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SECRET
West and particularly the United States, con-
bility, particularly in the selection and train-
tinued and deliberate violation of Peace Treaty
ing of a new officer corps. Some concrete re-
provisions, and open defiance of formal pro-
sults of the reorganization are already evident.
tests indicate Rumania's pursuit of this course.
Future progress will depend upon the political
The principal economic problem in Ru-
and economic development of the country as
mania is one of rehabilitating the basic ele-
well as strategic considerations governing the
ments of the economy (agriculture and petro-
employment of the army.
leum) which were exploited to the maximum
Rumania's importance in the East-West
by the Axis, and, during the occupation, by
struggle is closely related to the degree of its
the USSR. Drafting of industrial plans was
subservience to the USSR. Rather than seek-
begun in October 1948. A one-year experi-
ing the establishment of a "government
mental plan for recovery and development
friendly to the Soviet Union," Soviet moves
was announced at the end of December, and
have been designed to eliminate or minimize
went into operation on 1 January 1949.
all factors which detract from the full use of
The major difficulty lies in the fact that
Rumania's potential by the USSR and to ex-
critical items of equipment and machinery
ploit those elements which increase Ru-
must be obtained from sources outside Ru-
mania's value as a Soviet Satellite. In subju-
mania. Since many of these items are also
gating the Rumanian people, in establishing
needed in the USSR as well as in other Satel-
a Communist dictatorship and in erecting the
lites, it is doubtful that Rumania will receive
framework of a planned economy, the Krem-
more than a token amount. The relatively
lin has moved methodically, without devia-
slow progress achieved in meeting the produc-
tion. Such vital questions, from a national
tion goals already established is largely the
point of view, as the rehabilitation of the
result of the failure to obtain these critical
country, the establishment of a modern demo-
materials.
cratic order, and the organization of a de-
fensive army, have been wholly subordinated
The military importance of Rumania to the
to the seizure and consolidation of Commu-
Soviet Union arises from its strategic location
nist political control. As this control became
which makes Rumania significant in the
secure, the timing of specific measures to
Soviet defense in depth. Additional factors
transform Rumania into a replica as well as
of military importance are: the security of
appendage of the Soviet Union was based on
supply lines passing through Rumania; the
a policy of gradualism and expediency. The
construction of airfields for Soviet offensive or
implications of the new order being estab-
defensive use; the maximum use of oil fields
lished in Rumania were revealed to the peo-
and other petroleum installations.
ple step by step. The theory of "class war-
Development of Rumanian Armed Forces
fare" was first publicized in June 1948; the
will be governed by the decision of the Kremlin
"dictatorship of the proletariat" was publicly
as to what share in Soviet strategy can be
proclaimed in January 1949, and it was not
entrusted wholly or in part to Rumanian
until March 1949 that the Party formally an-
troops. This decision will be based in part
nounced its program for collectivization of
on the most efficient use of Rumanian man-
agriculture.
power as well as on the political reliability
In the face of constant Soviet pressures, the
of Rumanian units.
Rumanian people have remained hostile, res-
The appointment in December 1947 of Emil
tive and withal essentially impotent. Sur-
Bodnaras as Minister of National Defense
face cooperation with the regime is the price
marked the beginning of a program of rehabil-
of survival. Although estimates place the
itation and revitalization of the armed forces.
opposition as high as 90 percent of the total
Under this program definite steps are being
population, it has been thoroughly muzzled
taken to improve morale and to equip the
and suppressed. Resistance to the regime is
various units with standardized weapons.
not likely to become significant until the
Emphasis is being placed on political relia-
threat of overwhelming retaliation is removed.
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"ocrText": "2\nSECRET\nWest and particularly the United States, con-\nbility, particularly in the selection and train-\ntinued and deliberate violation of Peace Treaty\ning of a new officer corps. Some concrete re-\nprovisions, and open defiance of formal pro-\nsults of the reorganization are already evident.\ntests indicate Rumania's pursuit of this course.\nFuture progress will depend upon the political\nThe principal economic problem in Ru-\nand economic development of the country as\nmania is one of rehabilitating the basic ele-\nwell as strategic considerations governing the\nments of the economy (agriculture and petro-\nemployment of the army.\nleum) which were exploited to the maximum\nRumania's importance in the East-West\nby the Axis, and, during the occupation, by\nstruggle is closely related to the degree of its\nthe USSR. Drafting of industrial plans was\nsubservience to the USSR. Rather than seek-\nbegun in October 1948. A one-year experi-\ning the establishment of a \"government\nmental plan for recovery and development\nfriendly to the Soviet Union,\" Soviet moves\nwas announced at the end of December, and\nhave been designed to eliminate or minimize\nwent into operation on 1 January 1949.\nall factors which detract from the full use of\nThe major difficulty lies in the fact that\nRumania's potential by the USSR and to ex-\ncritical items of equipment and machinery\nploit those elements which increase Ru-\nmust be obtained from sources outside Ru-\nmania's value as a Soviet Satellite. In subju-\nmania. Since many of these items are also\ngating the Rumanian people, in establishing\nneeded in the USSR as well as in other Satel-\na Communist dictatorship and in erecting the\nlites, it is doubtful that Rumania will receive\nframework of a planned economy, the Krem-\nmore than a token amount. The relatively\nlin has moved methodically, without devia-\nslow progress achieved in meeting the produc-\ntion. Such vital questions, from a national\ntion goals already established is largely the\npoint of view, as the rehabilitation of the\nresult of the failure to obtain these critical\ncountry, the establishment of a modern demo-\nmaterials.\ncratic order, and the organization of a de-\nfensive army, have been wholly subordinated\nThe military importance of Rumania to the\nto the seizure and consolidation of Commu-\nSoviet Union arises from its strategic location\nnist political control. As this control became\nwhich makes Rumania significant in the\nsecure, the timing of specific measures to\nSoviet defense in depth. Additional factors\ntransform Rumania into a replica as well as\nof military importance are: the security of\nappendage of the Soviet Union was based on\nsupply lines passing through Rumania; the\na policy of gradualism and expediency. The\nconstruction of airfields for Soviet offensive or\nimplications of the new order being estab-\ndefensive use; the maximum use of oil fields\nlished in Rumania were revealed to the peo-\nand other petroleum installations.\nple step by step. The theory of \"class war-\nDevelopment of Rumanian Armed Forces\nfare\" was first publicized in June 1948; the\nwill be governed by the decision of the Kremlin\n\"dictatorship of the proletariat\" was publicly\nas to what share in Soviet strategy can be\nproclaimed in January 1949, and it was not\nentrusted wholly or in part to Rumanian\nuntil March 1949 that the Party formally an-\ntroops. This decision will be based in part\nnounced its program for collectivization of\non the most efficient use of Rumanian man-\nagriculture.\npower as well as on the political reliability\nIn the face of constant Soviet pressures, the\nof Rumanian units.\nRumanian people have remained hostile, res-\nThe appointment in December 1947 of Emil\ntive and withal essentially impotent. Sur-\nBodnaras as Minister of National Defense\nface cooperation with the regime is the price\nmarked the beginning of a program of rehabil-\nof survival. Although estimates place the\nitation and revitalization of the armed forces.\nopposition as high as 90 percent of the total\nUnder this program definite steps are being\npopulation, it has been thoroughly muzzled\ntaken to improve morale and to equip the\nand suppressed. Resistance to the regime is\nvarious units with standardized weapons.\nnot likely to become significant until the\nEmphasis is being placed on political relia-\nthreat of overwhelming retaliation is removed."
}