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CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
The elements of interest to US security, out-
temporary disruption in its programs which
lined in the preceding chapter, are not ex-
such far-reaching measures will entail.
pected to change appreciably in the foresee-
From a military standpoint, future develop-
able future. The Communist regime may be
ments in Rumania are not expected to change
expected to continue its efforts to solidify its
the situation as it affects US security. The
control over the people, and will remain a
USSR now has in Rumania the basic elements
loyal supporter of the Kremlin in foreign af-
needed for its strategic plans; assurance of a
fairs. Sporadic and isolated cases of resist-
cooperative Rumanian Government and the
ance to the government will continue to occur,
control of supply lines. It also has access to
but coordination of these efforts to lift them
whatever supplies may be available and,
above the nuisance level will be impossible un-
through the government, control of manpower
der present conditions.
including the armed forces. From present in-
While it is possible that one or more of the
dications there will be a gradual increase in
Communist leaders now holding power in the
the value of Rumania as a Satellite, but the
government may be replaced, this will not
limited potential of the country makes any
result in any basic change in the trend toward
assistance of secondary value.
more complete domination. Defection of the
The extension of International Commu-
Tito type is impossible in Rumania, where
nism into Rumania and the other Eastern
ample Soviet strength is available to discour-
European countries, and through it, the as-
age anti-Cominform sentiment at its incep-
sumption of Soviet control was a major Soviet
tion.
postwar objective. The full implications of
this action were not immediately apparent to
Integration of the Rumanian economy into
the majority of the anti-Communist peoples.
the Soviet-Satellite program will be pursued
As a result, the USSR initially encountered
as rapidly as possible. The basic plan for this
little outside opposition. In fact, the desire
action has been established and several major
of the Western Powers to establish the basis
steps have already been completed. Further
for a free and peaceful world, and to make
extension of the plan into such fields as the
concessions where necessary to reach agree-
collectivization of agriculture and the nation-
ment with the USSR, made the political con-
alization of small businesses is an essential
quest of the Satellites less difficult than it
step which is being approached with caution
would have been had a stronger initial stand
because of adverse public sentiment. While
been taken.
there is little question that the Communist
Anti-Communist opposition will have an ap-
regime could cope with any public disturb-
preciable effect on the orbit economy. The
ances which might result, it is apparent that
first indications of this are evident in the
other considerations make the execution of an
increasing difficulties experienced by the Sat-
all-out drive for these necessary objectives
ellites in obtaining critically short materials,
inopportune at present. The manner of ap-
largely because of the shortage of foreign ex-
proach and the timing of government action
change and curtailment of US exports. The
on these matters is of interest to the US as
effect which these and other Western-inspired
a barometer which indicates the confidence of
difficulties will have on Soviet plans, and their
the Communist regime in its ability to fulfill
impact on interrelated political factors, are
its commitments to the USSR, despite the
of the greatest significance.
Note: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 August 1949.
SECRET
51
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"ocrText": "ECRET\nCHAPTER VI\nPROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nThe elements of interest to US security, out-\ntemporary disruption in its programs which\nlined in the preceding chapter, are not ex-\nsuch far-reaching measures will entail.\npected to change appreciably in the foresee-\nFrom a military standpoint, future develop-\nable future. The Communist regime may be\nments in Rumania are not expected to change\nexpected to continue its efforts to solidify its\nthe situation as it affects US security. The\ncontrol over the people, and will remain a\nUSSR now has in Rumania the basic elements\nloyal supporter of the Kremlin in foreign af-\nneeded for its strategic plans; assurance of a\nfairs. Sporadic and isolated cases of resist-\ncooperative Rumanian Government and the\nance to the government will continue to occur,\ncontrol of supply lines. It also has access to\nbut coordination of these efforts to lift them\nwhatever supplies may be available and,\nabove the nuisance level will be impossible un-\nthrough the government, control of manpower\nder present conditions.\nincluding the armed forces. From present in-\nWhile it is possible that one or more of the\ndications there will be a gradual increase in\nCommunist leaders now holding power in the\nthe value of Rumania as a Satellite, but the\ngovernment may be replaced, this will not\nlimited potential of the country makes any\nresult in any basic change in the trend toward\nassistance of secondary value.\nmore complete domination. Defection of the\nThe extension of International Commu-\nTito type is impossible in Rumania, where\nnism into Rumania and the other Eastern\nample Soviet strength is available to discour-\nEuropean countries, and through it, the as-\nage anti-Cominform sentiment at its incep-\nsumption of Soviet control was a major Soviet\ntion.\npostwar objective. The full implications of\nthis action were not immediately apparent to\nIntegration of the Rumanian economy into\nthe majority of the anti-Communist peoples.\nthe Soviet-Satellite program will be pursued\nAs a result, the USSR initially encountered\nas rapidly as possible. The basic plan for this\nlittle outside opposition. In fact, the desire\naction has been established and several major\nof the Western Powers to establish the basis\nsteps have already been completed. Further\nfor a free and peaceful world, and to make\nextension of the plan into such fields as the\nconcessions where necessary to reach agree-\ncollectivization of agriculture and the nation-\nment with the USSR, made the political con-\nalization of small businesses is an essential\nquest of the Satellites less difficult than it\nstep which is being approached with caution\nwould have been had a stronger initial stand\nbecause of adverse public sentiment. While\nbeen taken.\nthere is little question that the Communist\nAnti-Communist opposition will have an ap-\nregime could cope with any public disturb-\npreciable effect on the orbit economy. The\nances which might result, it is apparent that\nfirst indications of this are evident in the\nother considerations make the execution of an\nincreasing difficulties experienced by the Sat-\nall-out drive for these necessary objectives\nellites in obtaining critically short materials,\ninopportune at present. The manner of ap-\nlargely because of the shortage of foreign ex-\nproach and the timing of government action\nchange and curtailment of US exports. The\non these matters is of interest to the US as\neffect which these and other Western-inspired\na barometer which indicates the confidence of\ndifficulties will have on Soviet plans, and their\nthe Communist regime in its ability to fulfill\nimpact on interrelated political factors, are\nits commitments to the USSR, despite the\nof the greatest significance.\nNote: This Chapter is based on information available to CIA as of 1 August 1949.\nSECRET\n51"
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