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{
    "localId": "486500592",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
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    "id": "486500592",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 23,
            "logicalDate": "1948-12-23",
            "month": 12,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
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{
    "seq": 23,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-023.tif",
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    "ocrText": "Sugar will remain \"king\" for some time to come in Cuba despite restrictions on\nimports by the major sugar-producing countries. Natural advantages plus modern\ntechnology still enable Cuba to compete effectively in world markets. The US Sugar\nAct of 1948 gives Cuba the largest quotas granted any non-US producer and Cuba now\nsupplies approximately 42 percent of US ordinary requirements, or about three million\ntons. Although this is a severe cut from the 5.725 million tons sold the US in 1947,\nthe remaining portion of the 1948 bumper crop (6.7 million tons) will probably be pur-\nchased with US dollars under the Economic Cooperation Administration or otherwise.\nAlthough Cuban modern thinking agrees with the Spanish colonial tradition in\nrejecting laissez faire and accepting the authority of the state as absolute in all fields,\nsystematic government control of the economy has been even less pronounced in Cuba\nthan in the US. The 1940 Cuban constitution establishes the norms for centralized\nand systematic control of economic life by government. To date, however, specific\nlegislation has been largely limited to efforts to protect Cuban labor and capital from\nforeign competition, and business operations have been relatively free of direct govern-\nment controls and taxation. Instead, the major industries-sugar, tobacco, and cof-\nfee-have evolved a system of joint industry-government control boards that implement\nthe terms of international agreements negotiated by the government on behalf of the\nproducers of these commodities. In the case of sugar, a control board known as the\nCuban Institute for Stabilization of Sugar apportions production quotas among the\nCuban producers, acts as agent for global sales of Cuban production, and supervises the\nfixing of wage rates in relation to sugar prices. In the case of tobacco, the board\nattempts to stabilize production and farmer income by buying and storing tobacco when\nforeign markets decline. The object of the coffee board is to stimulate domestic produc-\ntion to meet domestic demand, importing and distributing foreign coffee only in the\namount necessary to cover deficiencies of local production.\nDespite the present nature of these control boards, the acceptance by Cubans of a\nlegal and social philosophy that recognizes the right of the state to seize, operate, and\ncontrol the means of production whenever considered necessary for the general welfare\nrepresents, because at any time it can be put into practice, a constant threat to US\ncommercial interests in Cuba and is a source of vexation in their activities. This\ntheory of economic statism also creates difficulties for any Cuban government that\ndesires to encourage development of national resources. Foreign private capital is\nnecessary to Cuba if its full potentialities for the production of wealth are to be realized.\nAnd venture capital cannot be attracted without guarantees that would run counter to\nexisting economic policies. As a matter of practical politics, pressure organized by\nproponents of Cubanidad constitutes an almost insuperable obstacle to any Cuban gov-\nernment that would seek to insure a favorable climate for foreign investment capital.\nMeanwhile, Cuban capital is not sufficiently concentrated to finance major projects,\nand Cuban disinclination to enter corporate businesses in Cuba in the role of minority\ninterests causes available Cuban capital to flow principally into local real estate or\nforeign investments.\n16"
}