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Arnulfo Arias' recent line is that he is opposed to political intrigue and fully
subscribes to the electoral process. There is, however, no reason to believe that such
statements reflect his real views; and his mere presence in Panama keeps alive the possi-
bility, however remote at the moment, of a sudden coup that would, by giving him con-
trol of external policy, revive many of the vexed problems he posed for the US through
the months preceding his ouster. There are two principal obstacles in the path
of such a coup: (1) Chief of Police José A. Remón, whose position in the Panamanian
political framework will be discussed below (in the chapter on the Police Force) and
(2) the not inconsiderable personal influence of Arnulfo's elder brother, Harmodio Arias.
Reports now current in Panama state that Harmodio Arias, before throwing his
support to the National Democratic Front in the coming elections, promised his support
to Arnulfo in the 1952 elections. Harmodio is reported to have urged his brother to
run for President in 1948 SO as to keep his name before the public, preparing himself to
accept defeat with good grace. Harmodio has also reportedly urged his brother to
assume certain pro-US attitudes in the hope that by 1952 the US will forget his one-time
Nazi leanings and not oppose his re-election.
Arias' popularity would probably assure him a majority in the 1948 elections if he
were to have the support of his brother Harmodio. Without his brother's support, he is
unlikely to win. Diaz, however, has the handicap of age and the further handicap of
colorlessness, and as spokesman for the party that must explain the recent defense-sites
negotiations to a suspicious, increasingly nationalistic electorate, his campaign must
proceed uphill. Fabrega, the candidate of the Revolutionary Party, will appeal for votes
in terms indistinguishable from Diaz', save that he will be free to criticize (and will not
be called upon to justify) the involutions of Panamanian policy on the defense-sites
issue. The candidate of the National Democratic Front will probably have the support
of Panama's leading newspapers and radio stations. He will also have the added advan-
tage of being free to attack the defense-sites negotiations of Jiménez and, at the same
time, claim credit for the popular domestic policies of the Administration.
Insofar as the choice is narrowed to Diaz, Fabrega, and Vallarino (the probable
candidate of the National Democratic Front), the US will have no paramount interest
at stake in the election. If, on the other hand, Arias, as is expected, offers himself as a
candidate, the elections would assume great importance from the US point of view. As
a democratically elected President, able to claim the support of the majority of
Panamanians, Arias would be even more dangerous than as a self-appointed dictator.
Regardless of any protestations he might make in the course of the campaign, he could,
on assuming office, be expected to oppose various US policies and to miss no opportunity
to forward (along with his own interests) the interests of groups or individuals opposed
to the position of the US' dominant position in the Caribbean.
I-11
SECRE
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"ocrText": "Arnulfo Arias' recent line is that he is opposed to political intrigue and fully\nsubscribes to the electoral process. There is, however, no reason to believe that such\nstatements reflect his real views; and his mere presence in Panama keeps alive the possi-\nbility, however remote at the moment, of a sudden coup that would, by giving him con-\ntrol of external policy, revive many of the vexed problems he posed for the US through\nthe months preceding his ouster. There are two principal obstacles in the path\nof such a coup: (1) Chief of Police José A. Remón, whose position in the Panamanian\npolitical framework will be discussed below (in the chapter on the Police Force) and\n(2) the not inconsiderable personal influence of Arnulfo's elder brother, Harmodio Arias.\nReports now current in Panama state that Harmodio Arias, before throwing his\nsupport to the National Democratic Front in the coming elections, promised his support\nto Arnulfo in the 1952 elections. Harmodio is reported to have urged his brother to\nrun for President in 1948 SO as to keep his name before the public, preparing himself to\naccept defeat with good grace. Harmodio has also reportedly urged his brother to\nassume certain pro-US attitudes in the hope that by 1952 the US will forget his one-time\nNazi leanings and not oppose his re-election.\nArias' popularity would probably assure him a majority in the 1948 elections if he\nwere to have the support of his brother Harmodio. Without his brother's support, he is\nunlikely to win. Diaz, however, has the handicap of age and the further handicap of\ncolorlessness, and as spokesman for the party that must explain the recent defense-sites\nnegotiations to a suspicious, increasingly nationalistic electorate, his campaign must\nproceed uphill. Fabrega, the candidate of the Revolutionary Party, will appeal for votes\nin terms indistinguishable from Diaz', save that he will be free to criticize (and will not\nbe called upon to justify) the involutions of Panamanian policy on the defense-sites\nissue. The candidate of the National Democratic Front will probably have the support\nof Panama's leading newspapers and radio stations. He will also have the added advan-\ntage of being free to attack the defense-sites negotiations of Jiménez and, at the same\ntime, claim credit for the popular domestic policies of the Administration.\nInsofar as the choice is narrowed to Diaz, Fabrega, and Vallarino (the probable\ncandidate of the National Democratic Front), the US will have no paramount interest\nat stake in the election. If, on the other hand, Arias, as is expected, offers himself as a\ncandidate, the elections would assume great importance from the US point of view. As\na democratically elected President, able to claim the support of the majority of\nPanamanians, Arias would be even more dangerous than as a self-appointed dictator.\nRegardless of any protestations he might make in the course of the campaign, he could,\non assuming office, be expected to oppose various US policies and to miss no opportunity\nto forward (along with his own interests) the interests of groups or individuals opposed\nto the position of the US' dominant position in the Caribbean.\nI-11\nSECRE"
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