Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486499771",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Italy, Situation Report 15",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499771"
}

{
    "id": "486499771",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499771",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Italy, Situation Report 15",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499771",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875504/875504-02-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875504/875504-02-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875504/875504-02-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 78,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486499771",
    "naId": 486499771,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "logicalDate": "1948-01-01",
            "month": 1,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 52,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875504/875504-02-052.tif",
    "mediaId": "e2b8532d03f770bb",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\nSECTION VI\nPROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\nThe stability of the existing government depends primarily on its ability to obtain\nadequate economic support from the United States. With its present parliamentary\nmajority, it should be able to maintain its position politically until the general elections\non 18 April 1948.\nThe Communists and left-wing Socialists will continue their vigorous effort to inten-\nsify existing difficulties and dissatisfactions with the purpose of thoroughly discrediting\nthe existing government and winning the national elections.\nThe outcome of the April elections will depend not only on the prospects for the\nsuccess of the European Recovery Program, but also on the assurance of US support in\nthe face of Soviet expansion westward. Favorable developments in this regard would\nprobably result in a coalition government of moderate and rightist parties friendly to\nthe US. Adverse developments and the consequent disillusionment would enhance the\npossibility of a Communist electoral victory.\nArmed insurrection is a continuing Communist capability; the threat of insurrec-\ntion will be exploited to the full to intimidate both the Government and the electorate.\nIt is probable, however, that the Communists' overriding mission is to preserve and\ndevelop their organization. Insurrection, while there remained a fair chance of acces-\nsion to power by legal or quasilegal means, or in circumstances which gave no promise\nof early decisive success, is, therefore, unlikely.\nIf the Communists were to resort to force, their effort would be general throughout\nItaly, with a view to taking over the entire country. Their capabilities are greatest in\nthe North, however, where they played a major role in partisan resistance during the\nwar and still maintain an effective partisan organization. There, too, the proximity of\nYugoslavia affords them some prospect of support and would facilitate the maintenance\nof guerrilla operations similar to those in northern Greece. The opportunity is by no\nmeans SO favorable as that in Greece, however, for the frontier is much narrower in\nproportion to the depth of the area concerned and the interior is for the most part open\ncountry, tending to prevent the consolidation of guerrilla control.\nThe Italian armed forces could probably cope successfully with any Communist\ninsurrection which lacked general popular support, provided that the threat of Yugoslav\nintervention on a major scale were effectively neutralized.\nThe departure of Allied troops from Italy has substantially increased the tension\nbetween the Government and the Communists. The Government will suffer to some\nextent from the withdrawal of this source of strength which has been considerable, par-\nticularly since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. It is also evident that the\nCommunists have adopted a more aggressive policy since the departure of the Allied\ntroops.\nVI-1\nSECRET"
}