coquimbo,\nand is operated by the Bethlehem Chile Iron Mines Company (average prewar annual\nproduction, 1,600,000 tons). Before World War II the entire output was exported\nin Bethlehem ships to Sparrows Point, Maryland; but during hostilities, when shipping\nspace was short and available space was reserved for more important commodities like\ncopper, shipments were drastically reduced. (Iron should not, therefore, be included\namong the commodities for which the United States depends upon Chile in time of war.)\nUnder present conditions, however, Chile's iron is virtually useless save as\nan export commodity. Chilean production of steel and ferro alloys is SO small that\ndomestic consumption absorbs only a fraction of the iron ore mined. The Chileans\nhave plans for expanding their steel industry, but rapid progress in this regard is im-\nprobable. Meanwhile, the high quality Chilean ore is in a good competitive position\nin the post-war market, and iron ore shipments to the United States will probably re-\nturn to their prewar level.\nThe company operating El Tofo has an extraordinary record in one respect:\nit has never had a strike. There is very little labor turnover in the mine, and the\nSECRET\nIII-10"
}