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this production quota to (a) the amount of sugar it could sell in the US plus (b) the amount of sugar it could market in other countries in accordance with international agreements. Three international sugar arrangements were tried with varying success between 1928 and 1942, the last being the 1937 International Sugar Agreement. Mean- while Cuba's position in the US market was improved by lower tariffs and favorable quota treatment. World War II caused the suspension of all previous sugar quota arrangements, and Cuba agreed to sell to the US its entire crop. This arrangement was repeated during six years (1942-47) production restrictions were removed, and the total crop reached an all-time high. By the 1948 Sugar Act the US prewar quota system was reimposed on Cuban sugar. US producers-continental and non-continental-as well as the Philippines were given tonnage quotas greater than their previously demonstrated capacity to pro- duce. At the same time, Cuba was given a quota of 28.6 percent of estimated US con- sumption, plus a share of the amount by which other areas may fail to meet their quotas. In effect, Cuba was given permission to market larger amounts of sugar in the US if US consumption estimates should be adjusted upward or if, as appeared likely, other producers should not fill their quotas. Cuba's 1948 share of the US domestic market amounts to 2.8 million tons as compared to 5.7 million tons it sold the US in 1947. While a drastic readjustment might have been involved, Cuba has been able to place a total of 5.6 million tons this year by virtue of sales to the US Government for use in Europe (1.3 million tons) and direct sales to other nations (1.5 million tons). Cuban production in 1948, however, was greater than in 1947 SO that an unsold surplus will be carried over to 1949. Although ECA plans call for continued heavy sugar purchases from the Western Hemisphere, Cuba's task of selling future crops may become increas- ingly difficult unless new limitations of production are placed in effect. (A detailed statistical study of Cuba's foreign trade and Cuba's sugar sales to the US which constitute so important a factor in over-all Cuban economic relations will be found in Appendix D.) f. Transportation. Transportation within Cuba is provided by air, railway, and highways. The 8,700 miles of Cuban railways include both common carriers and lines maintained by sugar centrales to provide connections with ports. The largest of 22 public-service rail- ways is the British-owned United Railways, which is in poor financial and physical state. (It lost nearly six million dollars in 1946.) The other railways are owned by Cuban and US capitalists. Five of the nine largest railways showed losses for the latest fiscal year reported. Bus and truck lines, making use of the central highway system, transport an increasing share of passengers and freight, though most of the sugar still moves to port by rail. An increase in rail rates was allowed in March 1947 to apply to passengers and certain categories of freight. Results have not been reported yet, but standards of service and equipment on most railways in Cuba are so poor as to require more extensive changes than even the higher rates will permit. Expansion of highway construction by the state, already initiated by the government, seems the only practical solution at present to Cuba's problem of inadequate internal transportation facilities. 22

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    "ocrText": "this production quota to (a) the amount of sugar it could sell in the US plus (b) the\namount of sugar it could market in other countries in accordance with international\nagreements. Three international sugar arrangements were tried with varying success\nbetween 1928 and 1942, the last being the 1937 International Sugar Agreement. Mean-\nwhile Cuba's position in the US market was improved by lower tariffs and favorable\nquota treatment. World War II caused the suspension of all previous sugar quota\narrangements, and Cuba agreed to sell to the US its entire crop. This arrangement was\nrepeated during six years (1942-47) production restrictions were removed, and the\ntotal crop reached an all-time high.\nBy the 1948 Sugar Act the US prewar quota system was reimposed on Cuban\nsugar. US producers-continental and non-continental-as well as the Philippines\nwere given tonnage quotas greater than their previously demonstrated capacity to pro-\nduce. At the same time, Cuba was given a quota of 28.6 percent of estimated US con-\nsumption, plus a share of the amount by which other areas may fail to meet their quotas.\nIn effect, Cuba was given permission to market larger amounts of sugar in the US if\nUS consumption estimates should be adjusted upward or if, as appeared likely, other\nproducers should not fill their quotas. Cuba's 1948 share of the US domestic market\namounts to 2.8 million tons as compared to 5.7 million tons it sold the US in 1947.\nWhile a drastic readjustment might have been involved, Cuba has been able to place a\ntotal of 5.6 million tons this year by virtue of sales to the US Government for use in\nEurope (1.3 million tons) and direct sales to other nations (1.5 million tons). Cuban\nproduction in 1948, however, was greater than in 1947 SO that an unsold surplus will be\ncarried over to 1949. Although ECA plans call for continued heavy sugar purchases\nfrom the Western Hemisphere, Cuba's task of selling future crops may become increas-\ningly difficult unless new limitations of production are placed in effect.\n(A detailed statistical study of Cuba's foreign trade and Cuba's sugar sales to\nthe US which constitute so important a factor in over-all Cuban economic relations will\nbe found in Appendix D.)\nf. Transportation.\nTransportation within Cuba is provided by air, railway, and highways. The\n8,700 miles of Cuban railways include both common carriers and lines maintained by\nsugar centrales to provide connections with ports. The largest of 22 public-service rail-\nways is the British-owned United Railways, which is in poor financial and physical\nstate. (It lost nearly six million dollars in 1946.) The other railways are owned by\nCuban and US capitalists. Five of the nine largest railways showed losses for the latest\nfiscal year reported. Bus and truck lines, making use of the central highway system,\ntransport an increasing share of passengers and freight, though most of the sugar still\nmoves to port by rail. An increase in rail rates was allowed in March 1947 to apply to\npassengers and certain categories of freight. Results have not been reported yet, but\nstandards of service and equipment on most railways in Cuba are so poor as to require\nmore extensive changes than even the higher rates will permit. Expansion of highway\nconstruction by the state, already initiated by the government, seems the only practical\nsolution at present to Cuba's problem of inadequate internal transportation facilities.\n22"
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