Ask the Scholar
Page 43 of 45
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
ports (excluding reparations payments) by a
lease of hoarded goods and in a steady in-
considerable amount, and the USSR contrib-
crease in production in the western zones. A
uting heavily for the first time from its own
level approximately 88 percent of 1936, at-
stocks to maintain the faltering economy of
tained in May 1949, was maintained during
the zone. Zonal imports for 1948 were
the summer months.
RM 356.2 million, of which the USSR contrib-
Important among the factors which obscure
uted RM 88.2 million; and exports were only
the outlook for further recovery in the west-
RM 274.2 million, of which RM 40.5 million
ern zones is the question of future control of
went to the USSR. Although this trade was
the area containing most of the steel indus-
considerably in excess of the total 1947 foreign
tries and hard coal deposits-the Ruhr. The
trade, its distribution is significant in view of
US and UK decided on 10 November 1948 to
the East-West controversy. Less than one-
give temporary management of Ruhr indus-
fourth of the imports were from Western
tries back to the Germans. This decision al-
Europe, and exports to that area were corre-
lows German trustees to operate the indus-
spondingly small. Imports in the first quar-
tries until the new German Government in
ter of 1949 appeared to have increased about
the western zones acts to socialize them or to
50 percent over the 1948 rate, while exports in-
return them to private ownership. The de-
creased over 95 percent.
cision was made in the belief that increased
In 1948 the Soviet Zone sent about RM 104
production would result, that this in turn
million worth of goods to the Bizone and re-
would relieve US and UK taxpayers of occu-
ceived from that area about 140 million RM
pation cost burdens, and that it would ensure
worth. Much of this was raw material and
a maximum contribution from western Ger-
about 85 percent of it was shipped before Au-
many to recovery in Western Europe. French
gust when the counterblockade went into
concern regarding a too rapid revival of Ger-
effect.
man industry was partially allayed by a six-
power agreement reached 28 December 1948,
3. Economic Stability
establishing an International Authority for
the Ruhr with power to control minimum ex-
a. Western Zones.
port allocations of coal, coke, and steel from
During the first two years of Occupation,
the area. The agreement was signed and
conflicting Allied policies served only to
went into effect on 28 April 1949 amid German
deepen the confusion and uncertainty which
fears that the area was permanently lost to
their material assistance was intended to cor-
the German economy.
rect. In view of the low levels of production
Numerous other factors cloud the economic
attained, the worthlessness of the currency as
future of the western zones. To the extent
a measure of relative values, and the low level
that the area continues to be cut off from the
of foreign trade, only strict rationing of neces-
foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactures
sities and stringent price, wage and rationing
of eastern Germany, it must remain the more
controls prevented the economies of the sev-
dependent upon foreign trade. The prospects
eral zones from deteriorating.
for the attainment of prewar levels in trade
The Soviet action in breaking up the Allied
with eastern Europe are not bright. Trade
Control Council on 20 March 1948 may have
with the West, although contingent upon the
put a permanent end to quadripartite efforts
continued success of the ERP, will probably
to forge an economic entity of Germany;
improve.
nevertheless, it released the western zones
Further increases in production in the west-
from the baneful effects of Soviet tactics ob-
ern zones is being hampered by an inadequate
structive to economic recovery. The western
investment program and by the unsettling ef-
Allies countered the Soviet action by moves
fects of the necessity for reorganization of
aimed at increasing production in the western
the tax system and division of responsibilities
zones, beginning with the currency conversion
between the lower levels of government and
in June. This step alone resulted in the re-
the new central government. New capital
II-34
Page data
- Page
- 43
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 894187ec306f71df
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486500172
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486500172",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Germany, Situation Report 20, Chapter II and Summary",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 45,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486500172",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Germany, Situation Report 20, Chapter II and Summary",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486500172",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Germany, Situation Report 20, Chapter II and Summary",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-001.tif",
"imageCount": 45,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500172",
"naId": 486500172,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 1,
"logicalDate": "1950-03-01",
"month": 3,
"year": 1950
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 43,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875507/875507-01-043.tif",
"mediaId": "894187ec306f71df",
"ocrText": "ports (excluding reparations payments) by a\nlease of hoarded goods and in a steady in-\nconsiderable amount, and the USSR contrib-\ncrease in production in the western zones. A\nuting heavily for the first time from its own\nlevel approximately 88 percent of 1936, at-\nstocks to maintain the faltering economy of\ntained in May 1949, was maintained during\nthe zone. Zonal imports for 1948 were\nthe summer months.\nRM 356.2 million, of which the USSR contrib-\nImportant among the factors which obscure\nuted RM 88.2 million; and exports were only\nthe outlook for further recovery in the west-\nRM 274.2 million, of which RM 40.5 million\nern zones is the question of future control of\nwent to the USSR. Although this trade was\nthe area containing most of the steel indus-\nconsiderably in excess of the total 1947 foreign\ntries and hard coal deposits-the Ruhr. The\ntrade, its distribution is significant in view of\nUS and UK decided on 10 November 1948 to\nthe East-West controversy. Less than one-\ngive temporary management of Ruhr indus-\nfourth of the imports were from Western\ntries back to the Germans. This decision al-\nEurope, and exports to that area were corre-\nlows German trustees to operate the indus-\nspondingly small. Imports in the first quar-\ntries until the new German Government in\nter of 1949 appeared to have increased about\nthe western zones acts to socialize them or to\n50 percent over the 1948 rate, while exports in-\nreturn them to private ownership. The de-\ncreased over 95 percent.\ncision was made in the belief that increased\nIn 1948 the Soviet Zone sent about RM 104\nproduction would result, that this in turn\nmillion worth of goods to the Bizone and re-\nwould relieve US and UK taxpayers of occu-\nceived from that area about 140 million RM\npation cost burdens, and that it would ensure\nworth. Much of this was raw material and\na maximum contribution from western Ger-\nabout 85 percent of it was shipped before Au-\nmany to recovery in Western Europe. French\ngust when the counterblockade went into\nconcern regarding a too rapid revival of Ger-\neffect.\nman industry was partially allayed by a six-\npower agreement reached 28 December 1948,\n3. Economic Stability\nestablishing an International Authority for\nthe Ruhr with power to control minimum ex-\na. Western Zones.\nport allocations of coal, coke, and steel from\nDuring the first two years of Occupation,\nthe area. The agreement was signed and\nconflicting Allied policies served only to\nwent into effect on 28 April 1949 amid German\ndeepen the confusion and uncertainty which\nfears that the area was permanently lost to\ntheir material assistance was intended to cor-\nthe German economy.\nrect. In view of the low levels of production\nNumerous other factors cloud the economic\nattained, the worthlessness of the currency as\nfuture of the western zones. To the extent\na measure of relative values, and the low level\nthat the area continues to be cut off from the\nof foreign trade, only strict rationing of neces-\nfoodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactures\nsities and stringent price, wage and rationing\nof eastern Germany, it must remain the more\ncontrols prevented the economies of the sev-\ndependent upon foreign trade. The prospects\neral zones from deteriorating.\nfor the attainment of prewar levels in trade\nThe Soviet action in breaking up the Allied\nwith eastern Europe are not bright. Trade\nControl Council on 20 March 1948 may have\nwith the West, although contingent upon the\nput a permanent end to quadripartite efforts\ncontinued success of the ERP, will probably\nto forge an economic entity of Germany;\nimprove.\nnevertheless, it released the western zones\nFurther increases in production in the west-\nfrom the baneful effects of Soviet tactics ob-\nern zones is being hampered by an inadequate\nstructive to economic recovery. The western\ninvestment program and by the unsettling ef-\nAllies countered the Soviet action by moves\nfects of the necessity for reorganization of\naimed at increasing production in the western\nthe tax system and division of responsibilities\nzones, beginning with the currency conversion\nbetween the lower levels of government and\nin June. This step alone resulted in the re-\nthe new central government. New capital\nII-34"
}