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CHAPTER IV
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY
1. General.
opportunity, would hesitate to play off the US
As the major point of contact between the
against the USSR in an endeavor to achieve
policies and physical forces of the US and the
unification on their own terms. Although
USSR, Germany plays an important role in
Germany possesses trained manpower, tech-
the East-West struggle in Europe. Because
nical ability, and a considerable residue of in-
of its geographic location, because it is in-
dustrial potential, it is unlikely that western
capable of self-defense, and because it is not
Germany can at present, afford the US effec-
as yet formally committed to either side, Ger-
tive support in case the present East-West
many is of utmost strategic significance to the
conflict cannot be resolved peacefully.
US.
The success of the US policy of containing
Germany is the most important point at
the USSR within its present sphere of expan-
which the westward expansion of Communism
sion is conditioned to a large extent upon a
can be contained physically. At present it is
revived and strengthened western European
subjected to diametrically opposed policies
economy. Western Germany is expected to
based on the ideological differences between
make a considerable contribution to European
the US on one hand and the USSR on the
recovery if its levels of production can be
other. It will continue to be the scene of this
raised to approximately the levels of 1936.
East-West battle for the predictable future.
With adequate supplies of food and raw mate-
In this cold war the mass of German people
rials, it is hoped that this goal will be attained
are on the side of the US, not from any great
by 1952. As long as manufactured goods re-
admiration for American ideals or institutions,
mained a relatively small part of bizonal ex-
but from abhorrence of Communism and fear
ports which were principally coal and coke,
of Soviet political objectives. Foreign occupa-
timber and scrap, these contributions to Euro-
tion, the disappearance of the German Army,
pean recovery exerted a depressing effect upon
the disorganization following total defeat, and
the internal western German economy. As
the removal of much of the national war po-
production of consumer goods revives and the
tential have reduced the Germans to the sta-
standard of living increases, western Germany
tus of relatively powerless observers in this
can make a sounder contribution to European
struggle to determine their ultimate destiny.
markets and to the more economic use of
Under present conditions, it is doubtful that
European resources.
the Germans would render effective support to
The cost to the US of putting the western
one side or the other in the event of actual
German economy on a viable basis is great,
conflict with the exception of providing
but the only alternative is to maintain the
trained military manpower. Whether or not
population on a minimum relief standard of
they would be willing to take an active part
living as long as the US occupation lasts.
in such a war is problematical at this time, al-
While $416 million were allocated to the Bi-
though a considerable number of Germans
zone and $92 million to the French Zone in
have indicated their willingness to defend
the first year of the ECA program (1948-49),
their country against the Soviets. On the
the output of consumer goods increased sub-
other hand the Germans are determined to re-
stantially, as did exports in this category, but
gain as much of their former territory as con-
the increase was far short of satisfying do-
ditions will allow, and few Germans, given the
mestic requirements, and the standard of liv-
SECRET
IV-1
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nCHAPTER IV\nSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING US SECURITY\n1. General.\nopportunity, would hesitate to play off the US\nAs the major point of contact between the\nagainst the USSR in an endeavor to achieve\npolicies and physical forces of the US and the\nunification on their own terms. Although\nUSSR, Germany plays an important role in\nGermany possesses trained manpower, tech-\nthe East-West struggle in Europe. Because\nnical ability, and a considerable residue of in-\nof its geographic location, because it is in-\ndustrial potential, it is unlikely that western\ncapable of self-defense, and because it is not\nGermany can at present, afford the US effec-\nas yet formally committed to either side, Ger-\ntive support in case the present East-West\nmany is of utmost strategic significance to the\nconflict cannot be resolved peacefully.\nUS.\nThe success of the US policy of containing\nGermany is the most important point at\nthe USSR within its present sphere of expan-\nwhich the westward expansion of Communism\nsion is conditioned to a large extent upon a\ncan be contained physically. At present it is\nrevived and strengthened western European\nsubjected to diametrically opposed policies\neconomy. Western Germany is expected to\nbased on the ideological differences between\nmake a considerable contribution to European\nthe US on one hand and the USSR on the\nrecovery if its levels of production can be\nother. It will continue to be the scene of this\nraised to approximately the levels of 1936.\nEast-West battle for the predictable future.\nWith adequate supplies of food and raw mate-\nIn this cold war the mass of German people\nrials, it is hoped that this goal will be attained\nare on the side of the US, not from any great\nby 1952. As long as manufactured goods re-\nadmiration for American ideals or institutions,\nmained a relatively small part of bizonal ex-\nbut from abhorrence of Communism and fear\nports which were principally coal and coke,\nof Soviet political objectives. Foreign occupa-\ntimber and scrap, these contributions to Euro-\ntion, the disappearance of the German Army,\npean recovery exerted a depressing effect upon\nthe disorganization following total defeat, and\nthe internal western German economy. As\nthe removal of much of the national war po-\nproduction of consumer goods revives and the\ntential have reduced the Germans to the sta-\nstandard of living increases, western Germany\ntus of relatively powerless observers in this\ncan make a sounder contribution to European\nstruggle to determine their ultimate destiny.\nmarkets and to the more economic use of\nUnder present conditions, it is doubtful that\nEuropean resources.\nthe Germans would render effective support to\nThe cost to the US of putting the western\none side or the other in the event of actual\nGerman economy on a viable basis is great,\nconflict with the exception of providing\nbut the only alternative is to maintain the\ntrained military manpower. Whether or not\npopulation on a minimum relief standard of\nthey would be willing to take an active part\nliving as long as the US occupation lasts.\nin such a war is problematical at this time, al-\nWhile $416 million were allocated to the Bi-\nthough a considerable number of Germans\nzone and $92 million to the French Zone in\nhave indicated their willingness to defend\nthe first year of the ECA program (1948-49),\ntheir country against the Soviets. On the\nthe output of consumer goods increased sub-\nother hand the Germans are determined to re-\nstantially, as did exports in this category, but\ngain as much of their former territory as con-\nthe increase was far short of satisfying do-\nditions will allow, and few Germans, given the\nmestic requirements, and the standard of liv-\nSECRET\nIV-1"
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