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Since the Army's primary mission is to maintain internal order,* and since threat
of revolutionary action centers principally in Italy's politically developed industrial
north, five divisions of the Italian Army are strategically deployed across that area
(see map 8) where they are also available for redeployment along the Italo-Yugoslav
border. In the event of Yugoslav aggression, which, although immediately unlikely,
remains a constant threat, the Italian Army could fight only a brief delaying action
along the Tagliamento or Piave Rivers before being forced to withdraw to the Appen-
nines along the Genoa-Ancona line.
Of the three services, the Navy, probably because of its prewar prestige in the
Mediterranean, is bitterest about the Peacy Treaty limitations. A former Chief of
Staff, Admiral De Courten, who resigned in protest against the terms of the Treaty,
has spoken with some heat regarding the inadequacy of fleet units left to Italy. He
pointed out that his country, vulnerable to attack by sea and hemmed in by nations
with superior naval forces in the Mediterranean, would be in no position to defend itself
against any invader with the limited fleet at its disposal. He considered particularly
unfortunate the prohibition against retaining or building submarines or motor torpedo
boats, the types of vessels best suited to defend Italy's long coastlines and its merchant
trade. These types he said, are economical and would not weigh too heavily on
Italy's limited budget. De Courten felt that, in the event of Treaty revision, it would
be possible to replace the tonnage loss within a few years, and he considered that the
personnel strength (25,000) allowed by the Treaty would permit formation of an
adequate nucleus of trained people to permit further development. The December
1947 strength of 39,000 must be reduced to Treaty limits within nine months of
R-Day (15 September 1947). In any case officer personnel, discouraged by low pay and
poor prospects, are beginning to quit the Navy.
Combatant ships are limited to two battleships, four cruisers, four destroyers, 20
corvettes, 16 torpedo boats, and 21 minor vessels. Italy has some air search but no
surface naval radar. Surface equipment would necessitate refitting of ships and re-
education of personnel. Beside inadequacy of numbers, naval units, many of them
seriously damaged in the recent war, are of obsolescent construction and have insuffi-
cient armor. These factors, plus lack of fuel, leave the Navy unsuitable even to re-
inforce Army operations, since most of the fleet is now laid up for repairs at the two
main bases, Taranto and La Spezia. The principal use for active vessels is minesweep-
ing, although one corvette in December 1947 was patrolling off Bari in an attempt to
* Threats to internal order are presented by: (1) possible revolutionary action on the part
of political semi-military groups; (2) possible civil war between extremists of Right and Left; and
(3) strikes and anti-Government demonstrations.
In December 1947 the Yugoslav Army consisted of 345,000 men (including security forces)
and appeared to have entirely adequate facilities for the acquisition and maintenance of equip-
ment. Another neighbor, France, had a metropolitan army of some 220,000, poorly equipped. With
Colonial troops, its armed forces numbered 561,000.
In March 1948 the personnel strength of the Navy was reported to be between 32,000 and
35,000.
SECRET
IV-2
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nSince the Army's primary mission is to maintain internal order,* and since threat\nof revolutionary action centers principally in Italy's politically developed industrial\nnorth, five divisions of the Italian Army are strategically deployed across that area\n(see map 8) where they are also available for redeployment along the Italo-Yugoslav\nborder. In the event of Yugoslav aggression, which, although immediately unlikely,\nremains a constant threat, the Italian Army could fight only a brief delaying action\nalong the Tagliamento or Piave Rivers before being forced to withdraw to the Appen-\nnines along the Genoa-Ancona line.\nOf the three services, the Navy, probably because of its prewar prestige in the\nMediterranean, is bitterest about the Peacy Treaty limitations. A former Chief of\nStaff, Admiral De Courten, who resigned in protest against the terms of the Treaty,\nhas spoken with some heat regarding the inadequacy of fleet units left to Italy. He\npointed out that his country, vulnerable to attack by sea and hemmed in by nations\nwith superior naval forces in the Mediterranean, would be in no position to defend itself\nagainst any invader with the limited fleet at its disposal. He considered particularly\nunfortunate the prohibition against retaining or building submarines or motor torpedo\nboats, the types of vessels best suited to defend Italy's long coastlines and its merchant\ntrade. These types he said, are economical and would not weigh too heavily on\nItaly's limited budget. De Courten felt that, in the event of Treaty revision, it would\nbe possible to replace the tonnage loss within a few years, and he considered that the\npersonnel strength (25,000) allowed by the Treaty would permit formation of an\nadequate nucleus of trained people to permit further development. The December\n1947 strength of 39,000 must be reduced to Treaty limits within nine months of\nR-Day (15 September 1947). In any case officer personnel, discouraged by low pay and\npoor prospects, are beginning to quit the Navy.\nCombatant ships are limited to two battleships, four cruisers, four destroyers, 20\ncorvettes, 16 torpedo boats, and 21 minor vessels. Italy has some air search but no\nsurface naval radar. Surface equipment would necessitate refitting of ships and re-\neducation of personnel. Beside inadequacy of numbers, naval units, many of them\nseriously damaged in the recent war, are of obsolescent construction and have insuffi-\ncient armor. These factors, plus lack of fuel, leave the Navy unsuitable even to re-\ninforce Army operations, since most of the fleet is now laid up for repairs at the two\nmain bases, Taranto and La Spezia. The principal use for active vessels is minesweep-\ning, although one corvette in December 1947 was patrolling off Bari in an attempt to\n* Threats to internal order are presented by: (1) possible revolutionary action on the part\nof political semi-military groups; (2) possible civil war between extremists of Right and Left; and\n(3) strikes and anti-Government demonstrations.\nIn December 1947 the Yugoslav Army consisted of 345,000 men (including security forces)\nand appeared to have entirely adequate facilities for the acquisition and maintenance of equip-\nment. Another neighbor, France, had a metropolitan army of some 220,000, poorly equipped. With\nColonial troops, its armed forces numbered 561,000.\nIn March 1948 the personnel strength of the Navy was reported to be between 32,000 and\n35,000.\nSECRET\nIV-2"
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