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a. Army.
The ground forces of the Cuban Army include 1,392 officers and 14,200 enlisted
men - a total of 15,592 personnel. There are one infantry regiment, one artillery regi-
ment, and seven "rural guard" cavalry regiments. The first two regiments are known
in Cuba as the "regular army" and are stationed in Havana together with the General
Staff and the specialized services - constituting together 26 percent of the army ground
forces. These units, stationed as they are in the center of the Cuban political power,
constitute the nexus between the military and the civilian establishment and exert a
pervasive influence over the civilian political scene. The seven "rural guard" regiments
are stationed in small detachments throughout the interior of the Republic where they
perform the functions of rural police. Only in Santiago, Cuba's second city, is there any
large unit of the "rural guard" in one garrison.
The Havana-stationed "regular army" is considered to be good, the "rural
guard" regiments inferior. The quality and training of Cuban Army personnel in
general are adequate. Equipment and armament are obsolescent and insufficient for
purposes of combat againts a US or European army of comparable size, but are adequate
for the police and political functions of the Cuban Army. Maintenance of equipment
and training in its use are sufficient. Present armament includes 20 light tanks (12
M3A1), 23 Schneider 75's (1909 Model), 88-mm. anti-aircraft guns, 6 antiquated field
guns, and 4 15-cm. Ordónez Coast Defense guns. Infantrymen and rural guards are
normally equipped with Springfield rifles and/or Colt automatics of which there is an
ample supply. Artillery and special service units are also equipped with Colts.
In spite of the traditional political pattern of the Cuban Army, the present
Chief of Staff has endeavored to make the army a non-political force and has empha-
sized law enforcement functions. In line with this policy, a large proportion of the
officers have received US training, and a genuine attempt has been made to instill
professional pride throughout the army. Graft has been reduced. It is estimated,
however, that these disciplinary achievements are temporary. The army's political
potential is so high that despite several years of reform, the army will undoubtedly be
drawn into politics. President-elect Prío is already reported to be looking about for a
new Chief of Staff who can the better assure him of army support.
Cuban army officers and enlisted men are drawn primarily from the rural
regions of Cuba where the peasants consider the army a career more promising than
any they could expect at home. Though one-year enlistments are legally possible,
most enlistments are for longer periods, and there is a high proportion of re-enlistment.
As a result, a majority of the army are veterans with 5 to 20 years service. Most of the
officers are former enlisted men who obtained their present rank as a result of the
reorganization of the army that stemmed from the 1933 revolution. Both officers and
men, consequently, come from the same general social stratum. In contrast to other
Latin American republics, in Cuba few of the upper classes now elect army careers.
Since the total army strength has been reduced since 1943, the year of peak war
strength, the present army - except for officers named by the Grau regime and replace-
ments in the ranks - is substantially the army General Batista turned over to his
30
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"ocrText": "a. Army.\nThe ground forces of the Cuban Army include 1,392 officers and 14,200 enlisted\nmen - a total of 15,592 personnel. There are one infantry regiment, one artillery regi-\nment, and seven \"rural guard\" cavalry regiments. The first two regiments are known\nin Cuba as the \"regular army\" and are stationed in Havana together with the General\nStaff and the specialized services - constituting together 26 percent of the army ground\nforces. These units, stationed as they are in the center of the Cuban political power,\nconstitute the nexus between the military and the civilian establishment and exert a\npervasive influence over the civilian political scene. The seven \"rural guard\" regiments\nare stationed in small detachments throughout the interior of the Republic where they\nperform the functions of rural police. Only in Santiago, Cuba's second city, is there any\nlarge unit of the \"rural guard\" in one garrison.\nThe Havana-stationed \"regular army\" is considered to be good, the \"rural\nguard\" regiments inferior. The quality and training of Cuban Army personnel in\ngeneral are adequate. Equipment and armament are obsolescent and insufficient for\npurposes of combat againts a US or European army of comparable size, but are adequate\nfor the police and political functions of the Cuban Army. Maintenance of equipment\nand training in its use are sufficient. Present armament includes 20 light tanks (12\nM3A1), 23 Schneider 75's (1909 Model), 88-mm. anti-aircraft guns, 6 antiquated field\nguns, and 4 15-cm. Ordónez Coast Defense guns. Infantrymen and rural guards are\nnormally equipped with Springfield rifles and/or Colt automatics of which there is an\nample supply. Artillery and special service units are also equipped with Colts.\nIn spite of the traditional political pattern of the Cuban Army, the present\nChief of Staff has endeavored to make the army a non-political force and has empha-\nsized law enforcement functions. In line with this policy, a large proportion of the\nofficers have received US training, and a genuine attempt has been made to instill\nprofessional pride throughout the army. Graft has been reduced. It is estimated,\nhowever, that these disciplinary achievements are temporary. The army's political\npotential is so high that despite several years of reform, the army will undoubtedly be\ndrawn into politics. President-elect Prío is already reported to be looking about for a\nnew Chief of Staff who can the better assure him of army support.\nCuban army officers and enlisted men are drawn primarily from the rural\nregions of Cuba where the peasants consider the army a career more promising than\nany they could expect at home. Though one-year enlistments are legally possible,\nmost enlistments are for longer periods, and there is a high proportion of re-enlistment.\nAs a result, a majority of the army are veterans with 5 to 20 years service. Most of the\nofficers are former enlisted men who obtained their present rank as a result of the\nreorganization of the army that stemmed from the 1933 revolution. Both officers and\nmen, consequently, come from the same general social stratum. In contrast to other\nLatin American republics, in Cuba few of the upper classes now elect army careers.\nSince the total army strength has been reduced since 1943, the year of peak war\nstrength, the present army - except for officers named by the Grau regime and replace-\nments in the ranks - is substantially the army General Batista turned over to his\n30"
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