Ask the Scholar
Page 33 of 56
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
2.
OPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.
Despite the anti-US aspects of Cuban policy mentioned above, Cuba would align
itself solidly with the US in case of war with any possible group of states led by the
USSR. It will also support the US position in any serious situation short of war. This
attitude is determined by Cuba's basic economic interests, its location, and the convic-
tions of the vast majority of its people. The Communist minority cannot maneuver
pro-Cuban nationalists, who in foreign policy are its logical allies, into a position where
they would support the USSR against the US, though there are many intermediate
positions where anti-US policies would be acceptable as "the legitimate defense of Cuban
interests."
Cuba, next to the special US economic ties which make possible its prosperity, is
most interested in developing bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other American
states. It is one of the leaders in the inter-American movement because it thus gains
a measure of international prestige and develops a counterbalance to complete depend-
ence on the US. The United Nations has had little practical effect on Cuba but serves
as a useful forum before which to ventilate Cuban protestations of equality and inde-
pendence vis-à-vis the US. Cuba is certain to remain an active participant in the UN;
but it will continue to rely for its security upon the armed forces of the US.
Spain, because of the traditional and cultural ties of Hispanidad, is the only nation
that could become a strong competitor with the US and other American states for
Cuba's sympathy. Close ties are, however, at present impossible because of the con-
tempt which most Cubans have for the Franco regime. Spanish Republican intellec-
tuals who are refugees in Cuba maintain the prestige of Spanish culture although, at
the same time, they reinforce the sentiment against Franco and dictators in general.
The appeal of Franco-led Hispanidad is thus limited to a minority composed of the
wealthy and the ultra-montane. This group, although anti-US during World War II,
now favors the US because of its present attitude toward the USSR.
Cuba's opposition to "dictators" also influences its position within Caribbean
balance-of-power alignments. Both the present Cuban Government and a majority of
public opinion are opposed to the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Though
less interested in Central America, Cubans also oppose Somoza of Nicaragua and Carias
of Honduras. Their sympathies, less strong than their antipathies, are with the present
governments of Venezuela, Guatemala, and Haiti. In the event that the present divi-
sion within the Caribbean area continues, Cubans can be expected to maintain their
hostile attitude toward the present governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
and Honduras and to support jointly with Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala con-
spiratorial and propaganda activities designed to overthrow the "dictatorships" and
embarrass their leaders. To date no formal alliances or agreements have been made to
implement this policy which will probably be continued on the basis of informal under-
standings among the leaders of the "democracies."
Cuban aversion to "dictators" also makes it difficult for Argentina to gain converts
in Cuba to its "third position," though Cuban anti-US ultra-nationalistic sectors would
otherwise be attracted to such an idea. To the highly individualistic and emotional
26
Page data
- Page
- 33
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- e8b4889c82522bac
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486500592
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486500592",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"imageCount": 56,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486500592",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486500592",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba, Situation Report 29",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-001.tif",
"imageCount": 56,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486500592",
"naId": 486500592,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 23,
"logicalDate": "1948-12-23",
"month": 12,
"year": 1948
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 33,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875511/875511-02-033.tif",
"mediaId": "e8b4889c82522bac",
"ocrText": "2.\nOPERATION OF PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.\nDespite the anti-US aspects of Cuban policy mentioned above, Cuba would align\nitself solidly with the US in case of war with any possible group of states led by the\nUSSR. It will also support the US position in any serious situation short of war. This\nattitude is determined by Cuba's basic economic interests, its location, and the convic-\ntions of the vast majority of its people. The Communist minority cannot maneuver\npro-Cuban nationalists, who in foreign policy are its logical allies, into a position where\nthey would support the USSR against the US, though there are many intermediate\npositions where anti-US policies would be acceptable as \"the legitimate defense of Cuban\ninterests.\"\nCuba, next to the special US economic ties which make possible its prosperity, is\nmost interested in developing bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with other American\nstates. It is one of the leaders in the inter-American movement because it thus gains\na measure of international prestige and develops a counterbalance to complete depend-\nence on the US. The United Nations has had little practical effect on Cuba but serves\nas a useful forum before which to ventilate Cuban protestations of equality and inde-\npendence vis-à-vis the US. Cuba is certain to remain an active participant in the UN;\nbut it will continue to rely for its security upon the armed forces of the US.\nSpain, because of the traditional and cultural ties of Hispanidad, is the only nation\nthat could become a strong competitor with the US and other American states for\nCuba's sympathy. Close ties are, however, at present impossible because of the con-\ntempt which most Cubans have for the Franco regime. Spanish Republican intellec-\ntuals who are refugees in Cuba maintain the prestige of Spanish culture although, at\nthe same time, they reinforce the sentiment against Franco and dictators in general.\nThe appeal of Franco-led Hispanidad is thus limited to a minority composed of the\nwealthy and the ultra-montane. This group, although anti-US during World War II,\nnow favors the US because of its present attitude toward the USSR.\nCuba's opposition to \"dictators\" also influences its position within Caribbean\nbalance-of-power alignments. Both the present Cuban Government and a majority of\npublic opinion are opposed to the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Though\nless interested in Central America, Cubans also oppose Somoza of Nicaragua and Carias\nof Honduras. Their sympathies, less strong than their antipathies, are with the present\ngovernments of Venezuela, Guatemala, and Haiti. In the event that the present divi-\nsion within the Caribbean area continues, Cubans can be expected to maintain their\nhostile attitude toward the present governments of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,\nand Honduras and to support jointly with Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Guatemala con-\nspiratorial and propaganda activities designed to overthrow the \"dictatorships\" and\nembarrass their leaders. To date no formal alliances or agreements have been made to\nimplement this policy which will probably be continued on the basis of informal under-\nstandings among the leaders of the \"democracies.\"\nCuban aversion to \"dictators\" also makes it difficult for Argentina to gain converts\nin Cuba to its \"third position,\" though Cuban anti-US ultra-nationalistic sectors would\notherwise be attracted to such an idea. To the highly individualistic and emotional\n26"
}