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system capable of surviving in the absence of
League, youth in the Free German Youth and
direct Soviet support. The earliest move was
other groups. These mass organizations, in-
the Antifa System (anti-Fascist Front), con-
tended primarily as propaganda vehicles to
sisting of coalitions of the four major parties
promote various programs of the SMA and
(the CDU, SPD, LDP, and KPD) at all gov-
to regiment various social groups under SED
ernmental levels in the Laender, with the pur-
control were unable to attract genuine public
pose of promoting jointly the "democratic"
support. During 1948 and 1949 most of them
recovery of eastern Germany. Close Soviet
gradually dwindled in importance, except for
control and manipulation of the KPD into a
the Free German Youth and possibly the Free
dominant position soon caused the non-Com-
German Trade Union League, while the SMA
munist parties to lose interest.
directed SED interest in other directions.
The second phase of Soviet political policy
In the latter part of 1947, the KPD-SED
was the creation of the Socialist Unity Party
having proved its inability to win over the
(SED), which was the prelude to the era of
working class and petty bourgeois in appre-
the "mass organizations" approach. Because
ciable numbers, the SMA directed its tactics
of the KPD's inability to win the support of
toward enlisting for the SED the support of
the working classes, the SMA forced the SPD
German nationalism throughout Germany.
in Soviet-controlled territory to merge with
The first manifestation of these new tactics
the KPD to form the SED. For the KPD this
was the People's Congress (Volkskcongress),
merger had three main effects: (1) it removed
the revival under a new name of the defunct
a rival for the support of the working classes;
Antifa System. The main propaganda of the
(2) by superimposing the Communist Party
Volkskongress, however, was centered on
structure upon the SPD organization, the
withdrawal of all occupation forces and the
KPD acquired control of the largest party in
creation of a unified "democratic" national
the Soviet Zone; and (3) it opened the KPD
German government. In addition several
organization itself to the infiltration of hos-
small pseudo-nationalistic parties were set up
tile Socialist elements and resulted in consid-
by German collaborators and in 1949, a Com-
erable decrease in party loyalty to the USSR.
munist-inspired political movement called the
The SMA ensured predominance of the SED
National Front was organized under the lead-
in the Soviet Zone by providing it with every
ership of the SED. The bankruptcy of Soviet
possible benefit while denying the CDU and
policy designed to win German support was
LDP all but the most rudimentary propa-
highlighted by the outcome of zonal-wide elec-
ganda and organizational facilities. Despite
tions for the Volkskongress in May 1949, in
such methods and a carefully staged election,
which the announced opposition vote was one-
however, the newly formed SED was able to
third of the total polled vote, even after sev-
gain a bare 51 percent majority of the vote
eral days of manipulation of election figures
in Land and local elections in October 1946
by SMA representatives. A second blow to
only by including "Front" organization bal-
the SMA was the west German elections in
lots and manipulating election totals. A
August, which resulted in a high turn-out of
CDU-LDP coalition was forbidden, and in
the electorate and a further decrease in west-
some areas where the opposition had managed
ern KPD strength in spite of an energetic
to elect officials, they were soon rendered in-
campaign in the Soviet-controlled press. SED
effectual by SMA action in conferring greater
and Soviet reaction to the formation of the
power on local SED functionaries, who were
Federal Republic has consisted mainly of
placed in key positions in the local govern-
vituperative propaganda with negligible effect
ments.
in western Germany. In the Soviet Zone it-
In addition to the SED, the SMA took con-
self, preparation for the formalization as a
siderable pains to build up a system of mass
government of the existing administrative
organizations to serve as support for the SED.
and pseudo-parliamentary agencies has con-
Women were organized in the Frauen Bund,
tinued at an accelerated pace. The USSR is
labor in the Free German Trade Union
not expected to risk new elections, however,
SECRET
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"ocrText": "I-6\nsystem capable of surviving in the absence of\nLeague, youth in the Free German Youth and\ndirect Soviet support. The earliest move was\nother groups. These mass organizations, in-\nthe Antifa System (anti-Fascist Front), con-\ntended primarily as propaganda vehicles to\nsisting of coalitions of the four major parties\npromote various programs of the SMA and\n(the CDU, SPD, LDP, and KPD) at all gov-\nto regiment various social groups under SED\nernmental levels in the Laender, with the pur-\ncontrol were unable to attract genuine public\npose of promoting jointly the \"democratic\"\nsupport. During 1948 and 1949 most of them\nrecovery of eastern Germany. Close Soviet\ngradually dwindled in importance, except for\ncontrol and manipulation of the KPD into a\nthe Free German Youth and possibly the Free\ndominant position soon caused the non-Com-\nGerman Trade Union League, while the SMA\nmunist parties to lose interest.\ndirected SED interest in other directions.\nThe second phase of Soviet political policy\nIn the latter part of 1947, the KPD-SED\nwas the creation of the Socialist Unity Party\nhaving proved its inability to win over the\n(SED), which was the prelude to the era of\nworking class and petty bourgeois in appre-\nthe \"mass organizations\" approach. Because\nciable numbers, the SMA directed its tactics\nof the KPD's inability to win the support of\ntoward enlisting for the SED the support of\nthe working classes, the SMA forced the SPD\nGerman nationalism throughout Germany.\nin Soviet-controlled territory to merge with\nThe first manifestation of these new tactics\nthe KPD to form the SED. For the KPD this\nwas the People's Congress (Volkskcongress),\nmerger had three main effects: (1) it removed\nthe revival under a new name of the defunct\na rival for the support of the working classes;\nAntifa System. The main propaganda of the\n(2) by superimposing the Communist Party\nVolkskongress, however, was centered on\nstructure upon the SPD organization, the\nwithdrawal of all occupation forces and the\nKPD acquired control of the largest party in\ncreation of a unified \"democratic\" national\nthe Soviet Zone; and (3) it opened the KPD\nGerman government. In addition several\norganization itself to the infiltration of hos-\nsmall pseudo-nationalistic parties were set up\ntile Socialist elements and resulted in consid-\nby German collaborators and in 1949, a Com-\nerable decrease in party loyalty to the USSR.\nmunist-inspired political movement called the\nThe SMA ensured predominance of the SED\nNational Front was organized under the lead-\nin the Soviet Zone by providing it with every\nership of the SED. The bankruptcy of Soviet\npossible benefit while denying the CDU and\npolicy designed to win German support was\nLDP all but the most rudimentary propa-\nhighlighted by the outcome of zonal-wide elec-\nganda and organizational facilities. Despite\ntions for the Volkskongress in May 1949, in\nsuch methods and a carefully staged election,\nwhich the announced opposition vote was one-\nhowever, the newly formed SED was able to\nthird of the total polled vote, even after sev-\ngain a bare 51 percent majority of the vote\neral days of manipulation of election figures\nin Land and local elections in October 1946\nby SMA representatives. A second blow to\nonly by including \"Front\" organization bal-\nthe SMA was the west German elections in\nlots and manipulating election totals. A\nAugust, which resulted in a high turn-out of\nCDU-LDP coalition was forbidden, and in\nthe electorate and a further decrease in west-\nsome areas where the opposition had managed\nern KPD strength in spite of an energetic\nto elect officials, they were soon rendered in-\ncampaign in the Soviet-controlled press. SED\neffectual by SMA action in conferring greater\nand Soviet reaction to the formation of the\npower on local SED functionaries, who were\nFederal Republic has consisted mainly of\nplaced in key positions in the local govern-\nvituperative propaganda with negligible effect\nments.\nin western Germany. In the Soviet Zone it-\nIn addition to the SED, the SMA took con-\nself, preparation for the formalization as a\nsiderable pains to build up a system of mass\ngovernment of the existing administrative\norganizations to serve as support for the SED.\nand pseudo-parliamentary agencies has con-\nWomen were organized in the Frauen Bund,\ntinued at an accelerated pace. The USSR is\nlabor in the Free German Trade Union\nnot expected to risk new elections, however,\nSECRET"
}