Ask the Scholar
Page 29 of 75
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
25
only secondary consideration. Road and rail
enough, despite heavy destruction of freight
expansion is based largely on Soviet strategic
cars, to allow large withdrawals for such mod-
requirements. The new lines give an alter-
ernization as air-brakes installations. War
nate through-route across Rumania from the
destruction of railway equipment and track
Soviet frontier to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and
was severe as was damage to marshalling
Hungary, and the proposed new Danube
yards, shops, and stations. Rail traffic was
bridges, one reported under construction at
virtually at a standstill when Rumania was
Corobia-Gigen, one planned for Giurgiu-Ruse,
occupied by the Red Army in 1944.
and one rumored for Ismail-Tulcea, will give
The system has largely if superficially re-
the Soviet Union direct access to the Greek
covered from the war. In the past three years,
and Turkish frontiers. This is fundamental
nearly all damage has been shored up, three
to any Soviet intentions toward the Darda-
new lines-begun before the war-have been
nelles and the Aegean. In conjunction with
completed, and work is reported to have begun
these bridges and with construction now pro-
on one of the planned Danube bridges. Serv-
ceeding in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Ruma-
ice has been restored on all major and nearly
nia's transport network will give the Soviet
all secondary lines. By August 1948, passen-
Union direct access to several points on the
ger traffic was 25 percent heavier than in the
Adriatic coast and the Aegean.
previous year and freight movements in-
Another strategic gain of this centralization
creased 72 percent from January to December
is the effecting of a potential rolling stock re-
1947.
serve. Peak loading periods do not occur si-
This apparently healthy condition, however,
multaneously throughout Eastern Europe, and
proved to be misleading. By June 1948 the
centralization will permit emergency shifting
rapid rise in freight traffic had leveled off at 28
of rolling stock from slack to busy areas, re-
percent below prewar. Most repairs have
gardless of national frontiers. Traffic can
been temporary and all lines are now essen-
move with a smaller rolling stock establish-
tially in bad repair. The majority of the loco-
ment.
motive and rolling stock establishment is su-
(1) Railroads.
perannuated, maintenance is sub-minimum,
Railways move the bulk of Rumania's
retirement rates are excessive, and nearly all
freight, 83 percent in 1938, 86 percent in 1947.
production is diverted to the Soviet Union.
Before World War II, this traffic was mainly
Shortages of all types plague the rail sys-
in petroleum, grain, and timber shipments to
tem, but rolling stock and particularly loco-
Central Europe. Today, the majority of the
motives, are the critical deficiency. The loco-
traffic is in the same products shipped to the
motive inventory has declined more since,
Soviet Union.
than during, the war: 17 percent from 1938 to
The railways were primitive before the war,
1945 and 21 percent from then until now. The
but they were adequate for their requirements,
serviceable supply in mid-1948 was 1,260 or 34
and for such a system, were in fairly sound
percent below prewar. However, intensifica-
condition. Locomotives and rolling stock, if
tion of motive power employment has kept
antiquated, were in excess of demand; mainte-
traffic moving with the available locomotive
nance was adequate; and capacity was suffi-
supply. This has been accomplished by in-
cient for the needs of the national economy.
creased efficiency and by abusive practices
As the economy quickened, in the late thirties,
(such as increasing the length of service be-
a program of expansion was inaugurated,
tween overhauls), which multiply deprecia-
which was overtaken by the war.
tion and work against the recovery of inven-
During the war, the system was vital to Ger-
tories.
many for moving petroleum, grain, and timber
This intensification is consistent with the
to Central Europe as well as for east-front
exhaustive operating policies imposed by the
logistics. It was reenforced to some extent by
Soviets throughout eastern European trans-
German freight and tank cars, and the aug-
port systems. If pursued, they would seri-
mented rolling stock establishment was strong
ously undermine the railways, but there is no
Page data
- Page
- 29
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- ef0351e45d9b3bd7
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486499550
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486499550",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Rumania, Situation Report 12",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 75,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486499550",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Rumania, Situation Report 12",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486499550",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Rumania, Situation Report 12",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 75,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499550",
"naId": 486499550,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 5,
"logicalDate": "1949-10-05",
"month": 10,
"year": 1949
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 29,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875503/875503-01-029.tif",
"mediaId": "ef0351e45d9b3bd7",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n25\nonly secondary consideration. Road and rail\nenough, despite heavy destruction of freight\nexpansion is based largely on Soviet strategic\ncars, to allow large withdrawals for such mod-\nrequirements. The new lines give an alter-\nernization as air-brakes installations. War\nnate through-route across Rumania from the\ndestruction of railway equipment and track\nSoviet frontier to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and\nwas severe as was damage to marshalling\nHungary, and the proposed new Danube\nyards, shops, and stations. Rail traffic was\nbridges, one reported under construction at\nvirtually at a standstill when Rumania was\nCorobia-Gigen, one planned for Giurgiu-Ruse,\noccupied by the Red Army in 1944.\nand one rumored for Ismail-Tulcea, will give\nThe system has largely if superficially re-\nthe Soviet Union direct access to the Greek\ncovered from the war. In the past three years,\nand Turkish frontiers. This is fundamental\nnearly all damage has been shored up, three\nto any Soviet intentions toward the Darda-\nnew lines-begun before the war-have been\nnelles and the Aegean. In conjunction with\ncompleted, and work is reported to have begun\nthese bridges and with construction now pro-\non one of the planned Danube bridges. Serv-\nceeding in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Ruma-\nice has been restored on all major and nearly\nnia's transport network will give the Soviet\nall secondary lines. By August 1948, passen-\nUnion direct access to several points on the\nger traffic was 25 percent heavier than in the\nAdriatic coast and the Aegean.\nprevious year and freight movements in-\nAnother strategic gain of this centralization\ncreased 72 percent from January to December\nis the effecting of a potential rolling stock re-\n1947.\nserve. Peak loading periods do not occur si-\nThis apparently healthy condition, however,\nmultaneously throughout Eastern Europe, and\nproved to be misleading. By June 1948 the\ncentralization will permit emergency shifting\nrapid rise in freight traffic had leveled off at 28\nof rolling stock from slack to busy areas, re-\npercent below prewar. Most repairs have\ngardless of national frontiers. Traffic can\nbeen temporary and all lines are now essen-\nmove with a smaller rolling stock establish-\ntially in bad repair. The majority of the loco-\nment.\nmotive and rolling stock establishment is su-\n(1) Railroads.\nperannuated, maintenance is sub-minimum,\nRailways move the bulk of Rumania's\nretirement rates are excessive, and nearly all\nfreight, 83 percent in 1938, 86 percent in 1947.\nproduction is diverted to the Soviet Union.\nBefore World War II, this traffic was mainly\nShortages of all types plague the rail sys-\nin petroleum, grain, and timber shipments to\ntem, but rolling stock and particularly loco-\nCentral Europe. Today, the majority of the\nmotives, are the critical deficiency. The loco-\ntraffic is in the same products shipped to the\nmotive inventory has declined more since,\nSoviet Union.\nthan during, the war: 17 percent from 1938 to\nThe railways were primitive before the war,\n1945 and 21 percent from then until now. The\nbut they were adequate for their requirements,\nserviceable supply in mid-1948 was 1,260 or 34\nand for such a system, were in fairly sound\npercent below prewar. However, intensifica-\ncondition. Locomotives and rolling stock, if\ntion of motive power employment has kept\nantiquated, were in excess of demand; mainte-\ntraffic moving with the available locomotive\nnance was adequate; and capacity was suffi-\nsupply. This has been accomplished by in-\ncient for the needs of the national economy.\ncreased efficiency and by abusive practices\nAs the economy quickened, in the late thirties,\n(such as increasing the length of service be-\na program of expansion was inaugurated,\ntween overhauls), which multiply deprecia-\nwhich was overtaken by the war.\ntion and work against the recovery of inven-\nDuring the war, the system was vital to Ger-\ntories.\nmany for moving petroleum, grain, and timber\nThis intensification is consistent with the\nto Central Europe as well as for east-front\nexhaustive operating policies imposed by the\nlogistics. It was reenforced to some extent by\nSoviets throughout eastern European trans-\nGerman freight and tank cars, and the aug-\nport systems. If pursued, they would seri-\nmented rolling stock establishment was strong\nously undermine the railways, but there is no"
}