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CHAPTER VI
PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
*
The present strategic considerations will
An important level of military research and
probably continue to exist during the next
development will be maintained, though it
few years with little appreciable change, pro-
cannot be given unrestricted scope because
vided that (1) large-scale war is avoided; and
of the inability of the country's economy to
(2) US economic support is in any event not
support expensive projects. The fighting
prematurely withdrawn.
value of the services should remain qualita-
tively high, but in terms of numbers and
1. Military.
equipment they will be weak relative to their
The Labor Government appears at present
overseas commitments and presumptive
determined that no substantial reductions
enemies.
shall be made in appropriations for the mili-
tary establishment. This determination will
2. Economic.
certainly be tested, for there are many voices
Though the British have finished the first
on the left to demand that cuts in govern-
stage of their postwar economic history, that
mental expenditure, which now appear to be
of recovery from the direct effects of war,
inescapable, shall be made in the military
they face the much more difficult problem of
establishment and in the maintenance of
adjusting their economy to the changed world
strategic commitments rather than in the so-
trading conditions of the mid-twentieth cen-
cial services, the food subsidies, or other popu-
tury. The problems of this adjustment have
lar expenses. It is believed that the Labor
been indicated in earlier pages; they are of
Cabinet will not yield to these demands, how-
long standing, and at present it is open to
ever; a Conservative administration would be
question whether the 1952 goal of viabil-
even less disposed to do SO. Various econo-
ity will be fully attained. If progress to-
mies may nevertheless be expected, and ex-
ward this end is not maintained, and extraor-
pansion is virtually out of the question.
dinary US aid is not forthcoming, the British
Should future economic conditions become
will probably be driven to apply themselves to
disastrously bad, the armed forces would of
the consolidation and expansion of a non-
course be involved in the general retrench-
dollar trading area, comprising the British
ment.
Empire and Commonwealth (save Canada),
The UK will continue the present high de-
together with such other countries (with their
gree of military cooperation with the United
overseas dependencies) as have a recalcitrant
States. Britain's irreplaceable bases on the
dollar problem of their own. The members of
Eurasian perimeter and elsewhere will con-
such a group would perforce practice discrimi-
tinue to be available for US use; if danger
nation against the dollar; their own transac-
threatens any of them, as it currently does
tions would probably be conducted in sterling.
Hong Kong, the British will be likely to re-
Such a program would certainly be disad-
quest at least moral support from the US,
vantageous for US trade and contrary to US
and if the situation should grow worse they
commercial policy; nevertheless it would offer
would probably ask for material assistance in
probably the best possibility of stabilizing Brit-
the particular localities involved.
ish economic life, furnishing a substantial
basis for continuing British power, and to that
* This chapter redrafted 15 September 1949.
extent contributing to US security. It would
SECRET
101
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nCHAPTER VI\nPROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY\n*\nThe present strategic considerations will\nAn important level of military research and\nprobably continue to exist during the next\ndevelopment will be maintained, though it\nfew years with little appreciable change, pro-\ncannot be given unrestricted scope because\nvided that (1) large-scale war is avoided; and\nof the inability of the country's economy to\n(2) US economic support is in any event not\nsupport expensive projects. The fighting\nprematurely withdrawn.\nvalue of the services should remain qualita-\ntively high, but in terms of numbers and\n1. Military.\nequipment they will be weak relative to their\nThe Labor Government appears at present\noverseas commitments and presumptive\ndetermined that no substantial reductions\nenemies.\nshall be made in appropriations for the mili-\ntary establishment. This determination will\n2. Economic.\ncertainly be tested, for there are many voices\nThough the British have finished the first\non the left to demand that cuts in govern-\nstage of their postwar economic history, that\nmental expenditure, which now appear to be\nof recovery from the direct effects of war,\ninescapable, shall be made in the military\nthey face the much more difficult problem of\nestablishment and in the maintenance of\nadjusting their economy to the changed world\nstrategic commitments rather than in the so-\ntrading conditions of the mid-twentieth cen-\ncial services, the food subsidies, or other popu-\ntury. The problems of this adjustment have\nlar expenses. It is believed that the Labor\nbeen indicated in earlier pages; they are of\nCabinet will not yield to these demands, how-\nlong standing, and at present it is open to\never; a Conservative administration would be\nquestion whether the 1952 goal of viabil-\neven less disposed to do SO. Various econo-\nity will be fully attained. If progress to-\nmies may nevertheless be expected, and ex-\nward this end is not maintained, and extraor-\npansion is virtually out of the question.\ndinary US aid is not forthcoming, the British\nShould future economic conditions become\nwill probably be driven to apply themselves to\ndisastrously bad, the armed forces would of\nthe consolidation and expansion of a non-\ncourse be involved in the general retrench-\ndollar trading area, comprising the British\nment.\nEmpire and Commonwealth (save Canada),\nThe UK will continue the present high de-\ntogether with such other countries (with their\ngree of military cooperation with the United\noverseas dependencies) as have a recalcitrant\nStates. Britain's irreplaceable bases on the\ndollar problem of their own. The members of\nEurasian perimeter and elsewhere will con-\nsuch a group would perforce practice discrimi-\ntinue to be available for US use; if danger\nnation against the dollar; their own transac-\nthreatens any of them, as it currently does\ntions would probably be conducted in sterling.\nHong Kong, the British will be likely to re-\nSuch a program would certainly be disad-\nquest at least moral support from the US,\nvantageous for US trade and contrary to US\nand if the situation should grow worse they\ncommercial policy; nevertheless it would offer\nwould probably ask for material assistance in\nprobably the best possibility of stabilizing Brit-\nthe particular localities involved.\nish economic life, furnishing a substantial\nbasis for continuing British power, and to that\n* This chapter redrafted 15 September 1949.\nextent contributing to US security. It would\nSECRET\n101"
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