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2. NON-COMMUNIST. Sabotage agencies and possibilities in Cuba are not restricted to those under Com- munist control-though only these are highly significant from a strategic standpoint. The terroristic organizations mentioned in Chapter I, page frequently resort to sabotage to further their political, criminal or economic purposes. Since 1930 many Cubans, as students or revolutionists, have mastered the techniques of making and using bombs, burning canefields, or disrupting transportation. The resort to malicious violence is a common measure by which individuals or groups attempt to attain their ends. Few months go by in Cuba without the bombing of a store or plant or the as- sassination of some business or political leader who has incurred the enmity of some individual or group. Most of this is unimportant to the US while, as at present, the majority of Cubans are sympathetic to US aims, but the propensity to violent action and the existence of secret groups devoted to such activities increase the sabotage po- tential in the country by providing a reservoir of experienced saboteurs and can, from this standpoint, be dangerous to US interests. As a protection against extensive sabotage, whether by Communists or non-Com- munists, stands the Cuban Army, which-under its present Chief of Staff General Pérez Dámera-appears able to control the situation and is increasingly aware of the dangers involved. Although General Pérez appears to be more concerned with Com- munistic activity than with the terroristic acts of peripheral members of the party in power, the increasing authority he has assumed (since late 1947) and the high morale and discipline of the army are strong factors tending to contain and control the opera- tions of the various sabotage agencies existing in Cuba. It is estimated that once Cuba and the US are allied in a common war effort, the present Cuban Army would need very little help from the US in controlling the sabotage efforts made in that country. It is also estimated, however, that in spite of awareness of this danger on the part of the present Cuban Army command the period prior to open hostilities, though somewhat less impor- tant from a strategic standpoint, presents greater sabotage opportunities to subversive agencies than the war period itself. willds gelfillost anothia 14

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    "ocrText": "2. NON-COMMUNIST.\nSabotage agencies and possibilities in Cuba are not restricted to those under Com-\nmunist control-though only these are highly significant from a strategic standpoint.\nThe terroristic organizations mentioned in Chapter I, page frequently resort to\nsabotage to further their political, criminal or economic purposes. Since 1930 many\nCubans, as students or revolutionists, have mastered the techniques of making and\nusing bombs, burning canefields, or disrupting transportation. The resort to malicious\nviolence is a common measure by which individuals or groups attempt to attain their\nends. Few months go by in Cuba without the bombing of a store or plant or the as-\nsassination of some business or political leader who has incurred the enmity of some\nindividual or group. Most of this is unimportant to the US while, as at present, the\nmajority of Cubans are sympathetic to US aims, but the propensity to violent action\nand the existence of secret groups devoted to such activities increase the sabotage po-\ntential in the country by providing a reservoir of experienced saboteurs and can, from\nthis standpoint, be dangerous to US interests.\nAs a protection against extensive sabotage, whether by Communists or non-Com-\nmunists, stands the Cuban Army, which-under its present Chief of Staff General\nPérez Dámera-appears able to control the situation and is increasingly aware of the\ndangers involved. Although General Pérez appears to be more concerned with Com-\nmunistic activity than with the terroristic acts of peripheral members of the party in\npower, the increasing authority he has assumed (since late 1947) and the high morale\nand discipline of the army are strong factors tending to contain and control the opera-\ntions of the various sabotage agencies existing in Cuba. It is estimated that once Cuba\nand the US are allied in a common war effort, the present Cuban Army would need very\nlittle help from the US in controlling the sabotage efforts made in that country. It is also\nestimated, however, that in spite of awareness of this danger on the part of the present\nCuban Army command the period prior to open hostilities, though somewhat less impor-\ntant from a strategic standpoint, presents greater sabotage opportunities to subversive\nagencies than the war period itself.\nwillds\ngelfillost\nanothia\n14"
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