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To stave off the Soviet-satellite threat to its integrity, Greece must first of all
subdue the guerrillas, who, by proclaiming establishment of a government under
"General" Markos, have asserted themselves as the true representatives of the Greek
people. Despite substantial US material aid, the genuine social and economic recon-
struction the country needs cannot be attained SO long as the guerrilla campaign con-
tinues the wholesale destruction of property, forces thousands to flee their homes, and
paralyzes individuals and business enterprise with fear. Unfortunately, though the
Greek Army has been strengthened by acquisition of US equipment and may in the
future improve its tactical leadership under US advisers, it is still incapable of forcing a
decision in view of the proportionately increasing assistance its guerrilla opponents are
receiving from the satellites. It is manifestly too weak to resist open attack by the
USSR or a combination of the satellite powers, though possibly it could resist an
individual attack by Albania or Bulgaria.
Thus the survival of Greece as an independent nation depends largely on the
actions of the US and of the Soviet bloc. Even if the USSR and its satellites do not
officially intervene in support of the "free" Greek government, they can be expected
to maintain or increase their tremendous pressure on Greece.
The current American aid program, scheduled to end in June 1948, has kept Greece
from military and economic collapse, but it has become evident that the program cannot
revive the morale and economy of the country sufficiently by then for Greece to stand
alone, even with US and the traditional UK diplomatic support. Continued US as-
sistance and an increased sense of responsibility by Greek leaders will be necessary before
Greece can obtain the military, economic, and political balance on which lasting sta-
bility depends.
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nTo stave off the Soviet-satellite threat to its integrity, Greece must first of all\nsubdue the guerrillas, who, by proclaiming establishment of a government under\n\"General\" Markos, have asserted themselves as the true representatives of the Greek\npeople. Despite substantial US material aid, the genuine social and economic recon-\nstruction the country needs cannot be attained SO long as the guerrilla campaign con-\ntinues the wholesale destruction of property, forces thousands to flee their homes, and\nparalyzes individuals and business enterprise with fear. Unfortunately, though the\nGreek Army has been strengthened by acquisition of US equipment and may in the\nfuture improve its tactical leadership under US advisers, it is still incapable of forcing a\ndecision in view of the proportionately increasing assistance its guerrilla opponents are\nreceiving from the satellites. It is manifestly too weak to resist open attack by the\nUSSR or a combination of the satellite powers, though possibly it could resist an\nindividual attack by Albania or Bulgaria.\nThus the survival of Greece as an independent nation depends largely on the\nactions of the US and of the Soviet bloc. Even if the USSR and its satellites do not\nofficially intervene in support of the \"free\" Greek government, they can be expected\nto maintain or increase their tremendous pressure on Greece.\nThe current American aid program, scheduled to end in June 1948, has kept Greece\nfrom military and economic collapse, but it has become evident that the program cannot\nrevive the morale and economy of the country sufficiently by then for Greece to stand\nalone, even with US and the traditional UK diplomatic support. Continued US as-\nsistance and an increased sense of responsibility by Greek leaders will be necessary before\nGreece can obtain the military, economic, and political balance on which lasting sta-\nbility depends.\nSECRET"
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