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successor in the presidency. Places in the regular army are SO eagerly sought that there
is rather rigorous selection, and new recruits are far superior physically and educa-
tionally to existing personnel.
Training for recruits, as well as for non-commissioned officers and officer
candidates, is given at an army school established at Managua, Havana Province.
This school-apparently well-equipped and well-managed-has a present enrollment
of 76 cadets and over 500 in the other categories. The officer in command, a deserter
from the US Army during World War II, is proving to be an excellent commandant.
Many Cuban officers have taken advantage, at one time or another, of courses in US
Army service schools, and the effect of this training in improved efficiency is noticeable
throughout the Cuban Army.
The air corps of the Cuban Army is relatively less efficient and useful than the
ground forces, though improvement has been noted in the past two years. The air
forces have not, as yet, established the character of the service they may render, in
relation to the ground forces or to the republic at large. They have the double problem
of training personnel and fitting the corps' functions into those regarded as the normal
functions of the ground forces. The present air forces have 446 officers and men
organized into three squadrons (fighter, bomber, and maintenance). There is a total
of 72 aircraft of which all but 25 can be classified as training and liaison planes with
little tactical significance by US standards. The 25 include 5 B-25's, 6 P-38's, 1 B-24,
and several B-34's and transport planes. Since the proper role of the air corps in the
Cuban scene has not been determined, the relative value to Cuba of different types of
planes cannot be estimated. Although a proposed US Air Mission will aid greatly in
technical proficiency, neither it nor any foreign air mission can be expected to solve for
Cuba the fundamental problem of what an air corps can do for a country where the
military establishment is used primarily for political and police purposes.
b. The National Police.
The national police with a total strength of 7,231 men is second in importance
only to the army with which it is closely associated. The commander of the national
police must be selected by the President from among the senior officers of the army
and occupies, by virtue of his position, a sub-cabinet post. A large proportion of the
personnel are former soldiers. The organization is military in character and is divided
into seven divisions, of which the most important is stationed in the city of Havana.
This division is split into 14 units, each with separate motorized equipment. The other
divisions are stationed in the smaller cities of the interior where their work is supple-
mented by that of local municipal police who have only subordinate authority. The
national police, through their commander, is subject only to the orders of the President
of the Republic.
The national police now includes gangsters, who in the guise of sincere revolu-
tionaries primarily fought the repressive police of Machado and Batista, and use their
present position under the Auténticos to extend immunity or actual protection to male-
factors of all kinds. Recent shooting frays in Havana reveal that gangster rivalries
have thus penetrated the national police, and its members, because of their intimate
31
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"ocrText": "successor in the presidency. Places in the regular army are SO eagerly sought that there\nis rather rigorous selection, and new recruits are far superior physically and educa-\ntionally to existing personnel.\nTraining for recruits, as well as for non-commissioned officers and officer\ncandidates, is given at an army school established at Managua, Havana Province.\nThis school-apparently well-equipped and well-managed-has a present enrollment\nof 76 cadets and over 500 in the other categories. The officer in command, a deserter\nfrom the US Army during World War II, is proving to be an excellent commandant.\nMany Cuban officers have taken advantage, at one time or another, of courses in US\nArmy service schools, and the effect of this training in improved efficiency is noticeable\nthroughout the Cuban Army.\nThe air corps of the Cuban Army is relatively less efficient and useful than the\nground forces, though improvement has been noted in the past two years. The air\nforces have not, as yet, established the character of the service they may render, in\nrelation to the ground forces or to the republic at large. They have the double problem\nof training personnel and fitting the corps' functions into those regarded as the normal\nfunctions of the ground forces. The present air forces have 446 officers and men\norganized into three squadrons (fighter, bomber, and maintenance). There is a total\nof 72 aircraft of which all but 25 can be classified as training and liaison planes with\nlittle tactical significance by US standards. The 25 include 5 B-25's, 6 P-38's, 1 B-24,\nand several B-34's and transport planes. Since the proper role of the air corps in the\nCuban scene has not been determined, the relative value to Cuba of different types of\nplanes cannot be estimated. Although a proposed US Air Mission will aid greatly in\ntechnical proficiency, neither it nor any foreign air mission can be expected to solve for\nCuba the fundamental problem of what an air corps can do for a country where the\nmilitary establishment is used primarily for political and police purposes.\nb. The National Police.\nThe national police with a total strength of 7,231 men is second in importance\nonly to the army with which it is closely associated. The commander of the national\npolice must be selected by the President from among the senior officers of the army\nand occupies, by virtue of his position, a sub-cabinet post. A large proportion of the\npersonnel are former soldiers. The organization is military in character and is divided\ninto seven divisions, of which the most important is stationed in the city of Havana.\nThis division is split into 14 units, each with separate motorized equipment. The other\ndivisions are stationed in the smaller cities of the interior where their work is supple-\nmented by that of local municipal police who have only subordinate authority. The\nnational police, through their commander, is subject only to the orders of the President\nof the Republic.\nThe national police now includes gangsters, who in the guise of sincere revolu-\ntionaries primarily fought the repressive police of Machado and Batista, and use their\npresent position under the Auténticos to extend immunity or actual protection to male-\nfactors of all kinds. Recent shooting frays in Havana reveal that gangster rivalries\nhave thus penetrated the national police, and its members, because of their intimate\n31"
}