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73
military aid, but also moved toward the broad-
Government considers that its own national
ening of their Treaty into a North Atlantic
program of recovery through austerity is both
Pact, of which the United States would itself
more successful and more reputable than the
be a member. Toward the end of 1948 the
less demanding methods of continental na-
initiative in the formation of this new Pact
tions; it questions skeptically the value to the
passed from European into US hands, where
UK of more formal moves toward integration.
it remained until the completion of the Treaty
The British do not intend to relax their own
in April 1949. Britain has not been conspic-
program, nor to imperil its success, nor to un-
uous in the movement toward the North At-
dermine Commonwealth solidarity by undue
lantic Pact. There was indeed no need for
concessions to continental demands regarding
strong British direction, for events shaped
Britain's economic behavior. This attitude
themselves toward the sort of regional de-
has made difficulties-particularly with the
fense agreement which British statesmen had
French and the Belgians who consider that
been recommending ever since the war.
British policy directly harms their recovery-
(2) The Economic Instrument.
which will doubtless increase as the sellers'
market declines.
Bevin had in June 1947 convened a Council
for European Economic Cooperation which
(3) The Political Instrument.
was even more unprecedented than the mili-
Britain's "Western Union" proposal, it is
tary arrangements under the Brussels Pact.
clear now, envisaged political cooperation in
The "Council" became instituted as the "Or-
Western Europe as an informal evolutionary
ganization," but after Bevin's initial impetus
development which would take in its first
the British relapsed into caution and uncer-
stage the form of a conference of Ministers
tainty. They resisted proposals for a high-
of the various governments meeting periodi-
level, authoritative OEEC leadership with ex-
cally to consider questions of common con-
ecutive powers, favoring instead a consulta-
cern. Consequently, the UK strenuously re-
tive body of experts with power only to refer
sisted the strong wish of France and Belgium
matters back to their governments. With
(and of an appreciable segment of British
rather excessive rigidity they refused to alter
opinion) for a formal international Parlia-
their own national program, and they drew
ment which, with or without supranational
charges of "foot-dragging" and disregard for
powers, would according to British estimates
continental recovery. But during this time
only emphasize and exacerbate national dif-
they were passing through a financial crisis
ferences. The idea of federation the UK out-
of their own, altering their economic adminis-
rightly rejects as visionary, for at least this
tration, and consulting with the other Com-
generation. The numerous reasons for the
monwealth nations whose approval of any
British attitude include: (a) unreadiness to
radical measures the British considered neces-
surrender any great measure of sovereignty
sary. Following their early uncertainty and
and gear the UK to unstable western Euro-
indecision, and as their own progress toward
pean polities; (b) refusal to commit the UK
recovery stepped up, the British recovered the
any further than the rest of the Common-
initiative and made major contributions to
wealth would approve; (c) doubt that the di-
the functioning of the OEEC organization.
verse social and cultural practices of the na-
In the first year of ERP, under the intra-
tions can be harnessed to pull in the same
European payments scheme, they contrib-
direction; (d) conviction that informal coop-
uted substantial sums of sterling to the con-
eration on specific problems between govern-
ments would be more practical and fruitful
tinental members of OEEC; and they intro-
than an experimental Parliament; (e) fear
duced the idea of continuing the organization
that a public Assembly would pressure the
after the 4-year program of US aid ends.
UK into unwise or premature commitments;
Britain is at present firmly committed to the
and (f) a traditional penchant for the slow
program of cooperative European economic
and gradual evolution of institutions. Never-
recovery. It is plain, however, that the Labor
theless, faced with rising internal as well as
SECRET
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"ocrText": "ECRE\n73\nmilitary aid, but also moved toward the broad-\nGovernment considers that its own national\nening of their Treaty into a North Atlantic\nprogram of recovery through austerity is both\nPact, of which the United States would itself\nmore successful and more reputable than the\nbe a member. Toward the end of 1948 the\nless demanding methods of continental na-\ninitiative in the formation of this new Pact\ntions; it questions skeptically the value to the\npassed from European into US hands, where\nUK of more formal moves toward integration.\nit remained until the completion of the Treaty\nThe British do not intend to relax their own\nin April 1949. Britain has not been conspic-\nprogram, nor to imperil its success, nor to un-\nuous in the movement toward the North At-\ndermine Commonwealth solidarity by undue\nlantic Pact. There was indeed no need for\nconcessions to continental demands regarding\nstrong British direction, for events shaped\nBritain's economic behavior. This attitude\nthemselves toward the sort of regional de-\nhas made difficulties-particularly with the\nfense agreement which British statesmen had\nFrench and the Belgians who consider that\nbeen recommending ever since the war.\nBritish policy directly harms their recovery-\n(2) The Economic Instrument.\nwhich will doubtless increase as the sellers'\nmarket declines.\nBevin had in June 1947 convened a Council\nfor European Economic Cooperation which\n(3) The Political Instrument.\nwas even more unprecedented than the mili-\nBritain's \"Western Union\" proposal, it is\ntary arrangements under the Brussels Pact.\nclear now, envisaged political cooperation in\nThe \"Council\" became instituted as the \"Or-\nWestern Europe as an informal evolutionary\nganization,\" but after Bevin's initial impetus\ndevelopment which would take in its first\nthe British relapsed into caution and uncer-\nstage the form of a conference of Ministers\ntainty. They resisted proposals for a high-\nof the various governments meeting periodi-\nlevel, authoritative OEEC leadership with ex-\ncally to consider questions of common con-\necutive powers, favoring instead a consulta-\ncern. Consequently, the UK strenuously re-\ntive body of experts with power only to refer\nsisted the strong wish of France and Belgium\nmatters back to their governments. With\n(and of an appreciable segment of British\nrather excessive rigidity they refused to alter\nopinion) for a formal international Parlia-\ntheir own national program, and they drew\nment which, with or without supranational\ncharges of \"foot-dragging\" and disregard for\npowers, would according to British estimates\ncontinental recovery. But during this time\nonly emphasize and exacerbate national dif-\nthey were passing through a financial crisis\nferences. The idea of federation the UK out-\nof their own, altering their economic adminis-\nrightly rejects as visionary, for at least this\ntration, and consulting with the other Com-\ngeneration. The numerous reasons for the\nmonwealth nations whose approval of any\nBritish attitude include: (a) unreadiness to\nradical measures the British considered neces-\nsurrender any great measure of sovereignty\nsary. Following their early uncertainty and\nand gear the UK to unstable western Euro-\nindecision, and as their own progress toward\npean polities; (b) refusal to commit the UK\nrecovery stepped up, the British recovered the\nany further than the rest of the Common-\ninitiative and made major contributions to\nwealth would approve; (c) doubt that the di-\nthe functioning of the OEEC organization.\nverse social and cultural practices of the na-\nIn the first year of ERP, under the intra-\ntions can be harnessed to pull in the same\nEuropean payments scheme, they contrib-\ndirection; (d) conviction that informal coop-\nuted substantial sums of sterling to the con-\neration on specific problems between govern-\nments would be more practical and fruitful\ntinental members of OEEC; and they intro-\nthan an experimental Parliament; (e) fear\nduced the idea of continuing the organization\nthat a public Assembly would pressure the\nafter the 4-year program of US aid ends.\nUK into unwise or premature commitments;\nBritain is at present firmly committed to the\nand (f) a traditional penchant for the slow\nprogram of cooperative European economic\nand gradual evolution of institutions. Never-\nrecovery. It is plain, however, that the Labor\ntheless, faced with rising internal as well as\nSECRET"
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