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    "localId": "486499377",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Spain, Situation Report 11",
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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Spain, Situation Report 11",
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        {
            "day": 15,
            "logicalDate": "1948-11-15",
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{
    "seq": 11,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875502/875502-01-011.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nDISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION\nDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY\nThe Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, substantially dissents with\nthe conclusions set forth in this paper as to the probable future developments in Spain\nwhich will affect United States security. These conclusions are that, while no change\nis probable within six months, the situation in Spain is ultimately one of danger to\nthe United States because of the possibility of Communist domination of the area. It\nis indicated that such domination might result from (a) revolution aided by the USSR,\nor (b) military aggression by the USSR.\na. Regarding the first possibility, revolution, the paper states that the dissatis-\nfied working classes are susceptible to Communist propaganda. Furthermore, the\nassumption is implicit that no evolution toward a form of government more satis-\nfactory politically and economically is possible within the Franco regime and that no\nalleviation of internally and externally imposed pressures can be expected. This divi-\nsion, on the other hand, believes revolution unlikely. It considers the Franco govern-\nment one of the most stable in Western Europe and it believes the Spanish people to be\nmuch less susceptible to Communist propaganda than those of France or Italy. This\ndivision also believes that, given its present strength and stability, the Franco regime\ncan begin to implement certain long-considered plans for internal evolution which in\nturn will help relieve external pressures. That the external situation is not static even\nnow is shown by the betterment of Spanish relations with many countries during the\npast year, and particularly with France where anti-Franco feeling has had great\nstrength. That the internal situation is not static is shown by the partial compromise\nbetween Franco and Don Juan and by the announcement of the forthcoming municipal\nelections.\nb. As to the second possibility, direct military aggression by Soviet forces, this is\nbelieved impossible unless the USSR first dominates the major part of Western Europe\nincluding either France or Italy. This set of circumstances is not mentioned in the\npaper, leaving one with the impression that aggression might be undertaken from\npresent bases in the USSR or satellite countries, without a European or World War.\nC. The Intelligence Division, Department of the Army, considers that the paper\nfails to bring out the two most pressing problems affecting United States security which\nthe Spanish situation presents. First, the potential strategic importance of Spain to\nthe United States in the event of war with the USSR renders extremely serious the\npresent coolness of relations between Spain and the United States. Second, the stra-\ntegic importance to the United States of Western Europe as a whole renders equally\nserious the present coolness of the major Western European nations toward Spain.\nThe United States has shown that it recognizes the importance to its own security of\nthe integration of Western Europe economically, politically, and militarily. Such inte-\ngration is incomplete and inadequate without Spain, yet Spain has been specifically\nvii\nSECRE"
}