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SECTION VI PRESENCE OF SABOTAGE ELEMENTS IN PANAMA At the present time, the existence of considerable sabotage elements within the Republic of Panama constitutes the most important factor tending to jeopardize the security of the Panama Canal, and through it, that of the US. The USSR, whether alone or assisted by satellite or conquered nations, is the only present potential threat to the US. It is also the only potential threat to Panama, since, in view of the strategic necessities arising out of the presence of the Canal in its territory and of existing treaty obligations, a threat to the US is also a threat to Panama. In the event of a decision by the USSR to begin hostile operations against the US, concurrent hostile operations can be expected both against the Canal and against the Republic of Panama. In the event of such hostilities, USSR activities in Panama will, it is expected, take the form of an extensive sabotage and subversive campaign. This action might possibly be coupled with a limited submarine campaign, and hit-and-run attacks by air forces operating from either ocean. Within the confines of the Republic of Panama, it is estimated that the USSR's sabotage operations will be divided into two distinct fields: (1) sabotage activities aris- ing out of control of organized labor, which will, by promoting strikes, slow-downs, and sit-downs, seek to impair directly transportation, political stability, and public utilities; and, only by indirection, the operation of the Canal; and (2) sabotage activities against US naval, military, and air establishments within the Republic and against certain facilities related to the operation of the Canal (examples are the Gatun Spillway and the Madden Dam) designed to disrupt directly the functioning of the Canal as an artery of transportation. It cannot be doubted that Soviet agents can filter into the Republic of Panama for the purpose of promoting both types of sabotage. Furthermore, the Soviets can count, for local aid, on the well organized and disciplined management of the People's Party, which is the Communist Party of Panama. This group, not large numerically, owes its power to the fact that it is the directing force behind the Syndical Federation of Workers of Panama, an organization representing some eighteen unions in the Republic (it claims some 20,000 members, but 10,000 is believed to be a more accurate figure). Celso Solano, the Secretary General of the People's Party, is the Number One Communist of the Republic. At present he is known to take orders from Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the founder and president of the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). It is estimated, however, that were Lombardo Toledano, in the event of developments within Mexico, compelled to adhere to a national line as distinct from directives from Moscow, Solano would remain loyal to Moscow, and would do everything in his power to promote whatever objectives Moscow might dictate. Local 713 of the United Public Workers of America, CIO, which has about 7,000 dues-paying members among the 32,000 government employees in the Canal Zone, is an VI-1 SECRE

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "SECTION VI\nPRESENCE OF SABOTAGE ELEMENTS IN PANAMA\nAt the present time, the existence of considerable sabotage elements within the\nRepublic of Panama constitutes the most important factor tending to jeopardize the\nsecurity of the Panama Canal, and through it, that of the US. The USSR, whether alone\nor assisted by satellite or conquered nations, is the only present potential threat to the\nUS. It is also the only potential threat to Panama, since, in view of the strategic\nnecessities arising out of the presence of the Canal in its territory and of existing treaty\nobligations, a threat to the US is also a threat to Panama. In the event of a decision\nby the USSR to begin hostile operations against the US, concurrent hostile operations\ncan be expected both against the Canal and against the Republic of Panama. In the\nevent of such hostilities, USSR activities in Panama will, it is expected, take the form of\nan extensive sabotage and subversive campaign. This action might possibly be coupled\nwith a limited submarine campaign, and hit-and-run attacks by air forces operating\nfrom either ocean.\nWithin the confines of the Republic of Panama, it is estimated that the USSR's\nsabotage operations will be divided into two distinct fields: (1) sabotage activities aris-\ning out of control of organized labor, which will, by promoting strikes, slow-downs, and\nsit-downs, seek to impair directly transportation, political stability, and public utilities;\nand, only by indirection, the operation of the Canal; and (2) sabotage activities against\nUS naval, military, and air establishments within the Republic and against certain\nfacilities related to the operation of the Canal (examples are the Gatun Spillway and\nthe Madden Dam) designed to disrupt directly the functioning of the Canal as an\nartery of transportation.\nIt cannot be doubted that Soviet agents can filter into the Republic of Panama\nfor the purpose of promoting both types of sabotage. Furthermore, the Soviets can\ncount, for local aid, on the well organized and disciplined management of the People's\nParty, which is the Communist Party of Panama. This group, not large numerically,\nowes its power to the fact that it is the directing force behind the Syndical Federation\nof Workers of Panama, an organization representing some eighteen unions in the\nRepublic (it claims some 20,000 members, but 10,000 is believed to be a more accurate\nfigure). Celso Solano, the Secretary General of the People's Party, is the Number\nOne Communist of the Republic. At present he is known to take orders from Vicente\nLombardo Toledano, the founder and president of the Confederation of Latin American\nWorkers (CTAL). It is estimated, however, that were Lombardo Toledano, in the event\nof developments within Mexico, compelled to adhere to a national line as distinct from\ndirectives from Moscow, Solano would remain loyal to Moscow, and would do everything\nin his power to promote whatever objectives Moscow might dictate.\nLocal 713 of the United Public Workers of America, CIO, which has about 7,000\ndues-paying members among the 32,000 government employees in the Canal Zone, is an\nVI-1\nSECRE"
}