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    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Arab States, Situation Report 13",
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    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Arab States, Situation Report 13",
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            "logicalDate": "1949-09-27",
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    "seq": 49,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "46\nSECRET\ncountry, does not have the industrial potential\nfirm; an unknown number of these have been\nor technical ability to maintain modern heavy\ndelivered. The operational efficiency of the\nand highly technical equipment. Lacking\nREAF is probably less than 50 percent.\nplans for any significant industrial develop-\nThe anti-aircraft defenses of Egypt, which\nment, Egypt will have to continue to rely on\nare completely ineffective by Western stand-\nexternal (probably British) aid to arm and\nards, are concentrated in the Alexandria-Cairo-\nequip its armed forces.\nPort Said triangle. The artillery and the\nEgypt is, in effect, the only Arab country\nfire-control and radar systems are believed to\nthat has a navy. The navy consists of the\nbe obsolete, badly worn, or non-operational.\nfollowing vessels:\nThe UK assumes complete responsibility for\n1 LST\nthe air and ground defenses of the Suez Canal\n9 YMS (215 tons)\narea under the provisions of the 1936 treaty.\n3 Yachts (YP) (1069, 1330, and 4561 tons)\nAll Egyptian forces which entered Palestine\n20 LCM\nlast year are in the Gaza strip or back in\n1 Launch (65 tons)\nEgypt. Some reserve units have been reac-\n3 Attendant Vessels (450 tons) Y.A.G.\ntivated and disposed in the Cairo area to assist\n1 Transport (2640 tons)\nthe civil police in maintaining internal secu-\n1 Trawler (618 tons)\nrity. One Egyptian infantry battalion is per-\n1 Patrol Vessel (30 tons)\nmanently stationed in the Sudan, and all the\n2 Patrol Vessels (20 tons)\nremaining troops are garrisoned in the six\n1 Lighthouse Tender (1428 tons)\narea commands. The Royal Frontier Corps\n3 Training Ships (small)\nof 5,400 is organized into a light-car regiment\nThree frigates now on order from the UK\nand two camel-corps sections. Its normal mis-\nmay be delivered at any time. Egyptian naval\nsion is to police the Suez Canal, but currently\npersonnel are poorly trained and are inex-\nunits are stationed along the Israeli frontier\nperienced.\nas well. The Territorial Force of 2,000 is lo-\nOf all the Arab states Egypt possesses the\ncated primarily in the Western Desert and\nstrongest air force, but its capabilities are very\nalong Egypt's western and southern frontiers.\nlimited. The Royal Egyptian Air Force\nIn summary, the reverses suffered by the\n(REAF) consists of about fifty-seven Spitfire\nEgyptian ground, sea, and air forces in the\nfighter aircraft, eleven twin-engine aircraft\nPalestine conflict clearly reveal their weak-\nwhich can be used either for transport or\nnesses: low morale, poor leadership, insuffi-\nbombing duties, twenty-five single and twin-\ncient training, and inadequate equipment.\nengine advanced trainers, and about seventy\nAlthough the Egyptians dream of an armed\nother miscellaneous and/or obsolete aircraft.\nforce, modernly equipped and armed, they\nEgypt also possesses 103 twin-engine trans-\nlack the human, natural, and industrial re-\nports donated by the US for ground mechan-\nsources to fulfill their dream. Consequently,\nical instruction only, of which ten are believed\nit appears that Egypt must depend for its de-\nto have been made operational. The REAF\nfense on the UK and the US, although in the\nhas a personnel strength of 396 officers, 310 of\nevent of another major war, its armed forces,\nwhom are pilots, and 2,896 enlisted men. The\nas in World War II, could probably secure\npilots range from poor to fair, have a low\nEgypt's internal communications (the Suez\ncombat efficiency, and lack aggressiveness.\nCanal excepted), maintain internal security,\nIt is believed that the REAF has sustained\nand perform other guard and service functions.\nfairly heavy combat losses in the Palestine\nwar. To replace the destroyed aircraft, Egypt\n3. Transjordan.\nordered about fifty fighter aircraft, either\nThe armed forces of Transjordan consist\nMacchi or Fiat, from Italy. Five of these are\nprimarily of the Arab Legion, which is at\nknown to have been shot down on their first\npresent commanded by a British brigadier re-\nmission. Egypt is also attempting to buy\nsponsible directly to King Abdullah. Two\nStirling four-engine bombers from a Belgian\ndeputies, one (a Transjordanian) for Public"
}