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on the particular necessity of conservation
Command plus the control and reporting or-
under present circumstances and on the view
ganization. Further plans are being devel-
that technological developments would
oped slowly.
quickly render obsolete any interim equip-
(d) Industrial: The Ministry of Supply is
ment now manufactured. However, new pro-
working on a long-range plan for emergency
duction of certain categories of arms on a
industrial mobilization. Successive steps are
limited scale was authorized in the fall of
now envisaged as (1) increased work week to
1948, notably jet aircraft for both the RAF
56 hours, (2) introducing night shifts, and (3)
and the Brussels Pact Powers.
fully utilizing existing factory capacity, fol-
(3) In respect to manpower the factors are
lowed by expansion. Development of under-
more complex and no uniform policy has
ground plants is not contemplated; strategic
been carried out. Releases from the armed
stockpiling is virtually non-existent; machine
forces have been accelerated or decelerated
tools for the airframe industry have been sur-
as economic stress or strategic necessity has
veyed and a sufficient number placed in re-
prevailed. Women have been integrated into
serve to produce approximately 40 percent of
all Regular Forces on a permanent basis.
peak wartime output and other special tools
Peacetime national conscription, effective 1
are in storage; a list of jobs to be draft ex-
January 1949, was introduced to meet de-
empt has been prepared.
mands for a continuous reserve to be immedi-
(5) Overseas bases in strategic areas and
ately available in an emergency, but failure
on important lines of communications, most
of recruiting to provide needed numbers for
of them long held by the UK, are not being
the army and air force was a signal concomi-
abandoned by the military. The ring of bases
tant. Under this measure conscripts from
around Eurasia, extending from Gibraltar
the age bracket 18-26 will train under and
through the Mediterranean Sea and Indian
serve with the Regular forces for 18 months
Ocean to Hong Kong-enlarged by additions
and then be discharged to four years obligated
in Cyrenaica-is an irreplaceable asset in Brit-
part-time service in auxiliary or reserve or-
ish strategic planning. The retention, main-
ganizations. A dissenting opinion holds that
tenance, and development (if need be) of these
the needs of the regular forces should be met
bases are not seriously questioned in the UK,
by volunteers, while conscripts should serve
and they are freely available for US use.
only six months for basic training and not
be used to fulfill current military obligations.
C. To Develop Ties with Other States Likely
to Add to the Security Potential of the UK.
(4) Mobilization planning marked time un-
til the Berlin blockade was established; the
(1) Close collaboration with, and reliance
situation now is as follows:
on, the US forces is a basic postwar British
policy which has grown out of (a) Britain's
(a) Navy: (See page 88.)
inability to secure by itself its far-flung com-
(b) Army: Mobilization planning began
mitments, and (b) recognition that the se-
in the spring of 1948. Requirements of the
curity interests of the UK and the US largely
British Army of the Rhine, the Middle East
overlap. Cooperation is apparent in all fields
Land Forces, and the UK home base have been
of military activity: research and develop-
completed, but are subject to periodic revision
ment, staff planning, intelligence, overseas
when checked against available manpower,
base organization, and strategic deployments.
equipment, shipping, and the capacity of the
The British desire to maintain the Combined
mobilization machinery. Indications are
Chiefs-of-Staff organization in Washington
that equipment shortages would be the major
and to promote the standardization of equip-
difficulty in reaching planned strengths, and
ment. In event of war, the British military
that financial considerations will not permit
expect to rely heavily on US. industrial
the steps necessary to rectify this situation.
strength.
(c) Air Force: Plans are complete and de-
(2) Disappointed in the prospects of col-
tailed for a very rapid expansion of Fighter
lective security through the United Nations,
SECRE
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"ocrText": "84\nSECRET\non the particular necessity of conservation\nCommand plus the control and reporting or-\nunder present circumstances and on the view\nganization. Further plans are being devel-\nthat technological developments would\noped slowly.\nquickly render obsolete any interim equip-\n(d) Industrial: The Ministry of Supply is\nment now manufactured. However, new pro-\nworking on a long-range plan for emergency\nduction of certain categories of arms on a\nindustrial mobilization. Successive steps are\nlimited scale was authorized in the fall of\nnow envisaged as (1) increased work week to\n1948, notably jet aircraft for both the RAF\n56 hours, (2) introducing night shifts, and (3)\nand the Brussels Pact Powers.\nfully utilizing existing factory capacity, fol-\n(3) In respect to manpower the factors are\nlowed by expansion. Development of under-\nmore complex and no uniform policy has\nground plants is not contemplated; strategic\nbeen carried out. Releases from the armed\nstockpiling is virtually non-existent; machine\nforces have been accelerated or decelerated\ntools for the airframe industry have been sur-\nas economic stress or strategic necessity has\nveyed and a sufficient number placed in re-\nprevailed. Women have been integrated into\nserve to produce approximately 40 percent of\nall Regular Forces on a permanent basis.\npeak wartime output and other special tools\nPeacetime national conscription, effective 1\nare in storage; a list of jobs to be draft ex-\nJanuary 1949, was introduced to meet de-\nempt has been prepared.\nmands for a continuous reserve to be immedi-\n(5) Overseas bases in strategic areas and\nately available in an emergency, but failure\non important lines of communications, most\nof recruiting to provide needed numbers for\nof them long held by the UK, are not being\nthe army and air force was a signal concomi-\nabandoned by the military. The ring of bases\ntant. Under this measure conscripts from\naround Eurasia, extending from Gibraltar\nthe age bracket 18-26 will train under and\nthrough the Mediterranean Sea and Indian\nserve with the Regular forces for 18 months\nOcean to Hong Kong-enlarged by additions\nand then be discharged to four years obligated\nin Cyrenaica-is an irreplaceable asset in Brit-\npart-time service in auxiliary or reserve or-\nish strategic planning. The retention, main-\nganizations. A dissenting opinion holds that\ntenance, and development (if need be) of these\nthe needs of the regular forces should be met\nbases are not seriously questioned in the UK,\nby volunteers, while conscripts should serve\nand they are freely available for US use.\nonly six months for basic training and not\nbe used to fulfill current military obligations.\nC. To Develop Ties with Other States Likely\nto Add to the Security Potential of the UK.\n(4) Mobilization planning marked time un-\ntil the Berlin blockade was established; the\n(1) Close collaboration with, and reliance\nsituation now is as follows:\non, the US forces is a basic postwar British\npolicy which has grown out of (a) Britain's\n(a) Navy: (See page 88.)\ninability to secure by itself its far-flung com-\n(b) Army: Mobilization planning began\nmitments, and (b) recognition that the se-\nin the spring of 1948. Requirements of the\ncurity interests of the UK and the US largely\nBritish Army of the Rhine, the Middle East\noverlap. Cooperation is apparent in all fields\nLand Forces, and the UK home base have been\nof military activity: research and develop-\ncompleted, but are subject to periodic revision\nment, staff planning, intelligence, overseas\nwhen checked against available manpower,\nbase organization, and strategic deployments.\nequipment, shipping, and the capacity of the\nThe British desire to maintain the Combined\nmobilization machinery. Indications are\nChiefs-of-Staff organization in Washington\nthat equipment shortages would be the major\nand to promote the standardization of equip-\ndifficulty in reaching planned strengths, and\nment. In event of war, the British military\nthat financial considerations will not permit\nexpect to rely heavily on US. industrial\nthe steps necessary to rectify this situation.\nstrength.\n(c) Air Force: Plans are complete and de-\n(2) Disappointed in the prospects of col-\ntailed for a very rapid expansion of Fighter\nlective security through the United Nations,\nSECRE"
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