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annually, of which 70 percent went to agri-
C. Industry.
culture, 3.5 percent to industry, and 18.5 per-
The chaotic condition into which Germany
cent for export, with a small amount left un-
distributed. Potash production in 1948 in the
was plunged by total defeat and the collapse
of its industrial system is in sharp contrast
Bizone was 510,000 tons (K20 content) and in
to the stability, efficiency, and high degree of
the Soviet Zone 917,000 tons, of which 180,000
organization characteristic of German econ-
tons were taken for reparations and 238,000
omy in the past. The disaster was the more
tons for export.
spectacular because of the complexity of the
(16) Salt.
preponderantly industrial economy which was
The basic raw material of the important al-
geared to war production, but readjustment
kali chemicals is common salt, of which Ger-
was not made less difficult by the disappear-
ance of a sizable section (war goods) of an in-
many ranked first for many years among
dustrial .complex that provided a livelihood
world producers and exporters. The average
for millions of Germans. Efforts of the west-
prewar output was 3 million tons, of which
800,000 tons worth RM 10 million were ex-
ern Allies to get Germany back on a produc-
tion level approximating that of 1936 were
ported. About 82 percent of the salt was dis-
handicapped by the fact that the entire eco-
posed of through two syndicates, the larger of
which was an association of big potash com-
nomic structure was SO badly warped and dis-
panies that also mined salt. The principal
turbed by the stresses of the intervening
salt works in the US Zone total 10, in the UK
twelve years as to prevent its functioning on
Zone 28, in the Soviet Zone 23, and in the
any but a low level, and then only with con-
siderable outside assistance. The situation
French Zone 6. Salt mining was resumed in
was further aggravated by the lack of struc-
the bizonal area in 1946 and quickly brought
to prewar production levels.
tural economic unity resulting from the divi-
sion of Germany into the four separate po-
Despite the abundance of alkali raw mate-
litical and economic administrations, with a
rials, the chemical industry operated at such
fortuitous distribution of resources and with-
a low level until 1948 that the production of
out an effective coordinating authority. Re-
caustic soda and soda ash was insufficient to
gional specialization and economic inter-
meet demands. Consequently there was a se-
dependency, carried to great lengths by the
rious shortage of soap, detergents, and other
Nazis in order to maximize production, also
cleansing agents, while industries such as tex-
accentuated the troubles arising from the sep-
tiles, glass, paper, and rubber were also seri-
aration of the country into sharply delineated
ously affected. The largest caustic soda plant
zones of occupation. Moreover, the failure to
in Germany was at Bitterfeld, now in the So-
effect currency reform during the period 1945
viet Zone, which produced 32 percent of the
to June 1948, led to universal hoarding of
prewar total. Dismantling and inadequate
goods, and thus the potential ability of Ger-
fuel supplies affected the capacity of this
many (all zones) to contribute to its own re-
plant, and only 110,000 tons were manufac-
covery was not realized.
tured in 1948. Output of caustic soda in
Other important factors contributing to the
western Germany reached 155,000 tons in
continuance of the economic slump were the
1948, an increase of 80 percent over the pre-
reparations, demilitarization, decartelization,
ceding year. Production of soda ash in 1936
and denazification programs of the Occupa-
was 726,000 tons, with the largest plant at
tion Powers which: (1) closed and dismantled
Bernberg, now in the Soviet Zone, with an an-
plants; (2) prohibited the production of war-
nual capacity of 410,000 tons. In 1948 Soviet
potential materials formerly important to do-
Zone production was only 82,000 tons. Soda
mestic industry and to the export market; (3)
ash production in western Germany was 377,-
partially decentralized and destroyed long-
200 tons, or slightly in excess of the 1936 out-
established operational methods of whole in-
put for that area.
dustries; and (4) removed managerial talent
II-12
SECRET
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"ocrText": "annually, of which 70 percent went to agri-\nC. Industry.\nculture, 3.5 percent to industry, and 18.5 per-\nThe chaotic condition into which Germany\ncent for export, with a small amount left un-\ndistributed. Potash production in 1948 in the\nwas plunged by total defeat and the collapse\nof its industrial system is in sharp contrast\nBizone was 510,000 tons (K20 content) and in\nto the stability, efficiency, and high degree of\nthe Soviet Zone 917,000 tons, of which 180,000\norganization characteristic of German econ-\ntons were taken for reparations and 238,000\nomy in the past. The disaster was the more\ntons for export.\nspectacular because of the complexity of the\n(16) Salt.\npreponderantly industrial economy which was\nThe basic raw material of the important al-\ngeared to war production, but readjustment\nkali chemicals is common salt, of which Ger-\nwas not made less difficult by the disappear-\nance of a sizable section (war goods) of an in-\nmany ranked first for many years among\ndustrial .complex that provided a livelihood\nworld producers and exporters. The average\nfor millions of Germans. Efforts of the west-\nprewar output was 3 million tons, of which\n800,000 tons worth RM 10 million were ex-\nern Allies to get Germany back on a produc-\ntion level approximating that of 1936 were\nported. About 82 percent of the salt was dis-\nhandicapped by the fact that the entire eco-\nposed of through two syndicates, the larger of\nwhich was an association of big potash com-\nnomic structure was SO badly warped and dis-\npanies that also mined salt. The principal\nturbed by the stresses of the intervening\nsalt works in the US Zone total 10, in the UK\ntwelve years as to prevent its functioning on\nZone 28, in the Soviet Zone 23, and in the\nany but a low level, and then only with con-\nsiderable outside assistance. The situation\nFrench Zone 6. Salt mining was resumed in\nwas further aggravated by the lack of struc-\nthe bizonal area in 1946 and quickly brought\nto prewar production levels.\ntural economic unity resulting from the divi-\nsion of Germany into the four separate po-\nDespite the abundance of alkali raw mate-\nlitical and economic administrations, with a\nrials, the chemical industry operated at such\nfortuitous distribution of resources and with-\na low level until 1948 that the production of\nout an effective coordinating authority. Re-\ncaustic soda and soda ash was insufficient to\ngional specialization and economic inter-\nmeet demands. Consequently there was a se-\ndependency, carried to great lengths by the\nrious shortage of soap, detergents, and other\nNazis in order to maximize production, also\ncleansing agents, while industries such as tex-\naccentuated the troubles arising from the sep-\ntiles, glass, paper, and rubber were also seri-\naration of the country into sharply delineated\nously affected. The largest caustic soda plant\nzones of occupation. Moreover, the failure to\nin Germany was at Bitterfeld, now in the So-\neffect currency reform during the period 1945\nviet Zone, which produced 32 percent of the\nto June 1948, led to universal hoarding of\nprewar total. Dismantling and inadequate\ngoods, and thus the potential ability of Ger-\nfuel supplies affected the capacity of this\nmany (all zones) to contribute to its own re-\nplant, and only 110,000 tons were manufac-\ncovery was not realized.\ntured in 1948. Output of caustic soda in\nOther important factors contributing to the\nwestern Germany reached 155,000 tons in\ncontinuance of the economic slump were the\n1948, an increase of 80 percent over the pre-\nreparations, demilitarization, decartelization,\nceding year. Production of soda ash in 1936\nand denazification programs of the Occupa-\nwas 726,000 tons, with the largest plant at\ntion Powers which: (1) closed and dismantled\nBernberg, now in the Soviet Zone, with an an-\nplants; (2) prohibited the production of war-\nnual capacity of 410,000 tons. In 1948 Soviet\npotential materials formerly important to do-\nZone production was only 82,000 tons. Soda\nmestic industry and to the export market; (3)\nash production in western Germany was 377,-\npartially decentralized and destroyed long-\n200 tons, or slightly in excess of the 1936 out-\nestablished operational methods of whole in-\nput for that area.\ndustries; and (4) removed managerial talent\nII-12\nSECRET"
}