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waterways were closed until the spring of 1946
war. Although the Third Reich undertook
and their traffic capacity reduced to 25 per-
the motorization of Germany by constructing
cent of normal for the next three years.
an elaborate system of superhighways and
About 75 percent of inland waterways are now
airfields, its main reliance continued to be
open to traffic but on many the restrictions
placed on railroads and canals. Occupying a
are such that the volume of traffic is far below
central position in the European continent,
the prewar level. It is unlikely that prewar
German rail lines connected with the systems
traffic potential and efficiency on inland
of eight other countries, a connection which
waterways will be regained before 1955.
favored both the operation of through train
Inland navigation affords an important
services and the movement of trade across the
means of relief to the over-taxed German rail-
frontiers. By 1939 Germany was adequately
way system. As much freight as possible has
prepared for a land war based on internal lines
been diverted to German waterways, which
of communication. Despite later develop-
carried 31 percent of the total tonnage in
ments in aviation, and the use that could be
1946 compared to 27 percent before the war,
made of conquered resources, Germany was
although the volume of this tonnage was only
unable to employ air transportation to the
20 percent of what it was under normal con-
fullest extent, except in emergencies.
ditions. Terrific handicaps had to be over-
The present railway system is substantially
come in the replacement, repair, and upkeep
the same one as that of 1914, totaling about
of the inland waterway fleet of tugs and
35,000 miles of tracks. As a consequence of
barges, which severely taxed the facilities of
that war, Germany lost about 4,000 miles of
the badly damaged shipyards. Of the prewar
railway, and since then comparatively little
tugs and barges about three-fourths re-
new building has been undertaken. Only
mained, and 60 percent of these had to be
four hundred miles of track was laid in twenty
raised and repaired before being put back into
years and most of this duplicated existing sec-
service. The tonnage in operation declined in
tions. The main emphasis, apart from im-
1947 because the production of materials was
proved train operation and design resulting in
insufficient to keep pace with current repair
increased speeds, shifted from construction to
requirements. Many of the vessels, apart
policy and was marked by the gradual dis-
from war damage, were over-age; and increase
appearance of state and private railways, and
in the total fleet on a scale to meet future
the emergence of the centralized Reichsbahn.
traffic requirements called for larger amounts
Under the Dawes Plan of 1924 a new national
of material than could be made available for
railway system was organized as an autono-
this purpose. Despite these drawbacks, a to-
mous entity called the Deutsche Reichsbahn-
tal of 48,720,000 M.T. was loaded and dis-
Gesellschaft, the purpose being to mortgage
charged on bizonal waterways in 1948, a 41
the railway network in order to secure its
percent increase over 1947, although far
earnings for the partial payment of repara-
short of the 62.6 million tons carried in 1938.
tions. This scheme came to an end in 1932,
but the autonomous character of the organiza-
3. Railways.
tion was continued and more lines were ab-
The outstanding feature of Germany's
sorbed into the national system until 1937,
transportation system, in peace as in war, was
when the Nazis achieved the final absorption
its dependence on railroads. The country was
of the railways. Less than six percent of the
rich in coal and iron, but lacking in rubber
lines then remained independent of the
and oil. The distribution of German natural
Reichsbahn, which was highly organized and
resources depended on rail and water move-
scientifically operated for the purpose of de-
ment rather than air and motor transport.
veloping the state both economically and stra-
In the course of a century, Germany had de-
tegically. The head of this organization, a
veloped an extensive railway and canal net-
Cabinet Minister, controlled all means of
work, which was constructed not only for
transportation in the Reich. The railways
peacetime needs but for the requirements of
employed 839,000 persons in 1939 and were
SECRET
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"ocrText": "ECRET\nB-3\nwaterways were closed until the spring of 1946\nwar. Although the Third Reich undertook\nand their traffic capacity reduced to 25 per-\nthe motorization of Germany by constructing\ncent of normal for the next three years.\nan elaborate system of superhighways and\nAbout 75 percent of inland waterways are now\nairfields, its main reliance continued to be\nopen to traffic but on many the restrictions\nplaced on railroads and canals. Occupying a\nare such that the volume of traffic is far below\ncentral position in the European continent,\nthe prewar level. It is unlikely that prewar\nGerman rail lines connected with the systems\ntraffic potential and efficiency on inland\nof eight other countries, a connection which\nwaterways will be regained before 1955.\nfavored both the operation of through train\nInland navigation affords an important\nservices and the movement of trade across the\nmeans of relief to the over-taxed German rail-\nfrontiers. By 1939 Germany was adequately\nway system. As much freight as possible has\nprepared for a land war based on internal lines\nbeen diverted to German waterways, which\nof communication. Despite later develop-\ncarried 31 percent of the total tonnage in\nments in aviation, and the use that could be\n1946 compared to 27 percent before the war,\nmade of conquered resources, Germany was\nalthough the volume of this tonnage was only\nunable to employ air transportation to the\n20 percent of what it was under normal con-\nfullest extent, except in emergencies.\nditions. Terrific handicaps had to be over-\nThe present railway system is substantially\ncome in the replacement, repair, and upkeep\nthe same one as that of 1914, totaling about\nof the inland waterway fleet of tugs and\n35,000 miles of tracks. As a consequence of\nbarges, which severely taxed the facilities of\nthat war, Germany lost about 4,000 miles of\nthe badly damaged shipyards. Of the prewar\nrailway, and since then comparatively little\ntugs and barges about three-fourths re-\nnew building has been undertaken. Only\nmained, and 60 percent of these had to be\nfour hundred miles of track was laid in twenty\nraised and repaired before being put back into\nyears and most of this duplicated existing sec-\nservice. The tonnage in operation declined in\ntions. The main emphasis, apart from im-\n1947 because the production of materials was\nproved train operation and design resulting in\ninsufficient to keep pace with current repair\nincreased speeds, shifted from construction to\nrequirements. Many of the vessels, apart\npolicy and was marked by the gradual dis-\nfrom war damage, were over-age; and increase\nappearance of state and private railways, and\nin the total fleet on a scale to meet future\nthe emergence of the centralized Reichsbahn.\ntraffic requirements called for larger amounts\nUnder the Dawes Plan of 1924 a new national\nof material than could be made available for\nrailway system was organized as an autono-\nthis purpose. Despite these drawbacks, a to-\nmous entity called the Deutsche Reichsbahn-\ntal of 48,720,000 M.T. was loaded and dis-\nGesellschaft, the purpose being to mortgage\ncharged on bizonal waterways in 1948, a 41\nthe railway network in order to secure its\npercent increase over 1947, although far\nearnings for the partial payment of repara-\nshort of the 62.6 million tons carried in 1938.\ntions. This scheme came to an end in 1932,\nbut the autonomous character of the organiza-\n3. Railways.\ntion was continued and more lines were ab-\nThe outstanding feature of Germany's\nsorbed into the national system until 1937,\ntransportation system, in peace as in war, was\nwhen the Nazis achieved the final absorption\nits dependence on railroads. The country was\nof the railways. Less than six percent of the\nrich in coal and iron, but lacking in rubber\nlines then remained independent of the\nand oil. The distribution of German natural\nReichsbahn, which was highly organized and\nresources depended on rail and water move-\nscientifically operated for the purpose of de-\nment rather than air and motor transport.\nveloping the state both economically and stra-\nIn the course of a century, Germany had de-\ntegically. The head of this organization, a\nveloped an extensive railway and canal net-\nCabinet Minister, controlled all means of\nwork, which was constructed not only for\ntransportation in the Reich. The railways\npeacetime needs but for the requirements of\nemployed 839,000 persons in 1939 and were\nSECRET"
}