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Pindus mass. They have been used for generations by Greek bandits and guerrilla
fighters as operating bases and sanctuaries, and are particularly well suited to guerrilla
operations. From them it is possible, within a few minutes or hours, to raid villages on
the borders of the plains and to cut lines of communication winding through the narrow
valleys. Movement from one area to another is comparatively easy at night.
At the beginning of 1947 the resurgent guerrillas, by forcing the villagers to flee to
large towns, by destroying villages, by cutting all main lines of communications, were
paralyzing national recovery. An undertrained army began a series of operations
against the bands in April 1947. The strategy planned by the General Staff was to
clear these areas of guerrillas and then to seal the northern border against reinfiltra-
tion from the satellite countries. Tactically, it was planned for the field units to
surround single areas, thereby preventing escape to other areas, and then to crush the
trapped guerrillas. In both strategy and tactics, the army has failed. Some of this
failure lies with the army itself-a defensive rather than an offensive spirit, bad timing,
poor tactics, poor intelligence, and ineffective concentration of troops. Even more
important causes of Greek Army failure, however, have been the terrain, which favors
the highly mobile guerrillas not committed to defend given points; the ability of the
guerrillas to replace losses in men and matériel, and to take advantage of the refuge,
the bases of operation, and the protected routes of movement furnished by neighboring
satellite countries.
Until July the guerrillas contented themselves with evasive action, but since then
there have been occasions on which they have attempted to capture or stand and defend
certain areas, probably as a test of strength to discover the feasibility of defending the
"free" government should it be actually established on Greek soil. So far they have
failed to stabilize any single area.
It is difficult to predict the amount of aid in matériel or personnel which the satel-
lites will extend to the guerrillas. The guerrillas already possess artillery and their
employment of airplanes is considered possible in the future. (See Appendix I for
chart of guerrilla-held areas.)
SECRET
IV-8
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nPindus mass. They have been used for generations by Greek bandits and guerrilla\nfighters as operating bases and sanctuaries, and are particularly well suited to guerrilla\noperations. From them it is possible, within a few minutes or hours, to raid villages on\nthe borders of the plains and to cut lines of communication winding through the narrow\nvalleys. Movement from one area to another is comparatively easy at night.\nAt the beginning of 1947 the resurgent guerrillas, by forcing the villagers to flee to\nlarge towns, by destroying villages, by cutting all main lines of communications, were\nparalyzing national recovery. An undertrained army began a series of operations\nagainst the bands in April 1947. The strategy planned by the General Staff was to\nclear these areas of guerrillas and then to seal the northern border against reinfiltra-\ntion from the satellite countries. Tactically, it was planned for the field units to\nsurround single areas, thereby preventing escape to other areas, and then to crush the\ntrapped guerrillas. In both strategy and tactics, the army has failed. Some of this\nfailure lies with the army itself-a defensive rather than an offensive spirit, bad timing,\npoor tactics, poor intelligence, and ineffective concentration of troops. Even more\nimportant causes of Greek Army failure, however, have been the terrain, which favors\nthe highly mobile guerrillas not committed to defend given points; the ability of the\nguerrillas to replace losses in men and matériel, and to take advantage of the refuge,\nthe bases of operation, and the protected routes of movement furnished by neighboring\nsatellite countries.\nUntil July the guerrillas contented themselves with evasive action, but since then\nthere have been occasions on which they have attempted to capture or stand and defend\ncertain areas, probably as a test of strength to discover the feasibility of defending the\n\"free\" government should it be actually established on Greek soil. So far they have\nfailed to stabilize any single area.\nIt is difficult to predict the amount of aid in matériel or personnel which the satel-\nlites will extend to the guerrillas. The guerrillas already possess artillery and their\nemployment of airplanes is considered possible in the future. (See Appendix I for\nchart of guerrilla-held areas.)\nSECRET\nIV-8"
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